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WHEN CONSTITUTIONAL WORLDS 
COLLIDE: RESURRECTING THE 
FRAMERS' BILL OF-RIGHTS AND 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
George C. Thomas III* 
INTRODUCTION 
Different Constitutional Worlds 
For two hundred years, the Supreme Court has been interpreting 
the Bill of Rights. Imagine Chief Justice John Marshall sitting in the 
dim, narrow Supreme Court chambers,1 pondering the interpretation 
of the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process in United States 
v. Burr.2 Aaron Burr was charged with treason for planning to invade 
the Louisiana Territory and create a separate government there.3 To 
help prepare his defense, Burr wanted to see a letter written by 
General James Wilkinson to President Jefferson. In ruling on Burr's 
motion to compel disclosure, Marshall departed from the literal lan­
guage of the Sixth Amendment - which guarantees only the right to 
compel the attendance of witnesses4 - to hold that Burr was entitled 
to compel production of the letter. The distinction between compel-
* Professor of Law and Judge Alexander P. Waugh Sr. Distinguished Scholar, Rutgers, 
Newark. B.S. 1968, University of Tennessee; M.F.A. 1972, J.D. 1975, University of Iowa; 
LL.M. 1982, J.S.D. 1986, Washington University in St. Louis. - Ed. Many people provided 
helpful ideas and feedback - too many to name here. I should, however, acknowledge a few 
special debts. In various conversations, Donald Dripps put the idea squarely in my mind that 
incorporation was "the wrong road taken" in the criminal context and that it might not be 
too late to reverse course. Sherry Colb and Barbara Spillman Schweiger read earlier drafts 
and offered many detailed critiques and suggestions, as well as enthusiastic support. Michael 
Mulligan offered superior research assistance and more. He contributed ideas, phrasing, and 
an ongoing dialogue that sharpened every aspect of the Article. Dean Stuart Deutsch gener­
ously provided a research stipend to support this project. Finally, the editors at the Michigan 
Law Review engaged my ideas in ways that improved the substance and presentation of the 
Article. Though the end product is better because of help from these friends and others, I 
alone am responsible for the defects that remain. 
1 .  By leave of Congress, the Court in those days met in a small room, twenty-four feet 
wide and thirty feet long, located on the first floor of the Capitol. LEONARD BAKER, JOHN 
MARSHALL: A LIFE IN LAW 355-56 (1974). 
2. 25 F. Cas. 30 (D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692D) (Marshall, CJ., sitting as district court 
judge). 
3. For more on the context and eventual resolution of Burr, see Peter Westen, The 
Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 71 (1974). 
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
145 
146 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 100:145 
ling witnesses to attend and compelling witnesses to bring papers with 
them, Marshall wrote, "is too much attenuated to be countenanced in 
the tribunals of a just and humane nation."5 Marshall's view is widely 
regarded as a "sweeping construction to the compulsory process 
clause."6 
Fast forward just over 180 years and imagine Justice John Paul 
Stevens sitting at his desk pondering the interpretation of the right to 
compulsory process in Taylor v. Illinois.7 Taylor subpoenaed two wit­
nesses who would testify to his innocence of the charge of attempted 
murder, but his lawyer failed to include their names on the list of de­
fense witnesses that Illinois law required him to turn over to the 
prosecutor. From a list of sanctions for the lawyer's failure, the state 
trial judge chose the most draconian - he forbade the witnesses from 
testifying. The Court held in an opinion by Stevens that the right to 
compulsory process, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, did not forbid the judge from barrillg the testimony of 
witnesses that might have moved the jury to vote not guilty. 
In 1807, Chief Justice Marshall interpreted the right to compulsory 
process broadly to protect the rights of someone charged with treason 
against our young republic. In 1988, Justice Stevens, one of the 
Rehnquist Court liberals, interpreted the right to compulsory process 
narrowly in a garden variety state felony case. What happened along 
the road between these two decisions? 
One crucial cause of the change in the Court's interpretive theory 
is the doctrine of "incorporation." For almost all of our history, the 
federal government and each of the States operated independently in 
defining, investigating, and prosecuting crime. The Bill of Rights' limi­
tations on government did not apply to the States,8 which were free to 
protect - or not protect - individual liberties as they saw fit. Though 
all the criminal systems in this country drew from the colonial com­
mon law, the federal criminal process was doctrinally a world unto it­
self. It was separate from the worlds of the state processes. 
Then came the Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868 in re­
sponse to the refusal of the Southern States to protect the rights of 
former slaves and Union loyalists. The Fourteenth Amendment gave 
the Court, for the first time, a constitutional device for reviewing state 
law. Its broad, vague language permitted the Court to insist that, at 
least in some limited circumstances,9 the States must honor fundamen-
5. 25 F. Cas. at 35. 
6. Westen, supra note 3, at 101. 
7. 484 U.S. 400 (1988). 
8. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). 
9. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (holding that due process forbids a 
state conviction based on a confession coerced by physical brutality); Powell v. Alabama, 287 
U.S. 45 (1932) (holding that due process requires appointment of counsel in a state capital 
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tal rights. The States could no longer abridge the privileges and im­
munities of citizens, or deny any person due process or equal protec­
tion of the laws. But no one in the Congress or in the ratifying state 
legislatures attempted to present a comprehensive account of privi­
leges and immunities, due process, or equal protection.10 
For decades, the Court sought to articulate a Fourteenth Amend­
ment theory of fundamental rights. Benjamin Cardozo, one of the 
Court's leading thinkers, defined Fourteenth Amendment protections 
to include the "fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie 
at the base of all our civil and political institutions."11 Felix 
Frankfurter and John Marshall Harlan II continued the effort.12 Ulti­
mately, however, the Court abandoned the attempt to build from 
scratch a comprehensive theory of the rights protected by the Four­
teenth Amendment13 and, instead, turned to the Bill of Rights for a 
model. By its own hand, the Court forced the world of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to collide with that of the Bill of Rights. Incorporation 
resulted. 
The Court began the incorporation journey with the First 
Amendment, but it has now incorporated almost the entirety of the 
case where the defendants were ignorant and indigent, and the trial was conducted in a 
frenzy of racial hatred). 
10. Senator Jacob Howard stated that the Fourteenth Amendment.privileges or immu­
nities included all the rights guaranteed in the first eight Bill of Rights amendments plus cer­
tain natural law rights. Howard offered examples of the latter but no definitive account. 
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765-66 (1866). 
1 1 .  Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937) (Cardozo, J . ,  writing for eight mem­
bers of the Court) (quoting Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)). 
12. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 176 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) 
(noting that due process includes "immutable principles . . .  of free government which no 
member of the Union may disregard") (quoting Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389 (1898)); 
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., writing for the Court) (due process 
is the "compendious expression for all those rights which the courts must enforce because 
they are basic to our free society" and which "may not too rhetorically be called eternal veri­
ties"). 
13. The reasons the Court gave up this effort are surely many and complex, and far be­
yond the scope of this Article. One cause worth noting is our heritage of having a written 
Constitution. Our federal government began with a written Constitution, and American 
judges have always been more reluctant than British judges to "uncover" natural law. In 
Bram v .  United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897), for example, the Supreme Court engaged in an 
exhaustive review of the cases dealing with involuntary confessions. Almost all of these cases 
were state and English cases based on c:ommon law, derived from the unwritten English 
"constitution" that has its origin in Lockean notions of natural law. When it came time to 
decide the case before it, however, the Bram Court was careful to note that it was interpret­
ing the Fifth Amendment prohibition of compelling persons to be witnesses against them­
selves. The Court found that this Fifth Amendment provision included the common law 
prohibition against the use of involuntary confessions: "the generic language of the [Fifth] 
Amendment was but a crystallization of the doctrine as to confessions, well settled [in the 
common law] when the Amendment was adopted, and since expressed in the text writers 
and expounded by the adjudications . . . .  " Id. at 543. 
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Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment.14 Most of these rights 
limit the power of government to investigate and prosecute crime. In­
corporation thus caused the world of federal criminal process to col­
lide with the fifty different worlds of state criminal processes. In in­
corporating the criminal procedure guarantees,15 the Court sought to 
provide the benefits of the broad federal protections to state criminal 
defendants. But the Court has never had the appetite to apply the 
provisions to the States as rigorously as it had applied them against the 
federal government. 
Scholars agree that the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have limited 
the scope of criminal procedure guarantees.16 What remains largely 
hidden is the role of incorporation in the steadily diminishing scope of 
the criminal procedure guarantees. And this shrinking scope is not the 
only problem. The Court also has demonstrated a willingness to bend 
precedents to accomplish its goal of facilitating more effective state 
policing. As Donald Dripps puts it, "In the criminal procedure con­
text, the Court rather openly decides cases with minimal respect for 
doctrinal constraints . . . .  [which] has generated an unprincipled and 
inconsistent body of law" filled with "arbitrary distinctions."17 No sat­
isfactory understanding of the constitutional implications of incorpora­
tion exists because almost everyone looks at the phenomenon "post­
collision," ignoring or trivializing what those very different worlds 
looked like before the collision.18 The key to understanding incorpora-
l4. The exceptions are rights that might be considered exotic (the Second Amendment 
right to bear arms; the Third Amendment ban on quartering troops in private homes) or ir­
relevant to ascertaining criminal guilt (bail and grand jury indictment); the Seventh 
Amendment right to a civil jury; the Ninth Amendment reservation of rights to the people. 
15. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (right against double jeopardy); 
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (right to speedy trial); Washington v. Texas, 
388 U.S. 14 (1967) (right to compulsory process to obtain witnesses subpoenaed· by defen­
dants); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right to confront witnesses who testify for the 
prosecution); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (privilege against compelled self incrimina­
tion); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel for indigent defendants 
charged with felonies); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (right against cruel and 
unusual punishments); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (right to exclude evidence found 
in violation of the Fourth Amendment); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (right to public 
trial). 
16. See, e.g., Craig Bradley, The Court's "Two Model" Approach to the Fourth Amend­
ment: Carpe Diem!, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1993); Tracey Maclin, The Decline 
of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 
1258 (1990); Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, A Modest Proposal for the 
Abolition of Custodial Confessions, 68 N.C. L. REV. 69 (1989); Silas J. Wasserstrom, The In­
credible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 257 (1984). 
17. Donald Dripps, Akhi/ Amar on Criminal Procedure and Constitutional Law: "Here I 
Go Down That Wrong Road Again '', 74 N.C. L. REV. 1559, 1559-61 (1996). 
18. Two notable exceptions are Akhil Reed Amar and Donald Dripps. See AKHIL 
REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1998); Dripps, supra note 17. As will be clear in the 
balance of this Article, I think Amar gets the history mostly wrong and often draws unjusti­
fied inferences. I mostly agree with Dripps but offer a more comprehensive historical ac­
count. 
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tion is to look at the two doctrines before they collided. Only then do 
we have a proper background and framework against which to exam­
ine the world in which we find ourselves. 
Return to the 1790s. The States eye the central government, to 
which they have just ceded much of their sovereignty, as a potential 
bully or, worse, as a tyrant. The States look upon the freshly minted 
central government as it looms above them, and it reminds them of 
King George III and Parliament. Evidence of this strong antigovern­
ment attitude can be seen in the intense reaction of some of the States 
to the Alien and Sedition Laws, enacted in 1798. Thomas Jefferson 
predicted a quasi monarchy if those laws were accepted by the citi­
zenry: "(W]e shall immediately see attempted another act of Congress, 
declaring that the President shall continue in office during life, re­
serving to another occasion the transfer of the succession to his heirs, 
and the establishment of the Senate for life!"19 
Eight years earlier, in 1790, many feared precisely that abuse of 
power. The government was· but three years old, and no one knew 
how it might exercise its powers. Because of this fear of the distant, 
unknown government, the Bill of Rights is added in 1791, and the 
States grow more comfortable. They view the Bill of Rights as a wall 
between themselves and the central government. It guarantees free 
expression, forbids a national religion, guarantees a criminal process 
that is difficult to manipulate, and, in the Ninth and Tenth Amend­
ments, specifically reserves rights and powers to the people and the 
States. 
The potential tyrant has been hobbled. The citizens of the States 
are free to criticize the central government, to petition it, and to close 
their doors against its agents. Moreover, the prosecutors and judges of 
the central government can reach the citizens of States only through a 
rigorous process that includes the right to honexcessive bail, to trial by 
juries drawn from the community, to assistance of counsel, and to con­
front accusers who might not be telling the truth. The Supreme Court 
comprehends that the Bill of Rights was meant to limit severely the 
powers of the central government, erecting a formidable wall between 
the citizens and the government. The Court interprets these provisions 
to require federal prosecutors to walk through a narrow gate in the 
wall. The gate is hedged with a series of requirements designed to 
make convictions more difficult to obtain. In the meantime, the States 
remain sovereign, free to conduct their affairs in most criminal matters 
as if the federal government did not exist. 
Time passes. The debate over slavery and state sovereignty erupts 
into the Civil War, wrecking the country's peace and prosperity. Most 
Americans come to realize that too much state sovereignty is as haz-
19. THE VIRGINIA REPORT OF 1799-1800, at xiii (J.W. Randolph ed., 1850). 
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ardous as too little. Many begin to view the States, which they once 
thought of as responsive and protective of rights, with suspicion, par­
ticularly in their treatment of the freed slaves. The Fourteenth 
Amendment arrives with its explicit, though vague, limitations on state 
power. It takes the Court many years, but eventually it turns to the 
Bill of Rights to understand what rights the Fourteenth Amendment 
should protect from state intrusion. 
Now the Bill of Rights applies to the States, through the funda­
mental rights lens that is the Fourteenth Amendment, and the States 
struggle under this projection. Litigation explodes and the fundamen­
tal rights versions of the Bill of Rights evolve through thousands of in­
terpretations. We have been living with incorporation so long that any 
other system seems unthinkable. Of course the States should have to 
provide the same right to counsel or the same freedom of speech as 
the federal government, shouldn't they? 
But there is one flaw in the process. Once the worlds collide, once 
the Bill of Rights guarantees are incorporated into the Fourteenth 
Amendment, only one doctrine evolves - the doctrine expressing the 
fundamental rights· that the Court "found" in the Fourteenth Amend­
ment. Though the resulting unitary version of First Amendment rights 
seems to have worked well enough, an odd phenomenon has arisen in 
the interpretation of the criminal procedure guarantees. When the 
Court imposed the criminal procedure protections on the States in the 
1960s,20 the relevant concern was no longer the fear of a powerful cen­
tral government but, rather, a concern with the accuracy or fairness of 
the state processes leading to a verdict. As long as the process seemed 
likely to produce accurate verdicts and met a minimal threshold of 
fairness, the Court had little interest in making it more difficult for 
States to obtain convictions of dangerous criminals. When the Court 
moved tentatively in that direction, the political costs were heavy.21 
The momentous effect of incorporation of the Bill of Rights crimi­
nal procedure guarantees has passed under the radar screen of courts 
and scholars. The problem is not just that state criminal defendants get 
watered down versions of the Bill of Rights guarantees. Because of the 
fiction of incorporation - the notion that there is now one national 
standard for criminal procedure rights - the dilution of rights flowed 
20. See supra note 15. Only one criminal procedure right was incorporated outside the 
decade of the 1960s. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (right to a public trial). 
21. See LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS (1983) (discussing the po­
litical furor created by the requirement in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) that sus­
pects be warned of a right to remain silent); Yale Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress "Overrule" 
Miranda? 85 CORNELL L. REV. 883 (2000) (discussing the legal consequences of the political 
reaction to Miranda); George C. Thomas III, The End of the Road for Miranda v. Arizona?: 
On the History and Future of Rules for Police Interrogation, 37 AMER. CRIM. L. REV. 1 
(2000) (discussing reaction of police and prosecutors to Miranda and speculating on impos­
sibility of effectively regulating police interrogation practices). 
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backward to the Bill of Rights guarantees. In effect, the process of in­
corporation took a sledgehammer to the federal criminal procedure 
guarantees. The Court has amended the Bill of Rights not once, but 
eleven times - once for each criminal procedure guarantee incorpo­
rated into the Fourteenth Amendment and later diluted in its applica­
tion to federal cases.22 This amendment process is a fundamental his­
torical mistake, one that Justice Harlan feared23 but that, with his 
death, ceased to be mentioned by Court members or commentators. 
Even if the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended it to mir­
ror aspects of the Bill of Rights - even if they intended the doctrine 
of "total incorporation"24 - no evidence exists that they intended the 
federal Bill of Rights to become a fresh lump of clay for the Court to 
refashion into a new, less protective body of doctrine. 
The de facto amending of the Bill of Rights criminal procedure 
guarantees has been a gradual process, so gradual that no one has no­
ticed that the Court is using the Fourteenth Amendment to rewrite the 
Bill of Rights rather than vice versa. First, the criminal procedure right 
is incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, accompanied by 
great fanfare about protecting the rights of state defendants. Second, 
the fact that States have exclusive jurisdiction over the crimes that 
most affect our daily lives - from auto theft and assault to rape, rob­
bery, and murder - causes the right to be gradually diluted in order 
to permit States more latitude in investigating and prosecuting these 
crimes. The third step is subtle indeed. Having told us that it is inter­
preting the Bill of Rights in these state cases, the Court later follows 
the new and narrower precedents when the issue arises in federal 
court, often having to distinguish or overrule older, and broader, fed­
eral precedents. This is no way to amend the Constitution. 
Think of the Fourteenth Amendment as a lens projecting the Bill 
of Rights upon the States. For the criminal procedure guarantees, the 
lens is also a mirror. As the lens projects fundamental rights versions 
of the criminal procedure guarantees onto the States, it also reflects 
back onto the Bill of Rights, distorting their purpose as a barrier 
against federal prosecutors and judges. The original Bill of Rights 
criminal procedure guarantees - intended to establish a high wall 
22. See supra note 15. 
23. See, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 129 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (com­
plaining that the majoritis acceptance of a six-person jury in a state case was a "backlash" 
that "dilutes a federal guarantee in order to reconcile the logic of 'incorporation,' . . .  with 
the reality of federalism"). 
24. A version of total incorporation was urged by Senator Howard when he reported a 
draft of the Fourteenth Amendment out of committee. See infra text accompanying notes 
218-219. It reads all the rights created by the first eight amendments into the Fourteenth 
Amendment. On this view, States must provide a civil jury as guaranteed by the Seventh 
Amendment, must not abridge the Second Amendment right to "keep and bear arms," and 
must not quarter troops in homes in violation of the Third Amendment. 
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with a narrow gate - has been reduced to an annoying speed bump 
on a broad interstate that leads to a set of more or less accurate out­
comes. The essence of the Bill of Rights criminal procedure guaran­
tees has changed. Rather than a barrier designed to rein in powerful 
federal actors, the guarantees have become a framework for assessing 
the accuracy or fairness of the process. To take an example to which I 
will return, the Court has replaced the absolute right to a speedy trial, 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, with a right to a trial that is 
timely enough to be more or less accurate. The difference in these 
conceptions of rights is that a trial more than five years after the de­
fendant was arrested can be held, unanimously, to be "speedy."25 
To understand the real effects of incorporation, we need to under­
stand the worlds of criminal procedure before they collided. I will ex­
amine the history and interpretation of the Bill of Rights and of the 
Fourteenth Amendment during this premodern era to show how far 
we have strayed from the vision of the Framers of our constitutional 
protections. Part I summarizes the argument. Part II turns to the nine­
teenth and early twentieth century to show that, when first faced with 
the question of the permissible scope of federal investigation and 
prosecution of crime, the federal courts placed severe restrictions on 
the federal government. This discussion sets the stage for Part III, 
where I present the historical case that the Framers of the Bill of 
Rights intended them to be formidable barriers to the successful fed­
eral prosecution of criminal defendants, whether guilty or innocent. 
The Framers feared that the powerful federal government would seek 
to persecute its enemies through the use of federal law - that it would 
achieve persecution by prosecution. This is what the Bill of Rights 
criminal procedure provisions aimed to prevent. They were not de­
signed with accuracy of outcome as the principal goal. 
Part IV sketches an argument that the Framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not intend the Amendment to make the criminal 
procedure guarantees of the Bill of Rights a routine part of state 
criminal processes, and that the ratifying state legislatures would have 
found federal limits on their criminal processes particularly repug­
nant.26 States and their colonial antecedents had long prided them­
selves on their criminal law and criminal processes. It is highly unlikely 
that they would have quietly ceded all authority to mold their criminal 
procedure. Outside the South, little controversy attended the ratifica-
25. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). 
26. One might wonder whether deference to the intent of the ratifying state legislatures 
dooms the modern Court's progressive doctrine on racial discrimination. The short answer is 
no. As I will develop in more detail throughout the Article, the legislatures knew they were 
ceding sovereignty in matters involving legal discrimination against the former slaves. That 
they did not know the details of the resulting doctrine is no ground to claim its illegitimacy. 
But if the States were not aware that they were accepting the Bill of Rights criminal proce­
dure guarantees, then there are no details for later Courts to work out. 
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tion of the Fourteenth Amendment - a fact that casts doubt on the 
claim that the ratifying state legislatures intended to impose, in one 
fell swoop, a dozen new federal restrictions on their criminal proc­
esses. If Ohio, Michigan, Illinois, New York, and Pennsylvania, for ex­
ample, had known that they were about to impose the federal model 
on themselves and deprive their legislatures forever of the option to 
have a criminal process different from the federal model, I believe that 
the issue would have been discussed. The historical record contains 
only silence. 
In Part V, I argue that the traditional account of stare decisis per­
mits the Court to "overrule" the criminal procedure incorporation 
cases. The rulings that incorporated particular rights into the Four­
teenth Amendment are, on a traditional understanding of precedent, 
merely dicta. While disavowing dicta in these cases would be far from 
easy, stare decisis would not prevent the Court from refashioning 
strong Bill of Rights protections against the federal government, an 
interpretation that would honor the Framers' skepticism and suspicion 
of the central government. Part VI briefly surveys some ways this 
thought experiment might change the protections against the federal 
government. It sketches a new "road map" of the criminal procedure 
guarantees that resolves several interpretive tensions in current doc­
trine. 
The net effect of my proposal would be to increase protection from 
federal agents and prosecutors while leaving suspects and defendants 
roughly where they are now when state actors investigate and prose­
cute. This two-tiered interpretation is consistent with a century of 
criminal procedure doctrine as well as the history surrounding the Bill 
of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. It is also good policy. The 
federal government has far more power to investigate, compel discov­
ery, and generally manipulate our privacy and autonomy than the 
state governments. We should not forsake protection against the pow­
erful federal government to facilitate a more flexible set of restrictions 
on state criminal processes. We can have both, as I hope to show in 
what follows. 
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE ARGUMENT 
Fear of the Central Government and Fear of Criminals 
In 1880, a federal court for the Territory of Montana held that a 
delay of barely six months violated the Sixth Amendment speedy trial 
guarantee.27 The court viewed the rule as mechanical. It operated irre­
spective of the reason for the delay and without regard to whether the 
defendant's case was harmed. As that court put it, the "fact" of the 
27. United States v. Fox, 3 Mont. 512 (1880). 
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delay "is sufficient for the purposes of this case. "28 The federal crime 
being prosecuted was making false entries in bank books. Compare 
that holding to Barker v. Wingo,29 a state case in which the crime was 
the murder of an elderly couple with a tire tool. The modern Court 
held that a delay of five and one-half years did not violate the time­
liness requirement embedded in the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
principal rationale in Barker was that the delay did not harm the de­
fendant's case. In federal court, prior to incorporation at least, the rule 
was mechanical. The trial was speedy or not without regard to other 
criteria, such as whether the outcome was likely to be accurate. In 
state cases, by contrast, the value of speedy trial is subsumed within 
the larger value of accurate outcomes. 
My project is a delicate one. First, I must persuade that, as a matter 
of text, history, and policy, the criminal procedure protections should 
receive a robust interpretation vis-a-vis the federal government - that 
the 1880 Montana decision is a better reading of "speedy trial" than 
Barker. If I achieve that goal, the reader would justifiably want to 
know why the same robust protections should not also be available 
against state power. Part of the answer is that States can, of course, 
have the same (or greater) limitations either by statute or through an 
interpretation of their constitutions. Indeed, as the United States 
Supreme Court has steadily reduced some of the protections, States 
have adopted more protective interpretations of state law, particularly 
in the area of search and seizure.30 
To those who want the Supreme Court to force greater protections 
on the States, the answer, to be developed in more detail, is that States 
in our system are sovereign except to the extent they surrendered that 
sovereignty to the federal government in the Constitution and its 
amendments.31 The Bill of Rights guarantees did not originally limit 
the States. Thus, if the States did not intend to ratify a Fourteenth 
Amendment that forced them to follow Bill of Rights criminal proce­
dure - a reading of history that is at least plausible - then there is 
28. Id. at 520. 
29. 407 U.S. 514 (1972). 
30. See, e.g., State v. Morris, 680 A.2d 90 (Vt. 1996) (rejecting Supreme Court's rule that 
no Fourth Amendment interest exists in garbage in opaque bag placed on curb and still on 
owner's property); State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d 793 (N.J. 1990) (same); State v. Boland, 800 
P.2d 1 112 (Wash. 1990) (same). 
31.  I have no full-blown account of sovereignty but do not need one to make the argu­
ment in this Article. I need an account only as it respects the right of the courts and legisla­
tures to make and change criminal laws. Between the time English rule was thrown off and 
the Articles of Confederation adopted, no institution existed that could design a procedure 
for determining criminal guilt, or resolving civil cases for that matter, other than the courts 
and legislatures of each State. The States must necessarily have retained the right to develop 
court systems and processes to resolve cases except to the extent they ceded this sovereignty 
by ratifying the Constitution and its amendments. It is in this sense that I use "sovereign." 
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simply no basis to force the same kind of limits on the States that the 
Bill of Rights creates against the federal government. 
Some might say that history is not important here - that what is 
important is the best set of policy outcomes. But that argument misses 
a fundamental point about the structure of our federal government. 
History performs a different function when the issue is state sover­
eignty than when courts seek the best substantive interpretation of 
particular guarantees. Suppose we found incontestable proof that the 
Fourth Amendment was intended only to forbid Congress from 
authorizing or the federal judiciary from issuing general warrants.32 
Would that compel the Court to tear down its elaborate Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, which is based on a completely different 
understanding? The answer, I suggest, is no. Intentionalism is one tool 
for interpreting the substantive contours of the Bill of Rights, but it is 
only one tool. There is nothing illegitimate, or even problematic, 
about the Court reading the Fourth Amendment to extend far beyond 
the original concern with general warrants. 
But intentionalism creates boundaries within which interpretation 
can operate. Suppose we found incontestable proof that the ratifying 
state legislatures understood the Fourteenth Amendment to have no 
application to state criminal processes beyond ensuring that former 
slaves were treated the same way as everyone else. Here I think it 
much more difficult, and perhaps illegitimate, for the Court to ignore 
the historical evidence. It is not a question of how best to understand 
the substantive content of a right but, rather, who is required to pro­
vide that right. And, as my sovereignty argument makes plain, the in­
tent of the state legislatures cannot be ignored. The intent of the 
Framers does not - indeed, cannot - trump that of the ratifying state 
legislatures. If the States considered and rejected the idea that the 
Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the criminal procedure guaran­
tees of the Bill of Rights, it is difficult to imagine the Court nonethe­
less requiring the States to apply these guarantees. 
One aspect of the Fourteenth Amendment that the States did rec­
ognize was that it protected fundamental civil rights and equality un­
der the law.33 Thus, the ratification of the Amendment leaves room for 
the Court to interpret what those protections mean in a modern world. 
On this account, Brown v. Board of Education34 is a perfectly appro­
priate interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment even though no 
one could demonstrate that the Framers or the States contemplated 
that particular application. The difference is between an emerging 
32. Thomas Davies' recent proof of this historical understanding is a little less than in­
contestable, but for me it is utterly convincing. See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Origi­
nal Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547 (1999). 
33. See infra Part IV. 
34. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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"common law" interpretation of a right that the States unquestionably 
agreed to provide and, if my reading of history is correct, the reality 
that the States never agreed to bind themselves to the Bill of Rights. 
In the latter case, there is no state obligation for the Court to inter­
pret. 
In construing the Bill of Rights, Akhil Amar has argued eloquently 
that the document should be read as a whole, and that it should be 
read in the context of the entire Constitution. Amar's actual reading 
of the document, however, is less helpful. He reads the Bill of Rights' 
guarantees to promote the goal of protecting innocent defendants 
against wrongful convictions.35 Although one can read most of the 
guarantees that way, I think Amar is wrong as a historical matter that 
we should read the document in this way.36 
Instead, the Bill of Rights is a profoundly antigovernment docu­
ment that sought to impose restrictions on the federal government 
without regard to the innocence of particular defendants. As Louis 
Schwartz has suggested, the Framers almost surely intended the Bill of 
Rights to permit guilty defendants to go free.37 After all, many of the 
Framers themselves had violated British law. Thus, "many of these 
[Bill of Rights] rules were written into the Constitution by real 'crimi­
nals,' fresh from experience as smugglers, tax evaders, seditionists and 
traitors to the regime of George 111."38 As the violent reaction to the 
Alien and Sedition Laws made clear, many of the Framers would have 
wanted the Bill of Rights to frustrate the prosecution or conviction of 
anyone charged with "publishing any false, scandalous and malicious 
writing . . .  against the government of the United States."39 The more a 
defendant criticized the government, the more the anti-Federalists 
would have wanted to protect him. Leonard Levy reports several in­
stances of jury nullification producing acquittals of publishers and 
printers prosecuted for common law seditious libel.40 Potential jury 
nullification must have been in the mind of the Framers when they in­
sisted that the Sixth Amendment jury be drawn from the community. 
Though sedition was a crime that was particularly sympathetic to the 
anti-Federalists, they likely would have wanted to make the prosecu­
tion and conviction of smugglers and tax evaders difficult as well. 
35. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST 
PRINCIPLES (1997). 
36. George C. Thomas III, Remapping the Criminal Procedure Universe, 83 VA. L. REV. 
1819 (1997) (reviewing AMAR, supra note 35). 
37. Louis B. Schwartz, On Current Proposals to Legalize Wire Tapping, 103 U. PA. L. 
REV. 157, 158 (1954). 
38. Id. 
39. THE VIRGINIA REPORT OF 1799-1800, supra note 19, at 20 (reprinting Sedition Act 
of 1798) (quoting Section 2). 
40. See, e.g., LEONARD w. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 128, 157 (1985). 
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The anti-Federalists were also influential in writing the body of the 
Constitution. Fear of a powerful central government led the drafters 
to give the new government specific powers, with the idea that all 
other powers and functions remained with the States. The Tenth 
Amendment makes this point expressly: powers not delegated to the 
federal government were reserved to the States. To be sure, the 
twentieth-century Court read the specified powers so broadly that it 
obscured the vision of a government of limited powers. Recently, 
however, the Court has rediscovered these limitations, holding, for ex­
ample, in United States v. Morrison41 that the Commerce Clause does 
not bestow power on Congress to create a civil remedy for rape. De­
spite several cases putting limitations on the power of Congress to 
legislate,42 the modern Court has yet to rediscover that the criminal 
procedure provisions in the Bill of Rights are profoundly antigovern­
ment. The reason for this myopia, as Part IV hopes to make clear, is 
that the Court has been blinded by the mirror of incorporation. 
The Constitution did not limit the central government only by im­
plication. For example, in Article III we find this detailed, specific 
limitation on the power of the federal government: "Treason against 
the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in 
adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person 
shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Wit­
nesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court. "43 Also 
in Article III: "The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeach­
ment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where 
the said Crimes shall have been committed . . . .  44 Other sections pro­
hibited Congress from suspending the writ of habeas corpus,45 passing 
bills of attainder and ex post facto laws,46 and providing for the "cor­
ruption of blood" in treason cases.47 All of these provisions suggest an 
abiding concern with unjust federal laws and prosecutions. 
When that was not enough to satisfy the anti-Federalists, the Bill 
of Rights was proposed, drafted, submitted to the States, and ratified 
41. 529 U.S. 598 (2000) 
42. See Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that the Eleventh Amend­
ment bars congressional creation of money damages in Americans with Disabilities Act); 
Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (finding that the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act did not validly abrogate States' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suits 
by private individuals); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (explaining that 
Congress lacks authority to expand judicial interpretations of constitutional rights); United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act exceeds 
Congress's Commerce Clause power). 
43. U.S. CONST. art. III ,§ 3, cl. 1 .  
44 .  U.S. CONST. art. III ,§ 2 ,  cl. 2 .  
45. U.S. CONST. art I ,§  9 ,  cl. 2 .  
46. U.S. CONST. art I ,§ 9 ,  cl. 3 .  
47. U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 3, cl. 2. 
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on December 15, 1791. Consider these limitations as a whole. The 
First Amendment granted freedom of thought and expression, as well 
as the political right to assemble and petition the federal government.48 
The Fifth Amendment guaranteed that private property would remain 
sacrosanct - the government could take it only if it provided "just 
compensation." Fearing a federal government gone berserk, the anti­
Federalists included the Third Amendment to guarantee that its 
troops would not inhabit our homes. Even more important, the Sec­
ond Amendment sought to keep state militias as a viable force in op­
posing the federal government: a state militia in that era depended on 
citizens providing the weapons, and the Second Amendment forbids 
Congress from infringing the "right to keep and bear Arms." 
The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments mostly have to 
do with the power of the federal government to identify and punish 
criminals, who, given the experience with the British, might be guilty 
only of opposing the government. These provisions are rarely consid­
ered in their rich historical context. The Fourth Amendment procla­
mation of the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and sei­
zures" today seems to protect only drug traffickers and violent crimi­
nals. The Fifth Amendment right not to be compelled to be a witness 
against oneself in a criminal trial might look to us like a clever way for 
politicians to avoid admitting their mistakes and violations of the law. 
The right not to be placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense could 
be a hypertechnical protection for powerful criminals whose clever 
lawyers can make one offense look the same as another.49 
But consider the historical context. Imagine a powerful federal 
government that wanted to eradicate its enemies. The legislature 
might enact general search warrants that could be used to sweep 
buildings, neighborhoods, and whole towns, looking not for evidence 
of crimes of violence or theft but, instead, for evidence of opposition 
to the government. In addition, a grand jury could subpoena those 
suspected of harboring antigovernment sentiments and force them to 
answer questions about their activities and their friends under threat 
of contempt of court. We saw this use of the grand jury during the Red 
48. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The right to petition, which sounds arcane to us, was in the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries a vital part of the dialog between the citizens and 
the government. See Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigial Constitution: The History and Signifi­
cance of the Right to Petition, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2153 (1998). 
49. In the movie Double Jeopardy, for example, while the "criminal" seeking refuge in 
the Double Jeopardy Clause was not powerful, she and her defrocked lawyer ally certainly 
thought they were clever. DOUBLE JEOPARDY (Paramount Pictures 1999). They concluded 
that her conviction for murdering her husband, who had disappeared, gave her double jeop­
ardy protection if she killed him after he later turned out to be alive. The screen writers were 
too clever by half here, asserting that a Washington state conviction provided double jeop­
ardy protection if she killed him in New York or Louisiana. They obviously had not read, or 
understood, Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985). 
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Scare in the 1950s. Once federal officers executed the general warrants 
and compelled the testimony of "enemies," prosecutors could bring a 
criminal prosecution in a corner of the State far from where the al­
leged crime occurred; the defendant would be unknown and without 
friends and resources to assist in his defense. If the judge set bail im­
possibly high, the defendant could be held in jail for months or years 
waiting for the prosecution to proceed. When trial did finally begin, 
under the supervision of a lax federal judge, it could be done largely 
by affidavit, as England had permitted for hundreds of years, without 
a lawyer for the defendant and without access to subpoena power to 
compel attendance of the defense witnesses. And if the defendant 
somehow escaped with an acquittal, or with a sentence that the prose­
cutor found too lenient, the prosecutor could prosecute the same of­
fense all over again. 
State prosecutors and judges could do none of these things because 
of the common law limitations under which they had labored for over 
two centuries. But no one knew whether the common law would bind 
the new federal government. From this perspective, we can see that 
the villain in the Bill of Rights "drama" is not the criminal but the 
government. One reason the criminal was not the villain is that the 
contemplated federal criminal jurisdiction did not include the kind of 
crimes that affected the daily lives of most Americans. Federal crimes 
authorized in the Constitution are counterfeiting, piracy, felonies on 
the high seas, offenses against the law of nations, treason, and brib­
ery.50 The Constitution makes no provision for crimes of murder, rob­
bery, or burglary; crimes of this type were the responsibility of the 
States. 
The federal government could be brought under control only by a 
series of quite precise limitations on its power. Beyond the jury trial 
right and the guarantee of habeas corpus in the body of the Constitu­
tion, the Bill of Rights added a series of limitations on the federal 
criminal process. The Fourth Amendment forbids general warrants. 
The Fifth Amendment requires grand juries - an institution thought 
in those days to be friendly to defendants who were being persecuted. 
It also prohibits compelled self-incrimination and double jeopardy. 
The Eighth Amendment forbids excessive bail. The Sixth Amendment 
guarantees the right to a speedy trial, to confront witnesses, to compel 
the attendance of defense witnesses, and to the assistance of counsel. 
The federal government had weapons in its arsenal beyond the 
criminal process. When the general warrants disclosed alleged evi-
50. Article I, section 8 grants Congress authority to punish counterfeiting, piracy, felo­
nies on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations. Article III, section 3 confers 
authority to punish treason. Treason and bribery are mentioned as grounds for impeachment 
in Article II, section 4, along with the much-debated "other high Crimes and Misdemean­
ors." 
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dence of unpaid taxes and duties, for example, the federal prosecutor 
could bring a civil proceeding asking for forfeiture or penalty. The de­
fendant would have no right to a jury because Article III expressly 
limits the jury trial right to criminal cases. The lax, biased, or corrupt 
federal judge could therefore find for the government even when the 
defendant could show that he was not liable for the tax or duty. Enter 
the Seventh Amendment. The federal government is now forbidden to 
punish its enemies by means of civil forfeiture or penalty unless a jury 
agreed that the cause was just. 
The principal concern in the Bill of Rights was not to protect inno­
cent defendants. The Framers instead intended to create formidable 
obstacles to federal investigation and prosecution of crime. An expan­
sive protection against prosecution means, of course, that guilty as 
well as innocent people go free, but the Framers expressed no concern 
about this effect of the Bill of Rights. The anti-Federalists simply dis­
trusted prosecutors who would advance the federal government's in­
terests and federal judges who might be corrupt or biased against 
those who did not pay proper obeisance to the federal government. 
The odd historical twist on all of this is that the Framers can claim 
something approaching total success in achieving the goal they set for 
themselves: to keep Congress, the executive branch, and the federal 
judiciary from systematically depriving defendants of these rights. 
With only a few exceptions - the Alien and Sedition Laws, the in­
ternment of Japanese-American citizens during World War II, the 
McCarthy hearings during the 1950s - the federal government has re­
spected the basic values manifested in the Bill of Rights. Indeed, it 
goes beyond respect. It seems clear (though difficult to prove) that the 
Congress and the federal judiciary (along with American citizens in 
general) have internalized the values manifested in the Bill of Rights. 
Ironically, the very success of the Framers in instilling in the 
Congress and the courts the values that they held dear moved the de­
bate from the macro stage (to prevent wholesale and blatant denials of 
Bill of Rights guarantees) to the micro stage (how the rights should 
limit police and prosecutors in individual cases). At the micro stage, of 
course, defendants often are guilty, and the temptation is to construe 
narrowly the guarantees as they manifest themselves in doctrine, par­
ticularly those rights that impair accuracy of the criminal process. But 
the micro issues play themselves out on two macro stages in our sys­
tem - the state and federal judicial processes. To say that federal offi­
cers should routinely get warrants before opening packages that were 
properly seized is not to say that state officers should be required to 
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do more than possess probable cause that the package contains con­
traband or evidence of a crime.51 
The eighteenth century fear and concern about the powerful cen­
tral government did not extend to the States. The States and their co­
lonial antecedents had been around for over 150 years. They had just 
concluded a successful war against England. The Framers of the Con­
stitution were influential figures in state government. That the Bill of 
Rights did not apply to the States was confirmed in 1833 when Chief 
Justice John Marshall, a member of the Virginia ratifying convention, 
spoke for a unanimous Supreme Court in Barron v. Baltimore.52 The 
States were bound by their own constitutions, of course, but nothing in 
the Bill of Rights limited their power to investigate and prosecute 
crime. 
The next watershed event in American history was the Civil War. 
The attempt by the Confederate States to leave the Union caused a 
new concern in American political theory as the fear of balkanized 
governments largely replaced the fear of a strong central government. 
One concrete instantiation of this concern was a bill introduced in 
Congress a year after the Civil War ended to change the name of the 
country from the "United States of America" to "America." The bill 
failed in the Judiciary Committee,53 but the Fourteenth Amendment 
did pass, with its explicit (if not altogether clear) limitations on state 
power. 
Whatever the merits of the claim that the Fourteenth Amendment 
incorporated the Bill of Rights, Section 1 limits state criminal proc­
esses directly. Much about the intent of the F�amers and ratifying state 
legislatures is murky,54 but one aspect is clear. Everyone - propo­
nents and opponents alike - understood Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to intrude significantly into state sovereignty. For exam­
ple, Cabinet Secretary Browning, an opponent of the Amendment, 
said in a widely printed letter that its object and purpose was "to sub­
ordinate the State judiciaries in all things to Federal supervision and 
control" under the heel of the "due process" requirement.55 Even if no 
51. Compare United States v. Chadwick 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (requiring a warrant in a fed­
eral case), with California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) (requiring only probable cause in 
a state case). 
52. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). 
53. Proposed Change of the Name of the Government, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1866, at Al. 
The Times commented: "No doubt the proposition will meet with more general favor at the 
next session of Congress, when there will be fewer questions of greater moment to absorb 
the attention of the national Legislature." 
54. See infra Part IV. 
55. CINCINNATI COM., Oct. 26, 1866, p. 2. 
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one had contemplated incorporation, the States were required to pro­
vide a criminal process that comported with due process.56 
Determining the substantive content of "due process of law" in an 
acceptably precise way is far from easy. Indeed, Justice Hugo Black 
was a long-standing proponent of incorporation in part because he 
thought it provided relatively specific guidance for judges. Black 
feared that otherwise judges would roam at will through the vague 
contours of due process and substitute their personal judgments for 
those of democratically elected legislatures. He argued that if due pro­
cess implicates "immutable principles of free government,'' as some 
had suggested,57 the Fourteenth Amendment "might as well have been 
written that 'no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property ex­
cept by laws that the judges of the United States Supreme Court shall 
find to be consistent with the immutable principles of free govern­
ment.' "58 
Today, however, the very success of incorporation as an interpre­
tive theory provides a relatively clear and stable benchmark for due 
process in state cases. Thus, the only reworking of criminal procedure 
doctrine required by my theory is to resurrect the robust protections 
that the Framers intended to be available against federal actors. Most 
of the current federal criminal procedure doctrine has been con­
structed from state cases over the last four decades. Oddly enough, 
most of what we know or think we know about the Bill of Rights 
guarantees has been produced by cases in which the Court is inter­
preting the Fourteenth Amendment. Incorporation has unintention­
ally blinded the Court to the existence of separate worlds of criminal 
procedure. 
No one - Court or commentators - has noticed that criminal 
procedure doctrine in the last forty years has largely come from state 
cases. No one has noticed because everyone has taken at face value 
the Court's repeated insistence that after incorporating a particular 
Bill of Rights guarantee, it is then interpreting the language of the Bill 
of Rights rather than that of the Fourteenth Amendment. But I wish 
to challenge the assumption that the analytical methodology of incor-
56. For reasons having to do with the Court's unwillingness to overrule precedent, it has 
chosen to use the Due Process Clause as the principal device to review state criminal justice 
systems. Compare Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872) (asserting a very nar­
row reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause in a civil context), with Hurtado v. 
California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (considering, but rejecting, the later claim that the lack of a 
grand jury indictment would violate the Due Process Clause). 
57. See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937) (Cardozo, J., writing for 
eight members of the Court) (due process includes the "fundamental principles of liberty 
and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions" (quoting Herbert v. 
Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926))). 
58. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 168 (1968) (Black, J., concurring). 
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poration leads to the conclusion that the Court is interpreting the Bill 
of Rights. 
The assumption that the Court is "reading" the Bill of Rights in a 
state case ignores Barron. As long as Barron is still the law - and the 
Court has never suggested otherwise - the Bill of Rights' guarantees 
do not apply to the States, and the text the Court interprets in state 
cases is technically the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court is, of 
course, free to say that the Fourteenth Amendment entirely swallows 
up, for example, the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause, and 
that every interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment bearing on 
double jeopardy at the same time interprets the Fifth Amendment. 
Indeed, the Court has said precisely that.59 But the text being inter­
preted in state cases is still the Fourteenth Amendment, and the nar­
row holding of those cases is limited to the state context, or at least 
that is my argument in Part V. My argument requires that we separate 
the analytic structure of the Court's opinions, which claim to be inter­
preting the language in the Bill of Rights, from the narrow holding of 
these cases, which is only that the Fourteenth Amendment either 
permits or denies the state the power to conduct its criminal process in 
a particular way. On this view of the Court's criminal procedure doc­
trine, the state cases are interpretations only of the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause, not the Bill of Rights guarantees 
themselves. 
This view implicates current doctrine in two ways. First, the Court 
now possesses a stable body of law defining "due process" - the state 
cases that purport to be defining the guarantees in the Bill of Rights. 
Due process requires, for example, that States provide trials within the 
period loosely defined by the Court in Barker v. Wingo,60 the case in 
which the Court upheld a conviction despite a delay of five and one­
half years from arrest to trial. The rationale for this unanimous hold­
ing was essentially that the delay had not prejudiced the defendant's 
case, a rationale that has as its goal accuracy rather than simply the 
provision of the "speedy trial" the Sixth Amendment guarantees.61 
The second implication of my view is that Barker v. Wingo is not 
an interpretation of the speedy trial right in the Sixth Amendment. 
Federal trials might have to meet a more rigorous standard for time­
liness because they are covered by the "speedy trial" language of the 
Sixth Amendment rather than the "due process" language of the 
59. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 (1969). 
60. 407 U.S. 514 (1972). 
61. Justice Thomas noted this anomaly in his dissent in Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 
647 (1992). Because Doggett was a federal case, Thomas is right to claim that prejudice to 
the case should have been irrelevant. The government's real problem in Doggett was that the 
delay between indictment and trial stretched past eight years, and that is difficult to square 
with any common-sense meaning of "speedy." 
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Fourteenth Amendment. One would hope that five and one-half years 
is not a good working definition of "speedy." 
The value of my approach is that it permits the Court to keep its 
criminal procedure doctrine largely intact as a measure of due process 
in the Fourteenth Amendment, while also freeing the Court to return 
the Bill of Rights cfiminal procedure guarantees to their proper role as 
formidable barriers against the federal government. A careful exami­
nation of the state criminal procedure cases reveals that the Court has 
been using a sort of due process test all along. The cases, time and 
again, turn not on the interpretation of the language in the Bill of 
Rights as much as on the question of whether the process in question 
is likely to produce an accurate trial outcome or whether the investiga­
tion was fair. As my speedy trial example made clear, what satisfies 
due process in terms of accuracy or fairness would not necessarily, or 
even often, be the best reading of the language of the Bill of Rights. 
My proposed analytic structure presumes a maintenance of the 
current level of protection in state cases. If freed from specific Bill of 
Rights protections, the Court might, consciously or unconsciously, 
weaken protection in state cases as a further accommodation of the 
interest in convicting state criminal actors. But I think this weakening 
is unlikely. The criminal procedure protections are already articulated 
in generalized, due process language. For better or worse, state sus­
pects and defendants today face due process precedents that are 
"loose" enough to provide leeway for lower courts to seek fair and ac­
curate outcomes in individual cases. Given this flexibility, and the in­
stitutional disincentive to overrule well-established precedents, it is 
unlikely that the Court would significantly weaken its due process 
cases if it adopted my analytical structure, or that lower courts would 
change their approach to the already loose guidelines that are in place. 
In any event, I proceed on the assumption that the Court will maintain 
the current criminal procedure doctrine developed in state cases as the 
due process benchmark. 
Many have weighed in on the issue of how best to understand the 
Fourteenth Amendment.62 My project will cast a new light on the in­
corporation debate. By starting at the beginning - prior to the colli­
sion of the worlds of criminal procedure - we can better appreciate 
what was at stake when the Court merged the two worlds. Only then 
can we perceive the real effects of incorporation. 
Two models of the Fourteenth Amendment are possible. One cre­
ates a set of limitations on state actors that has no necessary connec­
tion to the Bill of Rights. Under this model, courts would interpret the 
Bill of Rights separately from the Fourteenth Amendment in every 
case. The other model is incorporation. It requires courts to interpret 
62. See infra Part IV. 
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the Fourteenth Amendment as if it were the Bill of .Rights. It requires 
courts to maintain the high barriers against prosecution and conviction 
that the Framers created. The Court has never had the political will to 
hamstring the States in that fashion, which is why I argue for a two-tier 
interpretation that I believe is closer to the historical understanding of 
both the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. My principal 
point, however, is that the mirror of the Fourteenth Amendment has 
distorted the picture of the Bill of Rights guarantees. We should re­
adjust that picture. 
My goal in the next two parts is to document the strong antigov­
ernment premise of the original Bill of Rights criminal procedure 
guarantees. Part IV then seeks to demonstrate that incorporation was 
an interpretative and historical error. Part V provides a way out of this 
mistake with an account of stare decisis that permits the Court to 
change its mind without overruling any precedents. Part VI is a 
thought experiment exploring how the Court might rebuild the high 
barriers against the federal government. Barker v. Wingo might be a 
sound interpretation of due process timeliness without telling us any­
thing about Sixth Amendment speedy trial. 
II. SOME PRINCIPLES OF AUTONOMY AND PRIVACY 
Barriers to Federal Investigations and Trials 
Few cases involving the criminal procedure provisions of the Bill of 
Rights reached the Court prior to Prohibition, but the Court decided 
these cases consistently with the notion that the barriers to federal in­
vestigation, prosecution, and punishment should be high. In 1886, 
Boyd v. United States63 reviewed a federal statute that permitted 
prosecutors to subpoena business records - hardly an outrageous 
idea by modern standards. The Court held that the Fourth Amend­
ment and the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 
deprived Congress of the power to enact that legislation. The records 
seized by subpoena could not be used in Boyd's civil forfeiture trial. In 
justifying this broad protection, the Court wrote: 
The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very essence of consti­
tutional liberty and security. They . . .  apply to all invasions on the part of 
the government and its employes of the sanctity of a man's home and the 
privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of 
his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the inva­
sion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty, and 
private property [that constitutes the harm].64 
63. 1 16 U.S. 616 (1886). 
64. Id. at 630. 
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According to the Supreme Court in 1886, the "indefeasible" right of 
personal security, personal liberty, and private property created a zone 
of privacy that Congress could not breach, even to permit a prosecutor 
to subpoena business records. 
Morgan Cloud demonstrates that Boyd led inexorably to Weeks v. 
United States,65 the first case to hold that a violation of the zone of pri­
vacy had evidentiary consequences in criminal cases.66 Though Weeks 
is often carelessly described as the first case to apply the exclusionary 
rule, what it actually held was more fundamentally antigovernment. 
Weeks did not move to suppress the letters and private documents 
seized in his house in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Instead, 
true to the property-based understanding of the Fourth Amendment 
then prevailing, Weeks moved for the return of his private papers. 
Holding that the judge should have ordered the papers returned, the 
Court implicitly found that Weeks had a property interest in his pa­
pers superior to that of the government, a property interest that cre­
ated a powerful zone of privacy. 
Because the federal authorities had no search warrant in Weeks, 
the question left for a later case was whether a search warrant would 
permit federal agents to breach the Fourth Amendment zone of pri­
vacy. If Boyd held that a subpoena could not defeat a superior prop­
erty interest that the Fourth Amendment protects, there was no rea­
son to think that a search warrant would fare any better. Indeed, as 
between the two invasions of privacy, the search warrant is far more 
intrusive because the agents enter the premises and search wherever 
authorized by the warrant. The subpoena simply orders the recipient 
to locate and produce the items requested. The resolution of the 
search warrant issue was clouded, of course, by the Boyd Court's ap­
parent reliance in part on the Fifth Amendment privilege. No one 
knew whether the Fourth Amendment by itself created a zone of pri­
vacy that a properly issued warrant could not breach. 
The Court answered this question in Gouled v. United States.67 
There, a Court that included Holmes and Brandeis held unanimously 
that even a search warrant would not justify entry into a house or of­
fice to search for papers or other property rightfully in the possession 
of the owner of the premises. Citing Boyd, the Court wrote that the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments "are to be regarded as of the very es­
sence of constitutional liberty."68 It then held that search warrants 
could authorize only searches for contraband, fruits of a crime, in-
65. Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy, Property, 
and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555 (1996). 
66. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
67. 255 U.S. 298 (1921 ). 
68. Id. at 303-04. 
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strumentalities used in the commission of a crime, or items required 
by law to be kept (as in records relating to articles on which excises 
were due). The theory in Gouled, like Boyd and Weeks, was that the 
government could search for and seize property only if it asserted a 
property interest superior to that of the possessor of the property. 
Boyd and Gouled, read together, suggest that the zone of privacy cre­
ated by a property interest simply could not be breached by a federal 
prosecutor or agent.69 
In 1949, in Wolf v. Colorado,70 the Court said that the "security of 
one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police - which is at 
the core of the Fourth Amendment - is basic to a free society. It is, 
therefore, implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as such en­
forceable against the States through the Due Process Clause."71 The 
Wolf majority refused, however, to compel the States to exclude evi­
dence seized in violation of this due process privacy interest. That doc­
trinal move occurred in 1961, when Mapp v. Ohio72 incorporated the 
entire Fourth Amendment, including the exclusionary rule, into the 
Due Process Clause. 
Mapp was an easy case for suppression. The state court ignored a 
series of severe infringements of Dollree Mapp's privacy interests. The 
police surrounded her house, ignored her refusal to let them in, broke 
down the door, and physically manhandled her when she demanded to 
see the search warrant they claimed to have. They offered no warrant 
at trial and sought to justify the admission of evidence on the ground 
that Ohio did not recognize the exclusionary rule. In effect, the prose­
cutor said, "It does not matter how egregiously the police invade the 
privacy of an Ohio citizen. No evidence can ever be suppressed." Be­
cause suppression looked like such a good idea in this case, the Court 
could have taken a smaller step. It could have held, as in did in Rochin 
v. California,73 that suppression was required under the Due Process 
Clause because the circumstances in Mapp offended notions of justice 
and fair play inherent in due process. 
· 
Instead, the Court chose another path, undoubtedly in the belief 
that a more general threat of suppression would make state law as 
protective of privacy as federal law. But Mapp has had precisely the 
opposite effect, moving federal law in the direction of the pre-Mapp 
state law. An absolute zone of privacy for lawfully possessed property 
69. Fourth Amendment privacy could be relinquished by its possessor through consent. 
See Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 317 (1921) (dicta). Moreover, it did not extend to 
all property. It did not, for example, protect "open fields." See Hester v. United States, 265 
U.S. 57 (1924). 
70. 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
71. Id. at 27-28. 
72. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
73. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
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was the natural construction of the Fourth Amendment when federal 
agents were investigating customs violations (Boyd), the mailing of 
lottery tickets (Weeks), and the use of the mails to defraud the United 
States ( Gouled). When faced with state police chasing a robbery sus­
pect into a house, however, the most natural construction was to em­
phasize the State's interest in preventing and solving crime. Gouled 
was a casualty of incorporation. 
As Justice Brennan said for eight members of the Court in reject­
ing the premise of Gouled, "The requirement that the Government as­
sert . . .  some property interest in material it seizes has long been a fic­
tion, obscuring the reality that government has an interest in solving 
crime."74 This of course ignores the pre-incorporation purpose and 
goal of the Bill of Rights criminal procedure guarantees. The Court's 
opinions in Boyd, Weeks, and Gouled do not once refer to the gov­
ernment's interest in solving crime. More importantly, the entire his­
tory of the debates surrounding the Bill of Rights contains not a single 
reference to the importance of enabling the crime-solving function of 
the federal government. 
Many reasons explain this shift in the Court's attitude. One is that 
the fear of the central government had, by the 1960s, largely been re­
placed by a fear of criminals. In addition, solving the crime of mailing 
lottery tickets or not paying duties on a few pieces of glass simply 
pales in comparison to the interest in solving the crimes of rape, rob­
bery, and murder. By broadening the Fourth Amendment in 1961 to 
protect those who committed violent state crimes, the Court truncated 
the very protections it attempted to impose on the States. 
Whether or not Boyd sensibly interprets the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments,75 the Court today no longer holds in such high esteem 
the "indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty, and pri­
vate property" that the nineteenth century Court found in the Bill of 
Rights. Justice Brandeis said that Boyd was "a case that will be re­
membered as long as civil liberty lives in the United States."76 It may 
be remembered today, but the modern Court has dismantled Boyd's 
zone of privacy without acknowledging the reasons the Framers cre­
ated a high barrier against federal intrusion. 
The search warrant requirement is another Fourth Amendment 
protection that has all but evaporated since incorporation. As long as 
Gouled was the law, warrants were limited to items that the suspect 
had no right to possess. Even then, the Court insisted that search war­
rants should be obtained when possible. Two categorical exceptions to 
74. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 306 (1967). Only Justice Douglas dissented. 
75. For an intriguing view that Boyd represents an admirable blend of formalism and 
pragmatism, see Cloud, supra note 65. 
76. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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this rule existed in the pre-1961 world: searches incident to arrest77 and 
searches of vehicles if the agents had probable cause to stop and 
search the vehicle.78 Today, roughly twenty-four exceptions to this 
"warrant requirement" exist, discovered by the Court largely in cases 
coming from state courts.79 While other causes undoubtedly played a 
part in the decline of the warrant requirement, incorporation was a 
crucial cause, one that has not been acknowledged. 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to detail all the ways in which 
federal criminal procedure rights have eroded in the modern era. We 
have already seen that compulsory process now receives a less robust 
interpretation than when Chief Justice Marshall was determining how 
it protected federal defendants accused of treason. We have seen that, 
in the federal courts in the nineteenth century, speedy trial meant a 
trial conducted in a prompt fashion, rather than a trial likely to have 
convicted a guilty defendant, as it is understood today. 
Prior to incorporation, the Court interpreted broadly the Sixth 
Amendment right to confront the prosecution's witnesses. In 1900, the 
Court unanimously held inadmissible the preliminary hearing testi­
mony of a witness who did not appear at trial.80 The Court's opinion, 
by the first Justice Harlan, drew from Cooley's Treatise on Constitu­
tional Limitations a rule that required sworn testimony in another pro­
ceeding, the chance to cross-examine, and proof that the witness is 
currently unavailable because he is "deceased, or is insane, or sick and 
unable to testify, or has been summoned but appears to have been 
kept away by the opposite party."81 This rule had teeth. Since incorpo­
ration, by contrast, the rule is that witnesses need not appear to testify 
if their absence can be explained by any of the "firmly entrenched" 
exceptions to the hearsay rule.82 This means, for example, that hearsay 
utterances of a co-conspirator can be admitted without offering the 
witness to testify even though he is available.83 This is a much weaker 
rule than the Court applied in 1900. Incorporation is part of the cause. 
77. The Court went back and forth on the permissible scope of searches incident to ar­
rest. For a good discussion of the Court's vacillating attitude toward this exception, see 
Chime/ v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
78. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
79. Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 
1473 nn.23-44 (1985) (mentioning twenty-two exceptions); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 
565, 582-83 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (adding two exceptions). Of the twenty-four ex­
ceptions, eighteen were announced in cases coming to the Court from state courts. 
80. Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900). 
81. Id. at 472 (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL 
LIMITATIONS *318). 
82. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992). 
83. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (plurality opinion). 
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Another demonstration of the unintended effect of incorporation 
is the plight of the jury of twelve. In Thompson v. Utah,84 the Court es­
tablished that when the Framers created a right to trial by jury in the 
Sixth Amendment, they meant a jury of twelve. Not eleven. Twelve. 
Thompson was emphatically reaffirmed in Patton v. United States:85 
A constitutional jury means twelve men as though that number had been 
specifically named; and it follows that when reduced to eleven it ceases 
to be such a jury quite as though the number had been reduced to a sin­
gle person . . . .  To uphold the voluntary reduction of a jury from twelve 
to eleven upon the ground that the reduction - though it destroys the 
jury of the Constitution - is only a slight reduction, is not to interpret 
that instrument but to disregard it.86 
Patton was being tried by a panel of twelve jurors when one be­
came severely ill. With the consent of the both sides, the requirement 
of a twelve-person jury was waived and a panel of eleven completed 
the trial, returning a guilty verdict. Due to dicta in Thompson, the 
lower court had been unsure whether a twelve-person jury was wai­
vable with the parties' consent. The Court held that a federal jury, or 
any portion thereof, "is not to be discharged as a mere matter of 
rote."87 Justice Sutherland emphasized: 
Not only must the right of the accused to a trial by a constitutional jury 
be jealously preserved, but the maintenance of the jury as a fact finding 
body in criminal cases is of such importance and has such a place in our 
traditions, that, before any waiver can become effective, the consent of 
government counsel and the sanction of the court must be had, in addi­
tion to the express and intelligent consent of the defendant.88 
Unless this rigorous waiver standard was met, twelve jurors were 
required for a constitutional jury. And the twelve-vote verdict had to 
be unanimous.89 These cases make clear that the federal jury require­
ment was not to be taken lightly. And it was not taken lightly for over 
fifty years. The principles of Thompson and Patton remained "jeal­
ously preserved" until June 22, 1970. On that day the Court sacrificed 
the twelve-person federal jury on the altar of incorporation in 
Williams v. Florida,90 holding that a six-person jury is constitutional in 
84. 170 U.S. 343 (1898). 
85. 281 U.S. 276 (1930). 
86. Id. at 292. 
87. Id. at 312. 
88. Id. (emphasis added). 
89. The Court held that the Seventh Amendment requires unanimous verdicts in federal 
civil cases. Springville v. Thomas, 166 U.S. 707 (1897). It follows from that holding that 
unanimous verdicts are required in federal criminal cases, but the issue has never been 
joined because the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure have always required a unanimous 
verdict. 
90. 399 U.S. 78 (1970). 
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a state case. I will later argue that the technical holding in Williams is 
limited to an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment because 
that is the relevant text the Court was interpreting. But the Court said 
the year before, in Benton v. Maryland,91 that " [o]nce it is decided that 
a particular Bill of Rights guarantee is 'fundamental to the American 
scheme of justice,' . . .  the same constitutional standards apply against 
both the State and Federal Govemments."92 Moreover, in Williams, the 
Court said it was interpreting the Sixth Amendment: "Our holding 
does no more than leave these [policy] considerations to Congress and 
the States, unrestrained by an interpretation of the Sixth Amendment 
that would forever dictate the precise number that can constitute a 
jury. ,,93 
In Williams, the Court first distilled the jury trial right to its "essen­
tial feature" of "the interposition between the accused and his accuser 
of the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen."94 The Court 
then explained: 
The performance of this role is not a function of the particular number of 
the body that makes up the jury . . . .  We do not pretend to be able to di­
vine precisely what the word 'jury' imported to the Framers, the First 
Congress, or the States in 1789.95 
Perhaps Williams is correct that the Framers had no particular number 
in mind. If so, then Thompson and Patton were mistaken. But the 
point for this Article is that the twelve-person jury was the uncontro­
versial understanding of the Framers' intent for over seventy years. 
And when it was summarily rejected, it was in a state case arising un­
der the Due Process Clause. 
In his Williams concurrence, Justice Harlan argued - quite cor­
rectly, it seems to me - that the Bill of Rights was being "watered 
down" in its application to the States. Justice Black, as usual, dis­
agreed with Harlan on the incorporation issue: "This assertion finds 
no support in today's decision or any other decision of this Court. We 
have emphatically 'rejected the notion that the Fourteenth Amend­
ment applies to the States only a 'watered down, subjective version of 
the individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights.' "96 Furthermore, "[t]he 
broad implications in early cases indicating that only a body of 12 
members could satisfy the Sixth Amendment requirement arose in 
91. 395 U.S. 784 (1969). 
92. Id. at 795 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)) (emphasis added). 
93. Williams, 399 U.S. at 103. 
94. Id. at 100. 
95. Id. at 98, 100. 
96. Id. at 106-07 (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 ,  10-11 (1964)). Justice Black may 
be right. Lowering the federal jury standard from twelve to six may not be watering down. It 
seems more like drowning in a flood. 
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situations where the issue was not squarely presented and were based, 
in my opinion, on an improper interpretation of that amendment."97 
Black's attitude toward Thompson parallels that of Brennan to­
ward Gouled. In both cases, the writer discredits the reasoning of the 
precedent and ignores the history that led to the holding. Moreover, 
both opinions undervalue the Framers' goal of having high barriers 
against federal prosecutors and judges. This leads to the historical mis­
take inherent in the notion of incorporation and thereby diminishes 
the Bill of Rights. 
To be sure, it is not only incorporation that can explain the Court's 
increasingly hostile attitude toward the Bill of Rights' criminal proce­
dure guarantees. The character and role of the federal government 
began to change in the twentieth century. By the time of Franklin 
Roosevelt's election, and certainly by the beginning of World War II, 
most Americans had a benevolent, or at least hopeful, view of the fed­
eral government. In addition, as I have indicated, most federal crimes 
in the nineteenth century were nonviolent and economic in nature. 
Strong Bill of Rights protections therefore did not noticeably affect 
the public safety. But the beginning of the twentieth century saw the 
rise of organized crime and the difficulty of enforcing Prohibition, 
which at least in the beginning was a popular law.98 The need to con­
trol gangsters and enforce sobriety required a strong federal response 
and also acted as a hydraulic that led the Court to narrow the rights of 
privacy and autonomy that underlie the criminal procedure guaran­
tees. The expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction continues to this 
day. It is, for example, a federal crime for a store to remove a mattress 
tag.99 The Framers would have thought the entire country quite daft to 
permit such a law to stand. 
But incorporation is related to the other causes and is at least as 
significant in reducing the scope of the protections. The Court began 
the full-scale process of incorporating the criminal procedure guaran­
tees in 1961. By the time it finished in 1970, the nation had come 
through a social upheaval unlike anything since the Great Depression. 
Crime rates had risen dramatically. Many people, and thus many poli­
ticians, had grown increasingly unhappy with anything that could be 
characterized as a "right of criminals." Richard Nixon campaigned on 
a "law and order" theme during the 1968 election, offering a velvet 
97. Id. at 107. 
98. Note, for example, the Court's expansive construction of the rights to search under 
the Prohibition Act, and the language supporting the Act, in Carroll v. United States, 267 
U.S. 132 (1925). 
99. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 192, 1196 (1994); 16 C.F.R. §§ 1632.31(b)(l), 132.31(b)(5) (1997); see 
Stuart P. Green, Why It's a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and 
the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533, 1610 & n.264 (1997). 
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glove alternative to George Wallace's mailed fist.100 Wallace said the 
Supreme Court was a "sorry, lousy, no-account outfit," and he prom­
ised that if he were elected president "you wouldn't get raped or 
stabbed in the shadow of the White House even if we had to call out 
30,000 troops and equip them with two-foot-long bayonets and station 
them every few feet apart."101 Not even Democratic presidential can­
didate Hubert Humphrey defended the Supreme Court's criminal 
procedure decisions. 
The crimes Americans fear most - everyday property crimes and 
crimes of violence - have always been the responsibility of local po­
lice and prosecutors. The modern Court's instinct has been to seek 
ways to make it easier for police and prosecutors to solve these kinds 
of crimes and convict the perpetrators. But the Framers were not con­
cerned with the government's interest in solving crime. While we to­
day fear criminals, the Framers feared the central government. 
Recall Barker v. Wingo, the case unanimously holding that a trial 
was speedy even though held five and one-half years following arrest. 
The Court began its recitation of the facts with, " [o]n July 20, 1958, in 
Christian County, Kentucky, an elderly couple was beaten to death by 
intruders wielding an iron tire tool."102 If the Court had found the de­
lay to violate Barker's right to a speedy trial, the only remedy would 
have been to reverse the conviction without remand for a new trial. A 
speedy trial violation cannot be remedied by giving the defendant a 
second, later trial. The defendant, a convicted murderer, must walk 
free. 
Given this extreme remedy, consider how much easier it was for a 
later Court to find a speedy trial violation in a federal case where the 
conviction was for conspiracy to import and distribute cocaine.103 As 
serious as the distribution of drugs might be, setting free a man con­
victed of murdering elderly people in their homes with a tire tool is far 
more difficult. Faced with the prospect of releasing murderers, rob­
bers, and rapists in the 1970s and 1980s, the Court "blinked" and be­
gan to shrink the criminal procedure protections available in state 
court.104 But in a world with a one-size-fits-all incorporation doctrine, 
federal prosecutors also benefit from the lowered barriers, thus mak-
100. The characterization is Liva Baker's. LIV A BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND 
POLITICS 244 (1983). 
101. Id. at 243. 
102. 407 U.S. at 516. 
103. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992). The delay in this case was eight 
years, but I don't see much difference in terms of "speedy" between a delay of five and one­
half years and a delay of eight years. 
104. Of course, Richard Nixon became President in 1969 and began to appoint lawyers 
with a more conservative philosophy to the Court, but I believe the Court was inevitably 
going to retreat from the expansive federal model as it faced the consequences of applying 
those doctrines to state criminal cases. 
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ing it easier for them to obtain convictions through the use of hearsay 
evidence, wiretapping, and questionable interrogation techniques. The 
Framers would have viewed this alien world and wondered why they 
bothered to write a Bill of Rights. What is striking about the Court's 
decision to force criminal procedure into a single track is that it oc­
curred without any discussion of whether it was a good idea for a local 
cop and prosecutor to have to pass the same hurdles as their federal 
counterparts. 
Identifying the precise cause that has produced a stunted set of 
criminal procedure guarantees is impossible. For example, as enforced 
sobriety became less popular and use of other recreational drugs in­
creased, the government would increasingly be seen by some citizens 
as more, not less, hostile. Indeed, the federal war on drugs will some­
times be a counter-example to points I make in this Article. For ex­
ample, when I argue that an expanded search warrant requirement 
would not unduly burden federal law enforcement, one rejoinder is, 
"What about the war on drugs?" In the wake of the September 11 ,  
2001, attack, the same question can be asked, with more urgency, 
about the war on terrorism. 
This is a fair question. It would, however, take another paper to 
work through in detail the implications of a more robust interpretation 
of the criminal procedure guarantees in the federal criminal process. 
To say that the Court should return to the original understanding of a 
more expansive Bill of Rights protection in the federal system is not 
necessarily to say that the Court should return to Boyd or Gouled. The 
world is different in 2001. The role of federal criminal law is far larger 
and is unlikely to retrench significantly. Though Part VI tentatively 
suggests some ways federal criminal procedure might be more protec­
tive than current doctrine, I make no effort to accommodate special 
federal law enforcement needs such as enforcing the drug laws, at­
tempting to control organized crime, or combating terrorism. 
Ill. VALVES UNDERLYING THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
Hobbling the Powerful Federal Government 
We have come to believe, because it has been repeated over and 
over, that the reason to have protections benefiting criminals is that 
these protections best deliver accurate verdicts that separate the guilty 
- the real criminals - from the innocent. This argument is reiterated 
endlessly because it is thought to be a good defense against the crime 
control adherents who would abolish or limit criminal procedure 
rights. Unfortunately, it poorly explains the Framers' insistence on the 
criminal procedure guarantees in the Bill of Rights. 
The Framers did not focus on separating the guilty from the inno­
cent because they were concerned with curtailing the power of federal 
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prosecutors and judges. I do not claim that innocence was irrelevant. I 
claim, instead, that when framing the Bill of Rights, the Framers un­
derstood "innocence" differently than we understand it in the context 
of today's property crimes and crimes of violence. Today we mean 
"factually innocent of the relevant wrongdoing." The Framers sought 
to protect the "innocence" of those against whom the central govern­
ment might improperly seek criminal or civil penalties. Whether a par­
ticular citizen was factually guilty of evading duties or of seditious libel 
was less important to the Framers than restraining the ability of the 
federal government to obtain wholesale convictions for what seemed 
to them little more than antigovernment conduct. 
Consider the Fourth Amendment. If protecting factual innocence 
were its principal goal, no particular reason compels us to ban general 
warrants. Innocent people have nothing to fear from warrants, general 
or otherwise. And general warrants are an efficient way to sort the fac­
tually guilty from the innocent. The Fourth Amendment bans general 
warrants because they manifest raw government power over our lives, 
because they subordinate the citizen to the government, and because 
they permit wholesale convictions for antigovernment conduct. 
The criminal procedure provisions that best advance the goal of 
accurate verdicts are the Sixth Amendment rights to notice of the na­
ture and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with adverse wit­
nesses, and to have compulsory process for obtaining favorable wit­
nesses. Yet the Framers said very little about these accuracy­
enhancing rights. Leaving aside the special case of treason, the only 
two criminal procedure guarantees in the body of the Constitution are 
two that have little to do with factual innocence - the right to a jury 
trial and the writ of habeas corpus. 
Habeas corpus, as understood in the eighteenth century, was not a 
mechanism to re-examine the accuracy of the outcome. Rather, it was 
a way to test whether the court that entered the conviction had juris­
diction. A court could lack jurisdiction because the offense was a "pre­
tended" one - the Declaration of Independence accused King 
George III of trying colonists of "pretended offences"105 - or because 
the prosecutor had brought the charge in the wrong court, presumably 
to obtain an advantage. In either case, a conviction would represent a 
highly arbitrary use of power that was objectionable not because the 
accused was factually innocent but simply because the crown should 
not obtain convictions in that manner. 
Most of the debate that led to the Bill of Rights was over trial by 
jury, an odd historical fact if protecting innocence were uppermost in 
the minds of the Framers. No one claims now - indeed, no one 
claimed in the Magna Carta, the Petition of Right in 1627, or the 
105. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 21 (U .s. 1776). 
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Massachusetts Body of Liberties in 1641 - that juries are uniquely 
qualified to deliver the truth about factual guilt. 106 Moreover, Article 
III already contained a right to trial by jury in criminal cases. A com­
parison of the relevant provisions is instructive. Article III requires 
that " [t]he Trial of all Crimes . . .  shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall 
be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been commit­
ted."107 The Sixth Amendment requires that crimes be tried by a jury 
"of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been commit­
ted." The Seventh Amendment requires trial by jury in "Suits at 
common law" and forbids the reexamination of any fact found by a 
jury. What the Framers found missing in Article III was the right to a 
trial in civil cases, with the jury as ultimate factfinder, and the right to 
a criminal jury from the "district" rather than the state. Richard Henry 
Lee's proposed amendments of October 16, 1787 put the concern this 
way: 
That the trial by jury in criminal and civil cases, and the modes pre­
scribed by the common law for safety of life in criminal prosecutions 
shall be held sacred - . . . .  That such parts of the new constitution be 
amended as provide imperfectly for the trial of criminals by a jury of the 
vicinage, and to supply the omission of a jury trial in civil cases or dis­
putes about property between individuals where by the common law is 
directed, and as generally it is secured by the several State constitu­
tions.108 
But why would these concerns cause the jury trial issue to domi­
nate the debate on amending the Constitution? The Constitution in 
1787 contained no right to counsel, no Fourth Amendment, no right to 
subpoena witnesses, no right to be informed of the nature and cause of 
the accusation. It did contain a right to trial by jury. Even if one 
thought the expression of the right imperfect, surely the complete lack 
of the other protections should be of more concern. But it was cor­
recting the Article III jury right that was the passion of the anti-
Federalists. 
· 
To understand this phenomenon, consider the role of the jury in 
the colonies. When rebels against the Crown were tried for evading 
customs duties, or for some offense made up by the Crown, the jury 
106. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157-58 (1968) (noting that waivers of jury 
trials are acceptable and that States can refuse to provide jury trials for petty offenses) . 
107. U.S. CONST., art. III,§ 2, cl. 3. 
108. NEIL H. COGAN, THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 415 (1997) (quoting VIRGINIA 
GAZETTE, Dec. 22, 1787). Cogan's work is a genuine treasure. It includes many sources be­
yond the congressional debates on the Bill of Rights, including the debates in the state leg­
islatures that proposed amendments to the Constitution and selections from pamphlets, 
newspapers, letters, and other sources that are difficult to locate. Cogan checked original 
sources in all cases, restoring the original spelling, capitalization, and use of italics that in 
some cases over the years had been modernized. Because of the quality of Cogan's work, I 
did not check original sources in most cases and simply cite to Cogan. 
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often acquitted even though the accused was guilty. The colonists 
wanted not truth as much as the voice and the law of the community. 
This can be seen in a resolution of the First Continental Congress: 
"Resolved . . .  That the respective colonies are entitled to the common 
law of England, and more especially to the great and inestimable 
privilege of being tried by their peers of the vicinage, according to the 
course of that law."109 The law to be applied was local, and the judg­
ment to be made by the peers of the vicinage. 
Other than questions of convenience, why would it matter that the 
defendant was tried in a far comer of the state where he was not 
known by the jurors? The goal is not likely to be protecting the inno­
cent. One could conjure up all sorts of theories about distant juries 
being easier for powerful federal prosecutors to manipulate, but any 
gain for the protection of innocence from local venue seems marginal 
at best. John Marshall sought to quell the concern about potential 
abuses of power by federal juries by asking what we would ask today: 
why would a jury of strangers be "the tools and officers of the gov­
ernment"? More fundamentally as to civil cases, "What is it to the 
government whether this man or that succeeds [in a civil suit]? It is all 
one thing."1 10 
So what was different about local juries? One real difference is that 
local jurors would be more likely to know the witnesses and their 
character as well as the character of the defendant. Eighteenth­
century rules of evidence and procedure permitted inquiry into the 
character of the defendant and also forbade the defendant from testi­
fying under oath. 1 1 1 Thus, one way the jury could better "see" the de­
fendant's side of the dispute from his personal vantage point was to 
know the defendant. In the words of Patrick Henry: 
Why do we love this trial by jury? Because it prevents the hand of op­
pression from cutting you off. They may call any thing rebellion, and de­
prive you of a fair trial by an impartial jury of your neighbors. Has not 
your mother country magnanimously preserved this noble privilege up­
wards of a thousand years? . . .  This gives me comfort - that as long as I 
have existence, my neighbors will protect me. Old as I am, it is probable 
that I may yet have the appellation of rebel.112 
Whatever the reason the Framers found the Article III jury trial 
right inadequate, they were determined to interpose the community 
between the citizens and the central government as a way to place 
stringent limitations on the federal government. Indeed, Luther 
Martin concluded that the inadequacy of the Article III jury right did 
109. Id. at 414. 
1 10. Id. at 439. 
1 1 1 .  See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *359-60. 
1 12. COGAN, supra note 108, at 438. 
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not arise from "inattention" or "any real difficulty in establishing and 
securing jury trials by the proposed constitution" but because the Fed­
eralists did not trust state juries to decide disputes involving the fed­
eral government.1 13 He argued that the right to a jury trial "is most es­
sential for our liberty, to have it sacredly guarded and preserved" in 
"every case whether civil or criminal between government and its offi­
cers on the one part and the subject or citizen on the other." 1 14 Thus, 
answering John Marshall, the real difficulty with Article Ill's lack of 
the civil jury trial right was not so much when individual sued individ­
ual but when the government sought a fine, penalty, or forfeiture. 
James Iredell noted that "the great instrument of arbitrary power 
is criminal prosecutions." There is, he continued, "no other safe mode 
to try these but by a jury," thus avoiding "the control of arbitrary 
judges." 1 15 Even more precise, and perceptive, was the observation by 
James Wilson: "There is another advantage annexed to the trial by 
jury; the jurors may indeed return a mistaken or ill-founded verdict, 
but their errors cannot be systematical ." 1 1 6  Implicit in this observation, 
of course, is the fear that judges would make errors that favored the 
government. Unlike today, when federal judges are held in high re­
gard, to the Framers they represented a potential return to the tyranny 
of British rule. 
Many other, more general attacks were made on the new central 
government. Patrick Henry said that without a Bill of Rights, " [i]f 
[citizens] dare oppose the hands of tyrannical power, you will see what 
has been practised elsewhere. They may be tried by the most partial 
powers, by their most implacable enemies, and be sentenced and put 
to death, with all the forms of a fair trial." 1 17 "Philadelphiensis" wrote, 
"To such lengths have these bold conspirators [the Federalists] carried 
their scheme of despotism, that your most sacred rights and privileges 
are surrendered at discretion." 1 18 The political commentator, "An Old 
Whig," accused the Federalists of wishing "to enslave the people."1 1 9 
Consider a list of the terms used to describe the central govern­
ment or the new Constitution: "hand of oppression," "congressional 
oppression" and "tyrannical power";120 "arbitrary power" and "arbi-
113. Id. at 465; see also id. at 472 (Martin argued that the same reason influenced the 
Federalists to provide an inadequate jury trial right as influenced them to create inferior 
federal courts: "they could not trust State judges, so they would not confide in State juries. "). 
1 14. Id. at 465. 
115. Id. at 426. 
1 16. Id. at 428. 
1 17. Id. at 436. 
1 18. Id. at 465. 
119. Id. at 466. 
120. Id. at 438, 436 (Patrick Henry). 
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trary judges";121 "scheme of despotism";122 "bad and arbitrary rul­
ers";123 "fangs of power"; "intolerable oppression";124 "despots," "an 
infernal junto," and "absolute monarchy";125 "wicked" judges and Star 
Chamber.126 Perhaps the feelings are best summed up by Patrick 
Henry: "As this government stands, I despise and abhor it." 1 27 
These statements were, of course, made by the anti-Federalists, but 
the anti-Federalists were largely responsible for the Bill of Rights. Do 
these statements suggest a concern with enabling the federal govern­
ment to solve crimes, to separate the guilty from the innocent? I think 
not. A fair reading of the text and history suggests that the writing and 
ratification of the Bill of Rights manifested a hatred and fear of the 
federal government. The point to the Bill of Rights, then, was to make 
it difficult for the federal government to deny bail, to convict anyone 
of a federal crime, or to subject anyone to forfeiture, fines, and civil 
penalties. The express concern was that the federal government would 
use its immense power to persecute its enemies. The memory of 
Parliament and King George III was still fresh in the minds of the 
Framers. 
The "glue" that holds the Bill of Rights' criminal procedure guar­
antees together is the goal of making it as difficult as possible for the 
new federal government to pursue its enemies. This was why the right 
to a jury trial conducted in the vicinage was of paramount importance 
to the Framers. Implicit in much of the debate is the assumption that a 
jury who knows the defendant's character will nullify a prosecution 
that was viewed as overreaching on the part of the federal govern­
ment, without regard to whether the defendant was factually guilty. 
Viewed in this light, it was important that the jury consist of twelve 
and that its verdict be unanimous, notwithstanding the modern protes­
tations of the Court in cases coming from state courts. 
Look at the other ways the central government was hobbled. It 
could not obtain search warrants unless it persuaded a magistrate that 
it had probable cause to look for specific evidence of a particular 
crime. It could not deprive the state militias of the weapons they 
would need to oppose a federal government that was threatening the 
liberty of state citizens. It could not appropriate private property for 
its own use without just compensation. It could not begin a prosecu­
tion without the judgment of a group of citizens, represented in an in-
121. Id. at 426 (Iredell). 
122. Id. at 465 ("Philadelphiensis"). 
123. Id. at 450 ("Cincinnatus"). 
124. Id. at 468 ("Brutus"). 
125. Id. at 463 ("Philadelphiensis"). 
126. Id. at 422 (Tredwell). 
127. Id. at 438. 
180 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 100:145 
dictment, that there was reason to proceed. It could not hold defen­
dants prior to trial by demanding excessive bail or postpone trial in­
definitely. It could not compel citizens to testify against themselves. It 
could not deny the assistance of counsel or any of the other accuracy­
enhancing rights (notice of the charges, compulsory process, confron­
tation). It could not try a defendant a second time hoping for a differ­
ent verdict or heavier penalty, nor could it impose cruel and unusual 
punishments. It could not seek to use civil fines and forfeiture to pe­
nalize defendants without persuading a jury of the justness of its cause. 
As Boyd and Gouled make plain, the early Court understood the 
concerns of the Framers and interpreted the criminal procedure provi­
sions in this context. Some of the barriers were so high that they were 
literally insurmountable - lawfully possessed property inside the 
house was immune from federal seizure. Trials had to be speedy. 
Compulsory process was interpreted broadly. The only exception rec­
ognized to the right of confrontation was when the witness was un­
available. 
None of these high barriers applied to the States. The anti­
Federalists who pressed the Bill of Rights to limit federal power saw 
state legislatures and state courts as the protectors of citizens· and not 
as threats. Until the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, the Consti­
tution placed no limits on the power of the States to fashion their own 
criminal processes. That would change, of course, but not for almost 
one hundred years after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. One 
question worth mulling as we consider the Fourteenth Amendment is, 
what did the Warren Court know in the 1960s that no other Court 
knew from 1868 until 1961? 
IV. VALUES UNDERLYING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
Paying Attention to History 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.128 
Lawyers love interpretational puzzles, and Section 1 provides four 
challenges. What are "privileges or immunities?" What is "due process 
of law?" "Equal protection of the laws?" Why does the privileges or 
128. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 .  
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immumttes guarantee extend only to citizens while all persons are 
guaranteed due process and equal protection? 
Much ink has been spilled seeking to uncover the . "intent" of the 
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. The issue in modern times is 
whether or to what extent the Fourteenth Amendment applied the 
Bill of Rights guarantees to the States. As the Article to this point has 
made clear, the Framers of the Bill of Rights intended to limit only the 
federal government. But fear of the federal government was supple­
mented, in the aftermath of the Civil War, by a fear of runaway States, 
and it would be natural for Congress to seek limits on States. The 
Fourteenth Amendment did this, without question. But did Congress 
intend to propose, and the States intend to ratify, the precise limits in 
the Bill of Rights? The classic debate was between Charles Fairman, 129 
a supporter of Justice Frankfurter and his nonincorporation theory, 
and William Crosskey,130 stating the incorporationist views of Justice 
Black. Later versions of the debate include Michael Curtis, Richard 
Aynes, Kevin Newsom, and Bryan Wildenthal,131 who seem solidly in 
Crosskey's camp; and Raoul Berger and Donald Dripps, who roughly 
follow Fairman. Then there are the historical treatments that either 
report no substantial evidence of incorporation or treat that issue as 
not very important - books by James E. Bond, Joseph James, Earl 
Maltz, William Nelson, and Joseph Sneed.132 
Two new theories of incorporation have appeared in the last few 
years. Akhil Amar introduced "refined incorporation" to the de­
bate,133 while William Nelson mentions almost in passing a new under­
standing of what the author of Section 1, John Bingham, might have 
129. Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 
STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949). 
130. William Winslow Crosskey, Charles Fairman, "Legislative History, " and the Con­
stitutional Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1954). 
131. MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE (1986); Richard L. Aynes, 
On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 57 (1993); 
Kevin Christopher Newsom, Setting Incorporationism Straight: A Reinterpretation of the 
Slaughter-House Cases, 109 YALE L.J. 643 (2000); Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Lost Compro­
mise: Reassessing the Early Understanding in Court and Congress on Incorporation of the Bill 
of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1051 (2000). Newsom goes so far as 
to claim that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment "clearly said" that it would incor­
porate the Bill of Rights. For my skeptical view of that claim, see the balance of this Part. 
132. JAMES E. BOND, NO EASY WALK TO FREEDOM (1997); JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1984) [hereinafter JAMES, 
RATIFICATION]; JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
(1956) [hereinafter JAMES, FRAMING]; EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITU­
TION, AND CONGRESS, 1863-1869 (1990); WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT, FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1988); JOSEPH T. 
SNEED III, FOOTPRINTS ON THE ROCKS OF THE MOUNTAIN (1997). 
133. AMAR, supra note 18, at 215-94; see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and 
the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193 (1992). 
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meant by incorporation.134 Canvassing in detail the relevant evidence 
about the various theories, and the huge body of scholarship, is be­
yond the scope of my project - indeed, merely summarizing the evi­
dence and arguments takes fully half the length of this Article - but I 
will sketch the history as it is relevant to my arguments. 
To put the issue in a conceptual context, consider how the Framers 
and ratifying state legislatures might have understood incorporation. If 
the point to the Fourteenth Amendment was, as Senator Jacob 
Howard of Michigan asserted when he introduced the amendment to 
the Senate,135 to incorporate in one fell swoop the words of the Bill of 
Rights as "privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States," 
then the only coherent understanding of the relationship between the 
Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment is what is called "total 
incorporation."136 No one in Congress, no state legislator, and no con­
temporary commentator noted any hierarchy or privileged list of the 
Bill of Rights guarantees that would allow some, but not all, to be read 
into the Fourteenth Amendment. If the States knew that total incor­
poration was the core meaning of "privileges or immunities," the rati­
fying legislatures intended to impose on themselves the Seventh 
Amendment right to a jury trial in civil cases, the Fifth Amendment 
right to a grand jury indictment, the Eighth Amendment prohibition 
of excessive bail, the Fifth Amendment prohibition of taking private 
property without just compensation, the Second Amendment right for 
militia members to keep and bear arms, and the Third Amendment 
prohibition of quartering troops in houses. Regardless of what the 
States might have thought about each of these rights on the merits, to­
tal incorporation required them to relinquish forever legislative con­
trol in all of these areas, effectively putting the state legislatures in an 
inferior position to Congress and the federal courts. 
If, on the other hand, incorporation is not a mechanical process 
but, rather, one in which the Bill of Rights informs a judgment about 
what the Fourteenth Amendment protects, then no incorporation 
technically occurs. On this view, the Bill of Rights is simply a source 
that can illuminate the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment; other 
sources would include the Magna Carta, Blackstone, Coke, the Peti­
tion of Right in 1627, the Massachusetts Body of Liberties in 1641, and 
the common law. For example, the ratifying state legislatures might 
have thought, as the Court said in Wolf, that the core notion of privacy 
underlying the Fourth Amendment is protected by the Fourteenth 
1 34. NELSON, supra note 132, at 1 17-23. 
135. See infra text accompanying notes 218-219. 
136. The meaning of Section 1 would not have to be limited to the Bill of Rights guaran­
tees, of course. Senator Howard in his message when introducing the amendment to the 
Senate clearly stated that it also included fundamental rights that were not protected by the 
Bill of Rights, such as the right to own property. See infra text accompanying notes 239-243. 
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Amendment. But unless the ratifiers thought the Bill of Rights was 
mechanically incorporated, that core notion is not automatically co­
extensive with the Fourth Amendment. It requires interpretation. It 
requires a kind of common law or natural law account of the scope 
and nature of privacy protected by due process or privileges and im­
munities. Using this analytical structure, one gets a different set of an­
swers to privacy questions depending on whether one is reading the 
Fourteenth Amendment text or the Bill of Rights text. 
The Court has refused to adopt either view of incorporation, in­
stead hewing to a "selective incorporation" theory by which the Court 
decides, by some mystical process, that a particular right either is in­
corporated (most of them) or is not (grand jury; civil jury).137 Once 
that is done, the Court treats the Fourteenth Amendment right and 
the Bill of Rights right as identical protections (or at least it claims to 
treat them this way). The Court has thus adopted an interpretive the­
ory that features, in Justice Harlan's words, "the ease of the incorpora­
tionist position, without its internal logic."138 Harlan is right on this 
point. Whatever the Framers might have thought,139 it seems incon­
ceivable that the ratifying state legislatures could have had selective 
incorporation in mind. Not knowing which rights would be selectively 
incorporated, the States would be signing a contract with its key provi­
sions left blank. The States would be saying, in effect, we are hereby 
surrendering as much of our sovereignty as later Supreme Courts de­
cide is a good idea.140 To state the notion is to reject it. In our federal 
system, the States were completely sovereign before the Articles of 
Confederation and the Constitution. What sovereignty they did not 
surrender in those documents, as amended, the States retain. 
My argument against incorporation as the preferred reading of his­
tory has four parts. Despite modern fascination with Section 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, it was relatively uncontroversial and thus lit­
tle explored in the debates in Congress. Most of the controversy was 
about Sections 2 and 3, and even more controversy centered on black 
suffrage and how or whether to admit the defeated Southern States 
back into the Union. Second, only two of about 230 members of 
137. For an example of how this process "works" along with a stinging critique from 
Justice Harlan, see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
138. Id. at 181 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
139. Wildenthal, who supports total incorporation, agrees that selective incorporation is 
an "uneasy compromise" that is "awkward and textually untenable." Wildenthal, supra note 
131, at 1055. 
140. In Nelson's theory of remedial incorporation, particular rights are enforced only 
against States that fail to provide that right equally to all citizens. But if the States knew this 
was the meaning of Section 1, they at least knew how much sovereignty they were surren­
dering - they were giving up the right to provide fundamental rights unequally. 
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Congress141 took a position on incorporation during the drafting and 
debates on Section 1 . 142 Senator Jacob Howard explicitly endorsed to­
tal incorporation as the core meaning of Section 1. Representative 
John Bingham was less clear but can be read the same way.143 No one 
else engaged the idea, either pro or con. Third, in addition to this con­
gressional silence on incorporation, no state legislator, governor, or 
newspaper editorial mentioned the concept of incorporation. Fourth, 
lawyers and judges were also silent on incorporation for four years af­
ter ratification even though at least one Supreme Court case cried out 
for that argument. When incorporation finally was mentioned in 1872, 
it was in the civil context and drew the support of a single Justice 
(Bradley). It was a full sixteen years after ratification before a criminal 
case reached the Supreme Court arguing incorporation, and the Court 
rejected the theory. 144 
Those who argue that the Framers meant to do more than assure 
the equality of the former slaves and Union loyalists in the unfriendly 
Southern States, that the Framers meant to incorporate the Bill of 
Rights, thus base their entire argument on the speeches of two (of 
about 230) members of Congress. They have almost no other evidence 
that anyone considered the Fourteenth Amendment to incorporate by 
reference the Bill of Rights. They do not explain why the debates in 
the state legislatures are silent, or why the newspapers did not take a 
position on incorporation,145 or why the lawyers and judges who lived 
141. JOINT COMM ON PRINTING, 100TH CONG.,  BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES CONGRESS, 1774-1989, s. Doc. No. 100-34, at 179-82 (1989). Although there 
were ultimately more than 240 members of the 39th Congress, the number at the time of the 
drafting and debates on section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment was somewhat smaller, due 
in part to the fact that the contingent representing Tennessee was not seated until July 24, 
1866. Id. 
142. Amar claims that four members of Congress favored incorporation. To bring 
Representative James Wilson into the fold, Amar uses a speech Wilson gave two years be­
fore the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment in which he claims that the First Amend­
ment already limited State power, a reading that ignores Barron. Amar, supra note 133, at 
1236. That is pretty thin evidence. To bring Representative Thaddeus Stevens into the fold, 
Amar relies on even shakier evidence. He reads Stevens's comment about "our 
DECLARATION or organic law" to be a possible misprint. Stevens might have said "of 
organic law," which, Amar asserts, would be a reference to the Constitution and Bill of 
Rights. Id. After all, Stevens noted that the Constitution did not apply to the States and that 
this "amendment supplies that defect." But Amar fails to quote the rest of the Stevens ' sen­
tence: "amendment supplies that defect and allows Congress to correct the unjust legislation 
of the States, so far that the law which operates upon one man shall operate equally upon 
all." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong. 1st Sess. 2459 (1866) (emphasis in original). Stevens then 
goes on to give several examples of how unjust laws would be corrected by ensuring that the 
law be applied equally to black and white. This is not incorporation that Stevens urges. It is, 
instead, the equality interpretation of Section 1 .  
143. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1s t  Sess. 1090-91 (1866). 
144. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (rejecting the claim that the grand 
jury requirement was included in the Fourteenth Amendment). 
145.  Curtis offers one example of an editorial endorsement of incorporation - The 
Dubuque Daily Times, November 21, 1866. CURTIS, supra note 131, at 132. But the refer-
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through the debate and ratification were silent. Lawyers read The New 
York Times in 1866. Senator Howard's speech setting out his view of 
total incorporation appeared on the front page of the Times on May 
24, 1866.146 The newspaper took no editorial stand on it.147 No newspa­
per in the South even mentioned the theory during the contentious 
ratification process.148 
The incorporationist explanation of silence is that it was all so ob­
vious that no one needed to mention it again. We are to assume that 
politicians playing to their constituencies in New England and the 
Midwest would refrain from mentioning incorporation because it had 
already been mentioned twice. Moreover, how are we to explain the 
silence of the state legislators? To accept the argument that of course 
the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights, we have 
to accept that all the state ratifying legislatures intended to impose on 
themselves the federal Bill of Rights criminal procedure model -
lock, stock, and barrel - as well as the Second, Third, and Seventh 
Amendments, and that they did this without comment. We must accept 
that incorporation was so obviously the intent of the Framers and the 
ratifying state legislatures that the newspaper editorial writers of the 
time saw no need to mention it even once. 
Whether total incorporation is the best understanding of the Bill of 
Rights as a policy matter is one issue; whether it represented the intent 
of the Framers in Congress is another. That it manifested the will of 
the ratifying state legislatures is almost beyond belief. And, however 
the reader resolves these issues, I simply reject out of hand the long­
standing view of the academy that incorporation is obviously the best 
historical understanding of what occurred between 1866 and 1868.149 It 
is, at a minimum, open to serious challenge. And if it is open to serious 
challenge, the reader can proceed with Parts V and VI of the Article 
to consider the benefits of returning to a model in which the criminal 
procedure guarantees are given an historically accurate interpretation 
when applied to the federal criminal process. 
Amar improves on selective incorporation by his notion of "re­
fined incorporation,'' which reads Section 1 to incorporate only those 
parts of the Bill of Rights that, in his view, constitute privileges or im-
ence to "privileges rightly conferred on every citizen by the federal constitution" could be 
clearer. Indeed, two sentences earlier the editorial had spoken of the "privileges and protec­
tions of law . . .  which nature gives." 
146. N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1866, at 1 .  
147. No report of any Times editorial stand on incorporation appears in the books listed 
in note 132. 
148. James canvasses newspaper response in the South during the ratification process, 
JAMES, RATIFICATION, supra note 132, at 80-155, and makes no mention of incorporation as 
a theory for interpreting Section 1 .  
149. See supra note 131. 
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mumtles that belong to individuals (for example, the freedom of 
speech) as opposed to rights that belong to the States or the public at 
large (for example, the Second Amendment right to bear arms).150 If 
limited to freedom of speech, Amar's refined incorporation is a plau­
sible understanding of history. Congress, and even some state officials, 
did express concern about protecting free speech through the Four­
teenth Amendment. When Governor Jacob D. Cox introduced the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Ohio Legislature on January 2, 1867, 
for example, he said that a limit on state power was 
necessary long before the war, when it was notorious that any attempt to 
exercise freedom of discussion in regard to the system which was then 
hurrying on the rebellion, was not tolerated in the Southern States; and 
the State laws gave no real protection to immunities of this kind, which 
are the very essence of free government.151 
However this issue is best resolved, my project is only about the 
criminal procedure guarantees found in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth 
Amendments. These provisions create rights in individuals as against 
the government, and it seems likely that they would qualify for incor­
poration under Amar's theory. Amar implicitly asks his reader to be­
lieve that the Framers and state legislatures were clear that these 
rights were to be included in the Fourteenth Amendment. As we will 
see, that claim simply does not match the history. 
William Nelson's theory152 matches almost all of the history but has 
not received the attention that it deserves.153 Because the effect of 
Nelson's reading of the history is to incorporate a right from the Bill of 
Rights only against States that fail to provide that particular right 
equally to all its citizens, I will refer to his theory as "remedial incor­
poration." I will reserve "incorporation" for the traditional theories of 
total and selective incorporation that apply to all States. The key to 
Nelson's theory is to recognize that even Bingham valued state sover­
eignty. In his most elaborate defense of Section 1 during the Thirty­
Ninth Congress, Bingham seems to concede that States have the pri-
1 50. AMAR, supra note 1 8, at 220-23. 
151 .  JAMES, RATIFICATION, supra note 132, at 162 (quoting CINCINNATI COM., Jan. 3, 
1 867) . 
1 52. NELSON, supra note 132, at 117-23. Though the idea is Nelson's, most of the de­
fense of it that follows is mine. 
153. I suspect this is because Nelson's book is about much more than just the best read­
ing of Section 1. Indeed, he offers his insight on incorporation in a short discussion buried 
deep within the book and does little to defend the theory. See id. at 117-23. Moreover, as a 
serious historian, Nelson offers his theory as a way of "resolv[ing] the contradiction in the 
evidence" rather than as a new historical discovery or an obvious plain meaning that others 
have missed. Id. at 118. Indeed, he ultimately concludes that the historical evidence is simply 
inadequate to know whether those who framed and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment in­
tended it to create substantive rights or simply to ensure equality in distribution of pre­
existing rights. Id. at 123. 
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mary responsibility to enforce "the rights of life, liberty, and prop­
erty."154 And he seems to say that Section 1 would give Congress the 
power to impose the "immortal bill of rights" only when States treat 
citizens unequally with regard to these fundamental rights. His argu­
ment is premised crucially on the notion that state legislatures never 
had the authority to treat citizens unequally with regard to "life, lib­
erty, and property." State officials and legislatures could treat citizens 
that way only if they disregarded their oaths to uphold the Constitu­
tion. He noted that those oaths "are disregarded to-day in Oregon; 
they are disregarded to-day, and have been disregarded for the last 
five, ten, or twenty years in every one of the deven States recently in 
insurrection. "155 
Bingham seems to reject the notion that Section 1 would create 
new substantive rights. What was missing in the Constitution, what 
Section 1 would supply, was an enforcement mechanism. Indeed, just 
after the remark about States lately in insurrection, he said, "The 
question is, simply, whether you will give by this amendment to the 
people of the United States the power, by legislative enactment, to 
punish officials of States for violation of the oaths enjoined upon them 
by their Constitution?" If that is, as he said, the "whole question," 
then "adoption of the proposed amendment" will not take rights "that 
belong to the States. They elect their Legislatures; they enact their 
laws for the punishment of crimes against life, liberty, or prop­
erty . . . .  "156 But, Bingham cautioned, if legislators "conspire together 
to enact laws refusing equal protection to life, liberty, or property, 
Congress is thereby vested with power to hold them to answer before 
the bar of the national courts for the violation of their oaths and of the 
rights of their fellow-men."157 
He repeats this theme near the end of the speech, noting that no 
one had ever claimed that States had the authority to deny "any free 
citizen" the protection of the "rights of life, liberty, and property." 
Thus, those who "oppose this amendment oppose the grant of power 
to enforce the bill of rights." Those who oppose the amendment "sim­
ply declare to these rebel States, go on with your confiscation statutes, 
your statutes of banishment, your statutes of unjust imprisonment, 
your statutes of murder and death against men because of their loyalty 
to the Constitution and Government of the United States."158 The next 
sentence begins, "That is the issue that is before the American peo-
154. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1090 (1866). 
155. Id. The reference to Oregon was to a state constitution adopted in 1857 that for­
bade blacks from "making contracts, holding property, or even entering the state." MALTZ, 
supra note 132, at 22. 
156. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1090 (1866). 
157. Id. 
158. Id. at 1091. 
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ple" and ends with a typical rhetorical flourish that he would not "be­
tray this great cause." 
If statutes of the type Bingham mentioned were the issue that Sec­
tion 1 was intended to address, and if its function was to "punish" 
States that failed to protect life, liberty, and property equally, Nelson's 
remedial incorporation theory seems right. If a State refused to pro­
vide freedom of speech to blacks or Union loyalists, the Fourteenth 
Amendment gave Congress the authority to enforce the First 
Amendment Free Speech Clause against that particular State.159 Im­
plicit in this argument is that if a State wished to ban free speech en­
tirely, the Fourteenth Amendment would have nothing to say about it. 
But the debate in Congress makes clear that the Fourteenth Amend­
ment was limited to fundamental rights. States were not very likely to 
deny fundamental rights to the rich white landowners.160 On this view, 
the Fourteenth Amendment simply required the States to give the 
same fundamental rights to everyone that the privileged classes en­
joyed. 
There are, however, a few rights in the Bill of Rights that would 
not have been quite so important as the right of free speech. So, for 
example, California in 1879 adopted a constitution that permitted 
criminal cases to begin by information, thus rejecting the Bill of Rights 
requirement of a grand jury indictment. Under remedial incorpora­
tion, the question would be whether California treated all citizens 
equally with regard to how the criminal process began. If California 
required probable cause to begin a criminal case against whites but not 
when blacks were the defendant, Congress would have the authority 
to "incorporate" the grand jury requirement from the Fifth Amend­
ment into the Fourteenth, but only as to California. 
Remedial incorporation makes sense of all the Republican protes­
tations that the Fourteenth Amendment "gave little new power to the 
federal government. "161 Indeed, five of the twelve Republican mem­
bers of the Joint Committee expressed federalism concerns about 
Bingham's initial draft. 162 One line of Republican argument "was that 
the amendment left the states free to grant or deny whatever rights 
they wanted and gave the federal government power only to make cer­
tain that the states distributed the rights they granted equally."163 On 
this view, the "only new power that the Fourteenth Amendment 
159. That Congress had the power to enforce the Bill of Rights against miscreant States 
would not foreclose an appeal to the federal courts by citizens in States that were refusing to 
provide fundamental rights equally. 
160. See NELSON, supra note 132, at 118 (noting that the States in 1866 provided by 
state law most of the rights contained in the Bill of Rights). 
161. Id at 121. 
162. MALTZ, supra note 132, at 94. 
163. NELSON, supra note 132, at 121. 
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would give to Congress and the federal courts would be to ensure that 
states regulated rights reasonably, which, as Senator Edmunds ex­
plained, meant 'equally and fairly.' "164 If the Framers instead intended 
to impose all the rights in the Bill of Rights on all the States, one must 
accept that these speakers were being disingenuous or dishonest when 
they protested that they were not substantially eroding state sover­
eignty.165 How much more satisfying to be able to take the Framers at 
their word that they respected state sovereignty and still find a role for 
incorporation.166 
Nelson is right that " [u]nderstanding section one as an instrument 
for the equal rather than absolute protection of rights resolves the 
contradiction in the evidence that has so puzzled historians."167 This 
understanding does not, of course, explain everything. As I will dem­
onstrate shortly,168 it does not explain Senator Howard's position on 
incorporation. But I think the history, on balance, supports an equal­
ity-based understanding of Section 1 .  The debate in Congress makes 
clear that the Framers neither had nor needed an exact list of pro­
tected rights. They assumed Section 1 would protect fundamental 
rights, in much the same way as the Civil Rights Bill, 169 and thus pro­
vide Congress with an additional tool to prevent the Southern States 
from creating a second-class citizenship for freed slaves.170 
To address the problem of discrimination against former slaves, 
Section 1 first makes all the former slaves citizens of the United States 
and the State in which they reside. This provision deprived States of 
the power to create a de jure second-class citizenship. Section 1 then 
provides three guarantees that can be read as limiting the authority of 
States to discriminate on the grounds of race or loyalty to the Union, 
or, presumably, any other classification for which the State lacked a 
reasonable basis. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
164. Id. John Harrison offers a similar account. John Harrison, Reconstructing the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385 (1992). 
165. NELSON, supra note 132, at 121. 
166. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (quoting Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. 
Cas. 546 (E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230)). Remedial incorporation is only one mechanism for 
infusing Section 1 with meaning. As Howard pointed out in his remarks, "privileges or im­
munities" had a natural law meaning as well as a meaning drawn from the Bill of Rights. 
Thus, quoting Justice Bushrod Washington, Howard suggested that the right to sue; to buy, 
own, and sell property; and to the writ of habeas corpus were included in the meaning of 
"privileges or immunities." 
167. NELSON, supra note 132, at 1 18. 
168. See infra notes 218-219 and accompanying text. 
169. See infra notes 205-208 and accompanying text. 
170. Many speakers also expressed concern about the treatment of Union loyalists who 
returned to, or remained in, the South. In the text that follows, I will generally refer only to 
the discrimination against former slaves, because that was the overarching concern, but the 
reader should be aware that white Union loyalists were also the intended beneficiaries of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
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abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States" 
perhaps requires the legislature to "make" only facially neutral laws 
and the executive to "enforce" facially neutral laws fairly.171 A State 
could not, for example, enact a law that excluded blacks from serving 
on juries.172 Nor could a prosecutor use peremptory challenges in a 
way that achieved the same result. 173 
The equal protection provision might apply only to the judiciary, 
limiting its application of facially neutral laws. A judge could no more 
exclude blacks from serving on a jury than could the legislature. 174 
Thus, no judge, legislature, or prosecutor could keep a black citizen 
from serving on a jury because of race. And the guarantee of due pro­
cess assures that everyone has equal access to a fair court process gov­
erned by facially neutral laws applied by judges in a neutral way. 
When faced with a criminal charge, a black citizen had the same right 
to jury trial, counsel, and standard of proof as did white citizens. Sec­
tion 1, read this way, is a remarkably "tight" document. It guarantees 
equal access to the courts and protects former slaves from discrimina­
tory state laws creating privileges or immunities and arbitrary en­
forcement of all existing state laws. On this view, the Fourteenth 
Amendment creates no substantive rights accruing to United States citi­
zens. 
The Court saw the Fourteenth Amendment in this way when it be­
gan to hear cases raising issues of fair treatment.175 In the most famous 
of these cases, the butchers in New Orleans claimed that a state statute 
deprived them of the "privilege" of practicing their profession without 
171. By contrast, the modern Court finds very little work for privileges or immunities. 
See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999). 
172. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (finding unconstitutional under 
the Fourteenth Amendment state law excluding blacks from serving on grand and petit ju­
ries). One argument against the equality view of privileges or immunities is that it duplicates 
the guarantee of "equal protection of the laws." But equal protection of the laws might apply 
only to the application of existing laws and not to their substantive content. On this view, a 
state law that permits whites, but not blacks, to own property would violate the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause and not, as courts would say today, the Equal Protection Clause. The lat­
ter clause would be violated if a judge took a race-neutral law and applied it unevenly (if 
judges, for example, routinely granted counsel to indigent whites but not to indigent blacks). 
Thus, it is possible that the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment meant the 
Equal Protection Clause to forbid unequal judicial application of existing laws, while the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause limits the legislative and executive branches in their ability 
to "make or enforce" laws creating fundamental privileges or immunities that discriminate 
on account of race. 
173. In a series of cases decided within twenty years or so of Strauder, id., the Court rec­
ognized this understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment, but the Court did not find a case 
that proved the requisite intent until 1986 when it changed the standard by which the intent 
must be proved. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
174. In Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880), a companion case to Strauder, 100 U.S. 
303, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited state judges from striking 
blacks from a jury on account of their race. 
1 75. For an excellent account of the early cases, see NELSON, supra note 132, at 148-96. 
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legislative interference. The Court rejected the claim.176 But when a 
black defendant in West Virginia claimed, in Strauder v. West 
Virginia,177 that a state statute forbidding blacks to serve on juries vio­
lated the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court agreed. In explaining the 
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, Strauder first paraphrased the 
three clauses of the second sentence in Section 1 and then explicitly 
adopted an equality-based understanding of Section 1 :  
What is this but declaring that the law in  the States shall be  the same for 
the black as for the white; that all persons, whether colored or white, 
shall stand equal before the laws of the States, and, in regard to the col­
ored race, for whose protection the amendment was primarily designed, 
that no discrimination shall be made against them by law because of their 
color? The words of the amendment, it is true, are prohibitory, but they 
contain a necessary implication of a positive immunity, or right, most 
valuable to the colored race, - the right to exemption from unfriendly 
legislation against them distinctively as colored, - exemption from legal 
discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society, lessening the security 
of their enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy, and discriminations 
which are steps towards reducing them to the condition of a subject 
race.11s 
To assess the various positions on the Fourteenth Amendment, it is 
useful to look at all sections of the Fourteenth Amendment. As other 
historians have demonstrated,179 this inquiry is more than just about 
historical completeness. When construing words that lack a plain 
meaning, context is everything. The history of the debates and discus-
176. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). Both Newsom and Wildenthal 
have recently reinterpreted Slaughter-House to be consistent with the theory that the Four­
teenth Amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights guarantees, though not the "privilege" of 
practicing the profession of being a butcher. See Newsom, supra note 131; Wildenthal, supra 
note 131 .  While a provocative, clever argument, it is beside the point for my project. The 
narrow holding of Slaughter-House sheds no meaning on the incorporation of specific provi­
sions from the Bill of Rights given the Court's later holdings that the Fourteenth Amend­
ment did not include the privilege against compelled self-incrimination, the right to trial by 
jury, or the right to a grand jury indictment (to list only criminal procedure provisions). See 
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 601 (1900); 
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884). The relevance of early cases is to illuminate the 
contemporary understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment to help show that Twining, 
Maxwell, and Hurtado (among others) were incorrectly decided. Finding a narrow holding 
hidden amongst the analysis, however, does little to tell us what lawyers and judges of the 
time understood. If it was so clear, why not state it? Indeed, Wildenthal cites two cases, from 
the same year and same lower federal court, that do exactly that. In United States v. Hall, 26 
F. Cas. 79, 82 (S.D. Ala. 1871), the court clearly stated that the first eight amendments are 
"privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States." See also United States v. Mall, 
26 F. Cas. 1 147 (S.D. Ala. 1871) (limited to rights of assembly and free speech). The exis­
tence of dozens of cases like these from different courts would be evidence of a contempo­
rary understanding favoring incorporation. But two cases from the same court in the same 
year is hardly overwhelming. 
177. 100 U.S. 303 (1879). 
178. Id. at 307-08. 
179. See supra note 132. 
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sions of the Fourteenth Amendment are clear about one facet, if not 
about the meaning, of Section 1. Section 1 was of "secondary impor­
tance" compared to questions of "political power, particularly the 
power of the rebellious southern states and of the leaders of the rebel­
lion."180 The real controversy stirred by the Amendment was about 
Section 2, a precursor to the Fifteenth Amendment's requirement of 
black suffrage. As James puts it, " [s]o much of the agitation and per­
sonal correspondence of Radicals [Radical Republicans] in 1865 is de­
voted to the suffrage issue that one cannot but believe it to have been 
the center of their desires" when they approached the drafting of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.181 
What the country would achieve explicitly in the Fifteenth 
Amendment was preceded by the Fourteenth Amendment's incentive 
structure to encourage black suffrage. Section 2 subtracts from the 
number of citizens counted in apportioning the House of Representa­
tives all male inhabitants whose right to vote is abridged. The net ef­
fect, of course, is to penalize States that did not permit blacks to vote 
by reducing their representation in Congress. It was the focus of most 
of the debates on the Fourteenth Amendment. Thaddeus Stevens, 
Republican leader in the House, told the Congress that the most im­
portant part of the Amendment was Section 2. 182 The debate on Sec­
tion 2 manifested both irony and raw politics. Because former slaves 
would now count as whole persons, rather that three-fifths of a person 
as slaves had counted in the original Constitution, the South poten­
tially would have even more political power once readmitted to the 
Union than it had prior to the war. Section 2 might have been a 
non-too-subtle attempt to reduce the number of House seats the 
Southern States would have, on the probably safe assumption that 
these States would not grant the right to vote to former slaves.183 
Section 2 was controversial not only in the South but also in the 
Midwest. Only six States granted blacks the right to vote in 1866184 and 
there was palpable concern in some that Section 2 portended a more 
direct requirement of black suffrage, as indeed it did in the Fifteenth 
Amendment. Representative Miller of Iowa expressed concern about 
the hypocrisy of forcing black suffrage on the Southern States when 
Iowa itself did not permit blacks to vote. 185 
180. CURTIS, supra note 131, at 13.  
181. JAMES, FRAMING, supra note 132, at 21. 
182. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866). 
183. Id. at 2798 (decrying Section 2 as "barter[ing] away human rights"). 
184. These States were Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode 
Island, and Vermont. See KIRK H. PORTER, A HISTORY OF SUFFRAGE IN THE UNITED 
STATES 148-49, 166 (1918). 
185. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 305 (1866). 
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Section 3 prohibited Southern leaders who supported the Confed­
eracy from holding federal or state office, though it permitted that dis­
ability to be removed by a vote of two-thirds of each house in 
Congress. Both sides criticized this provision. Radical Republicans 
opposed the provision permitting removal of the disability,186 while the 
Southern and border States thought the penalty too harsh. In North 
Carolina, for example, it was considered "the strongest issue" and 
some said the State should stay out of the Union rather than "exclude 
[its leaders] from office."187 A committee of the Maryland legislature 
declared the provision so "repugnant to the Constitution" that it 
"doubted the right of a state to ratify it."188 A Florida committee re­
jected the section because "we will bear any ill before we pronounce 
our own dishonor."189 
Section 4 declared valid the debts of the United States, but not 
those of the Confederacy. It stirred less controversy than Sections 2 
and 3, though James concludes that "at least as much attention" was 
centered on it as on Section 1.190 There were complaints about this 
provision in the South,191 but even there it was ultimately accepted as 
the penalty for losing the war.192 Section 5, like Section 2 of the Thir­
teenth Amendment, gave Congress the authority to enforce the other 
provisions by "appropriate legislation." Though this was unsurprising, 
given the precedent in the Thirteenth Amendment, it precipitated 
comments. The tenor of the comments, naturally, were directed at the 
substantive provisions that Section 5 gave Congress the right to im­
plement. The Florida governor, for example, recommended rejection 
of the amendment on the ground that Section 5 together with Section 
1 gave "Congress the power to legislate in all cases touching the citi­
zenship, life, liberty or property of every individual in the Union, of 
whatever race or color, and leave no further use for the State govern­
ments. "193 
186. Id. at 2544 (Stevens) ("Gentlemen tell us it is too strong - too strong for what? 
Too strong for their stomachs, but not for the people. Some say it is too lenient. It is too le­
nient for my hard heart. Not only to 1870 but to 18070, every rebel who shed the blood of 
loyal men should be prevented from exercising any power in this Government. That, even, 
would be too mild a punishment for them."); see also id. at 2536 (Eckley) ("Reject the 
amendment disenfranchising rebels and you must widen the asylum in the North for those 
southern people who have sympathy with the Government."). 
187. JAMES, RATIFICATION, supra note 132, at 100-01. 
188. Id. at 176 (paraphrasing the Maryland Senate Journal). 
189. Id. at 1 1 1  (quoting the Florida House Journal). 
190. JAMES, FRAMING, supra note 132, at 48. 
191. Id. at 94 (Georgia); id. at 1 1 1  (Florida). 
192. Id. at 1 1 1  (Florida); id. at 113 (Arkansas). 
193. Id. at 1 10-11 (quoting the Florida Senate Journal). 
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Odd though it might seem to modern readers, even the most con­
troversial parts of the Fourteenth Amendment had to compete with 
more fundamental concerns. Congress had for months been consumed 
with developing the right political theory of how to rebuild the Union. 
The Joint Committee on Reconstruction - the same Committee that 
drafted the Fourteenth Amendment - operated under a charge to 
"inquire into the condition of the States which formed the so-called 
Confederate States of America, and report whether they, or any of 
them, are entitled to be represented in either House of Congress."194 
Included in the notion of rebuilding the Union was the question of 
black suffrage. The suffrage issue proved intractable in 1866, raising as 
it did questions about female suffrage and whether to limit black suf­
frage to the Southern States. Referring to suffrage, the Report of the 
Joint Committee on Reconstruction stated that it was "doubtful . . .  
whether the States would consent to surrender a power they had al­
ways exercised, and to which they were attached."195 
But the Reconstruction Committee could not so easily dodge the 
status of the defeated Southern States. Were these States still in the 
Union? That, after all, had been Lincoln's theory - once joined as a 
Union of States, no State could leave. But if the defeated Southern 
States were still States in the Union, by what right did Congress refuse 
to seat their senators and representatives? Perhaps the States of the 
former confederacy had relinquished statehood by the act of rebellion 
against the Union. If so, what were they? The Radical Republicans re­
lied on international law norms to argue that the defeated Confeder­
acy had become a territory that could be governed by Washington in 
the same way the Western territories were governed.196 That theory 
explained why there were no senators and representatives from these 
"former States," but it did not appeal to moderate Republicans. Few 
relished the prospect of the indefinite governance of that "territory" 
by force of arms. Better, the moderates thought, to hobble these 
States as needed to achieve freedom for the slaves and protection for 
union loyalists and readmit them as States. But, on this theory, what 
were the defeated States in the meantime? Were they States that had 
temporarily lost their statehood, until such time that the Union States 
decided to restore it? All theories offered to explain the political situa­
tion of the country in 1866 were ultimately inadequate. And all raised 
the ire of one side or the other. 
194. BENJ. B. KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON 
RECONSTRUCTION 37 (Faculty of Political Sci. of Columbia Univ. ed., 1914); see also JAMES, 
FRAMING, supra note 132, at 39. 
195. JOINT COMM. ON RECONSTRUCTION, 39TH CONG., REPORT OF THE JOINT 
COMMITTEE ON RECONSTRUCTION at XIII (1st Sess. 1866). 
196. SNEED, supra note 132, at 49-83. 
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Some found the Fourteenth Amendment far too modest. The 
Cincinnati Commercial dismissed the Fourteenth Amendment as the 
"total abandonment of the two leading ideas upon which the Radicals 
started to make their fight last December: dead States and equal suf­
frage."197 It is easy to forget, almost 150 years later, but the Fourteenth 
Amendment was a compromise brought about by the Civil War - an 
attempt, however modest, to change the political system to prevent 
another war and to keep the South from continuing slavery under an­
other name. The Civil War had been about preserving the Union and 
the achievement of a unified, industrial, free labor economy. Freeing 
the slaves was essential to the latter goal. The Thirteenth Amendment 
freed the slaves, and the Fourteenth Amendment sought to protect the 
Union - by hobbling the Southern States politically - and to protect 
legal rights of freed slaves. Placing Section 1 in that context makes it 
look different than when it is examined by itself. Perhaps it, too, was 
only about equality in providing basic freedoms rather than creating 
specific new federal rights immune from state abridgement. 
Many voiced a concern in the Thirty-Ninth Congress that the 
South was trying to reclaim a form of slavery by enacting new, and en­
forcing old, laws to treat freed slaves differently from whites. Senator 
Henderson put the matter this way: 
The South saw its opportunity and promptly collected together all 
the elements of prejudice and hatred against the negro for purposes of 
future party power. They denied him the right to hold real or personal 
property, excluded him from their courts as a witness, denied him the 
means of education, and forced upon him unequal burdens. . . . [The 
South] adopted a system of laws which doomed the negro to hopeless ig­
norance, degradation, and misery. They not only denied him the ballot, 
but denied him the commonest rights of human nature . . . .  The only 
change made was in the name: he was once a slave, and men called him a 
slave; men now mocked his condition by calling him a freeman.198 
A letter writer reported that while Southerners had accepted 
emancipation, they did not accept the indivisibility of the Union, pre­
ferring the motto "Patience, and shuffle the cards."199 Representative 
at Large Sidney Clarke noted: "Every mail brings us the records of 
injustice and outrage. Every gathering of the defeated yet struggling 
and defiant rebels, shows conclusively that the only purpose enter­
tained by them is to hold on to as much of slavery as possible."200 
Representative Sidney Perham of Maine said of the former rebels: 
197. JAMES, FRAMING, supra note 132, at 145 (quoting CINCINNATI COM., June 7, 
1866). 
198. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3034 (1866). 
199. SNEED, supra note 132, at 57. 
200. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 1838 (1866) (commenting on the need for 
the Civil Rights Bill). 
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"Their policy is to render it so uncomfortable and hazardous for loyal 
men to live among them as to compel them to leave . . . .  Others have 
been murdered in cold blood as a warning to all northern men who 
should attempt to settle in the South."201 Senator Lot Myrick Morrill 
of Maine said that "the contest for chattel slavery is over, but the 
struggle for the possession of the negro as a forced laborer goes 
on . . . .  "202 Representative William Windom of Minnesota said that 
many in the South "have demonstrated to us" by the "reenactment of 
vagrant laws and slave codes for freedmen, with how much sincerity 
they agreed to the abolition of slavery, and how readily that institu­
tion, abolished in name, may be reestablished in fact and with in­
creased cruelty."203 The feeling about Southern intransigence was per­
haps most cogently put by General Oliver Otis Howard, head of the 
Freedmen's Bureau, who said that Southerners "surrender slavery 
inch by inch and piece by piece."204 
The manifest concern among the Framers was to compel the South 
to provide equal treatment for freed slaves and others who were not in 
favor in the war's aftermath. Prior to considering the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Thirty-Ninth Congress had debated and passed a 
Civil Rights Bill, its protections specifically tailored to protect equal­
ity. It guaranteed citizens of the United States 
of every race and color . . .  the same right, in every State and Territory in 
the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties and 
give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and 
personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceed­
ings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citi­
zens.205 
Many in Congress expressed concern over whether the Civil Rights 
Bill was constitutional,206 and President Johnson questioned its consti­
tutionality when vetoing it.207 That concern was sometimes offered as a 
reason to pass the Fourteenth Amendment despite the claim of some 
that it was unnecessary in light of the Thirteenth Amendment, the 
Civil Rights Bill, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause in Article 
IV.208 To the extent there was doubt that Congress had the authority 
to legislate equality under the Civil Rights Bill, a Fourteenth Amend­
ment that protected equality would be the easy solution. And, as we 
201. Id. at 2082. 
202. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 155 (1866). 
203. Id. at 3170. 
204. Id. at 1838 (quoted by Sidney Clarke). 
205. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27. 
206. JAMES, FRAMING, supra note 132, at 89-90. 
207. Id. at 97-99. 
208. SNEED, supra note 132, at 173-81. 
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will see, both the proponents and opponents of the Fourteenth 
Amendment during the ratification process, at least in the South, used 
the Civil Rights Bill as a proxy for what Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment protected.209 
The discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment in Congress was 
dominated by concern about creating equality under the law. 
Representative Henry Jarvis Raymond of New York noted his support 
for the Fourteenth Amendment as a way of "secur[ing] an equality of 
rights among all the citizens of the United States."210 Windom of 
Maine complained that the Fourteenth Amendment did not go far 
enough because it did not include "political as well as civil equality 
among its guarantees. "211 Senator Henderson said, "Within the scope 
of State jurisdiction [in the South] there is no such thing as equality in 
law."212 Thaddeus Stevens, the Republican leader noted when pre­
senting the Fourteenth Amendment to the House that Section 1 "al­
lows Congress to correct the unjust legislation of the States, so far that 
the law which operates upon one man shall operate equally upon 
all. ,,213 
As an example of how the equality view of the Fourteenth 
Amendment would work, consider what the Framers had to say about 
freedom of speech and of the press.214 The history is replete with ref­
erences to the need to protect free speech and free assembly in the 
South.215 A colorful example was Representative Price's observation 
that "if a citizen of a free State visiting a slave State expressed his 
opinion in reference to slavery he was treated without much ceremony 
to a coat of tar and feathers and a ride upon the rail. "216 Curtis con­
cludes that " [d)enial of First Amendment rights [by the Southern 
States) was a recurring theme" of the election of 1866.217 But all that 
was necessary to protect First Amendment rights was to ensure that 
the rights of the freed slaves and loyalists were protected the same 
209. See infra notes 250-259 and accompanying text. 
210. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2502 (1866). 
211. Id. at 3169. 
212. Id. at 3035. 
213. Id. at 2459. 
214. See Crosskey, supra note 130, at 33. 
215. In Curtis's fascinating account of speeches, newspaper accounts, and reports from 
the election of 1866, covering fifteen pages, there is a single reference to problems in the 
criminal systems and dozens of references to deprivation of First Amendment freedoms. 
CURTIS, supra note 131, at 131-145. 
216. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1066 (1866). The remarks referenced the time 
before slavery was abolished, but the speaker makes clear that nothing had changed in re­
gard to free speech in the South. 
217. CURTIS, supra note 131, at 138. 
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way as those of the white political majorities. Perhaps that is all that 
the Framers intended Section 1 to do. 
There is one more piece of evidence that the Framers did not in­
tend to incorporate the Bill of Rights so that it applied to all States. 
While it is true that Bingham and Jacob Howard articulated an incor­
poration theory when explaining Section 1 ,  what escapes notice is the 
lack of effect these remarks had on the rest of the debate in Congress 
and among the States. As we saw, Bingham spoke at length in the 
House about the need to impose the Bill of Rights on States that en­
acted laws creating inequality in fundamental rights. Senator Jacob 
Howard's remarks on May 23, 1866, when he defined "privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States" were even clearer. These 
privileges and immunities include certain natural law rights, according 
to Howard, and also "the personal rights guarantied and secured by 
the first eight amendments of the Constitution."218 Moreover, after 
noting that Congress lacked the authority to enforce the Bill of Rights 
against the States, Howard said, "[t]he great object of the first section 
of this amendment is, therefore, to restrain the power of the States 
and compel them at all times to respect these great fundamental guar­
antees. "219 
It is difficult to be much clearer than that, though if application to 
all the States as a routine matter were the widely shared goal, one 
wonders why the clause was not drafted to say that - "No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the rights created in the 
first eight Amendments to this Constitution, or any other privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws."220 That phrasing is pretty easy to invent; it took me about five 
minutes. What seems at first glance odd about the debate after 
Howard's remarks, however, is that his clear-headed interpretation 
seems to have had no effect. At least two members of the Senate who 
218. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866). 
219. Id. at 2766. 
220. My proposed language is a rejoinder to Curtis, who argues that the drafters made 
no specific mention of the Bill of Rights because they wanted to protect a more inclusive set 
of liberties. CURTIS, supra note 131 , at 125. My language does both. Amar argues that the 
language of the Amendment is "exactly what one would expect if incorporation were a goal 
of the Fourteenth Amendment." Amar, supra note 133, at 1220. But Dripps gets the better 
of Amar here, asserting that it 
would be equally fair to say that the text is exactly what one would expect if protecting sex­
ual privacy. or freedom of contract, or the right to grow marijuana were a goal of the Four­
teenth Amendment. To say that the text is consistent with incorporation is uninteresting, be­
cause the text is consistent with almost anything. 
Dripps, supra note 17, at 1576. My proposed language in the text is, instead, "exactly what 
one would expect if incorporation were a goal of the Fourteenth Amendment." 
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spoke in later sessions expressed their lack of understanding of 
"privileges or immunities," one of them during a colloquy with 
Howard himself and one a moment later.221 Yet no one mentioned 
Howard's elegant theory or offered an incorporationist response to the 
challenge to define "privileges or immunities." Howard himself did 
not reference his theory of incorporation when challenged to define 
privileges or immunities. It is not that there was argument about what 
Howard had said. It was as if he had not said the words at all. 
Almost all of the debate that followed Howard's speech was about 
adding a new sentence to Section 1 - the current first sentence that 
defines citizenship. It caused great debate over whether it granted citi­
zenship to Chinese persons and to Indians.222 But no one engaged 
Senator Howard's theory of incorporation. Is this a "dog that didn't 
bark,"223 suggesting that, at least in Congress, the idea of incorporation 
was so noncontroversial and so obvious that it simply did not need to 
be repeated? Curtis argues that everyone already understood that full 
incorporation was the Republican position, and it was unnecessary to 
say it more than twice. Amar claims that the clarity of Howard's and 
Bingham's remarks, combined with their prominent roles in the crea­
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment, makes the silence into evidence in 
favor of incorporation. In Amar's words: "Surely, if the words of Sec­
tion 1 meant something different, here was the time to stand up and 
say so."224 Perhaps. But it remains intriguing that when questions were 
raised about the meaning of "privileges or immunities," no one re­
sponded by citing the speeches of Howard or Bingham. One explana­
tion is that those who raised the questions were opponents of the 
Amendment, and Republicans simply kept their counsel because they 
saw the question as political rhetoric. But missing here is why oppo­
nents of the Amendment did not adopt the incorporation theory and 
221. In response to Senator Howard's attempt to explain why he used "abridge" in con­
nection with "privileges or immunities," Senator Hendricks said "I have not heard any Sena­
tor accurately define, what are the rights and immunities of citizenship; and I do not know 
that any statesman has very accurately defined them." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 
3039 (1866). No one responded to the challenge. One speaker later, Senator Johnson said 
that the "privileges or immunities" clause was objectionable "simply because I do not under­
stand what will be the effect of that." Id. at 3041. No one responded. In addition, Senator 
Yates complained about "tortuous and hard-to-be-understood propositions," presumably in 
reference to Section 1. Id. at 3037. 
222. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1 st Sess. 1088 (1866) (Woodbridge); id. at 
1095 (Hotchkiss); id. at 2510 (Miller); id. at 2890 (Howard); id. at 2890-91 (Cowan); id. at 
2892 (Doolittle); id. at 2893 (Fessenden); id. (Trumbull); id. (Johnson); id. (Wade); id. at 
2894 (Van Winkle); id. at 2895 (Hendricks); id. (Clarke); id. (Clarke); id. at 2986 (Fessenden, 
Howard, Doolittle, Grimes); id. at 2897 (Williams, Saulsbury). 
223. The reference is to a Sherlock Holmes story in which Holmes solved the mystery by 
noting that the dog didn't bark when he should have (and thus knew the person who com­
mitted the crime). A. CONAN DOYLE, Silver Blaze, in THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES 
383, 400 (1938). 
224. Amar, supra note 133, at 1238. 
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use it against the Amendment. The more restrictions to be placed on 
state government, the stronger the argument that state sovereignty 
was being eroded too severely. But no one - no supporter, no oppo­
nent - said anything to engage Bingham's or Howard's incorporation 
theory. 
One reason for the failure to engage the incorporation question is 
that, as we have seen, members of Congress were more concerned 
about other sections of the Amendment as well as more fundamental 
issues that had to do with the structure of government. Was there still 
time to amend the bill to provide for black suffrage? Should passage 
of the Amendment be a condition for readmission of the States of the 
former confederacy? If so, should these States be told that ratification 
guaranteed readmission? Perhaps passage was insufficient to secure 
readmission (this was the Radical position). These were weighty mat­
ters: the Union still literally hung in the balance. 
Drawing on newspaper accounts, James reports that when Howard 
rose to speak, "Very little interest could be detected among the sena­
tors. As one observer wrote, 'A lethargy more alarming than high ex­
citement is generally visible.' "225 Howard had a speaking style that 
was "somewhat ponderous,"226 and the speech lasted two hours.227 His 
approach to issues in general "appealed to reason rather than to the 
emotions"228 and perhaps the speech did not play well with the audi­
ence.229 Though a member of the Reconstruction Committee, Howard 
had not been a major figure in the drafting of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and he reported the Amendment to the Senate only be­
cause William Fessenden of Maine was ill that day.230 Howard "was 
noted for his radicalism,"231 and had repeatedly voted against 
Bingham's language protecting privileges and immunities, due process, 
and equal protection. A late draft in Committee had Bingham's lan­
guage as Section 5 with a Section 1 that said, "No discrimination shall 
be made by any State nor by the United States as to the civil rights of 
persons because of race, color or previous condition of servitude. "232 
On a motion in committee to strike Section 5, Howard voted yes and it 
225. JAMES. FRAMING, supra note 132, at 135 (quoting THE N.Y. HERALD, May 24, 
1866). James' citation is to the May 21, 1866, edition of the Herald, but this must be a mis­
print as Howard's speech did not occur until May 23. 
226. 9 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 278 (Dumas Malone, ed. 1932). 
227. JAMES, FRAMING, supra note 132, at 135 (citing THE N.Y. HERALD, May 24, 1866). 
228. DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY, supra note 226, at 278. 
229. Some of the newspapers, however, were paying attention. The part of Howard's 
speech discussing privileges and immunities was quoted verbatim on the front page of the 
next day's New York Times. N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1866, at 1 .  
230. JAMES, FRAMING, supra note 132, a t  135. 
231. Id. at 45. 
232. KENDRICK, supra note 194, at 90-91. 
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passed, seven to five.233 This left only the civil rights provision. After 
much parliamentary maneuvering, and undoubtedly much off-stage 
politicking, Bingham moved a few days later to amend by substituting 
his language for Section 1, thus eliminating the civil rights provision.234 
This motion passed with Howard one of three members voting no.235 
Thus, rather than an Amendment with both a civil rights provision and 
Bingham's provision, the Committee reported an Amendment with 
only Bingham's language. 
Perhaps Howard voted against Bingham's language as a substitute 
for the civil rights provision because Howard's goal was to prohibit ra­
cial discrimination and he doubted whether Bingham's vague language 
would achieve that goal.236 When Howard lost that vote, he presuma­
bly sought to give a broad construction to Bingham's language to 
achieve as much protection as possible against racial discrimination. 
The goal of forbidding racial discrimination, so clearly held by almost 
all Republicans in Congress, provides the key for why the debate fo­
cused on equality rather than incorporation. This brings us back, of 
course, to Nelson's theory of remedial incorporation - permit 
Congress to enforce the Bill of Rights guarantees against any State 
that did not provide basic rights equally to blacks and all whites. The 
real prize was equality and that was what Congress intended Section 1 
to achieve.237 
Opponents viewed Section 1 as a guarantee of equality. Represen­
tative Andrew Rogers of New Jersey, speaking in opposition to the 
Amendment, summarized one natural law effect of Section 1. He 
pointed out that in Kentucky, the law proscribed the penalty of death 
for a black man, but not a white man, who raped a white woman; in 
Indiana, blacks were forbidden to own property; Pennsylvania had 
segregated schools. Rogers believed that the effect of the Fourteenth 
Amendment would be to compel Kentucky "to inflict the same pun­
ishment upon a white man for rape as a black man," to "abrogate and 
blot out" the Indiana law about property ownership, and to compel 
Pennsylvania "to provide for white children and black children to at­
tend the same school"238 Rogers thus understood the Amendment to 
require each State to give black citizens the same fundamental rights 
as it created for white citizens. 
233. Id. at 98. 
234. Id. at 106. 
235. Id. 
236. MALTZ, supra note 132, at 91-92. 
237. See, e.g., SNEED, supra note 132, at 330-31 (quoting Stevens); id. at 350 (quoting 
Eliot); id. at 350 (noting that Miller "linked the spirit of Section 1 to the Declaration of In­
dependence.") 
238. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 134 (1866). 
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As Howard made clear, these rights were broader than the rights 
in the Bill of Rights. They were the "principles lying at the very foun­
dation of all republican government,"239 including the right to hold 
land; the right to collect wages by legal process; the right to sue, the 
right to testify;240 the right to hold real and personal property, to be 
confronted by witnesses, to have the process of the courts, to hold real 
or personal property, to testify, to have an education, and not to be 
given "unequal burdens";241 to marry, to vote, to contract, to be a ju­
ror.242 Historian Joseph James concludes that "judicial minds in the 
Senate understood as fundamental rights" those mentioned in the sev­
enth section of the Freedman's Bureau Bill: "the right to make and en­
force contracts; to sue, be parties, and give evidence; to inherit, pur­
chase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property; and to 
have full and equal benefit of personal right guarantees in the laws 
and constitutions of the several states."243 Incorporation was, of 
course, irrelevant to these concerns. Indeed, most of the Bill of Rights 
guarantees were quite beside the point in addressing the problems of 
the Black Codes and wholesale discrimination against blacks and 
Union loyalists. 
Now we have a pretty good account of why no one spoke of incor­
poration other than Bingham and Howard. It was partly that Congress 
faced other, more fundamental problems that, being political in na­
ture, they understood better than the delicate task of explaining 
Bingham's vague language in Section 1. It was partly that incorpora­
tion did not address most of the pressing problems in the States of the 
former confederacy. It was partly that Congress might have under­
stood Section 1 to authorize enforcement of the Bill of Rights only 
against States that failed to provide those rights to all citizens equally. 
Those States would be largely, perhaps exclusively, the defeated 
Southern States that had no representatives in Congress. Even the 
Democrats from the border States were probably unwilling to argue 
that States should not provide freedom of speech and other funda­
mental rights equally to all. 
If Nelson's reading of the history is correct, no one objected to in­
corporation as an erosion of state sovereignty because it did not erode 
the sovereignty of States that treated their citizens fairly. Moreover, 
there would be no reason for supporters of the Amendment to refer to 
incorporation when questions arose about the meaning of Section 1 .  
Incorporation was simply one mechanism by which miscreant States 
239. Id. at 2961. 
240. Id. at app. 219. 
241. Id. at 3034-35 (Henderson). 
242. Id. at 2538 (Rogers). 
243. JAMES, FRAMING, supra note 132, at 76. 
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could be brought into line. The goal was equality in the provision of 
fundamental rights and that was the tenor of the explanations the sup­
porters offered the skeptics. 
Even if Nelson's reading of the history is incorrect, we are still left 
with a pretty clear picture of why incorporation provoked silence 
rather than discussion among the Framers. Reading the entire debate 
in the Congressional Globe discloses that Howard's and Bingham's 
comments are lost in a sea of concern about ensuring that States treat 
blacks and Union loyalists fairly. Looming over everything was the 
realpolitik of how to deal with the Southern States and keep the Union 
intact. Moreover, there was an election coming up in the fall, and the 
Republicans wanted a campaign issue to use against President 
Johnson and the Democrats. It was critical to Republican hopes for 
achieving equality to maintain a veto-proof majority in both Houses of 
Congress.244 Thus, they could not linger over nice judicial questions 
about privileges or immunities, due process, or equal protection. 
That the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment no longer trusted 
state legislatures and judges as completely as did the Framers of the 
Bill of Rights cannot be questioned. The whole point to the Thirteenth 
and Fourteenth Amendments was to restrict the power of States to 
abridge rights; the debate, of course, is to what extent state power was 
to be restricted. The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment had lost 
confidence in at least the Southern legal processes to treat blacks and 
whites equally. Had the Framers also lost confidence in the ability of 
state legislatures to set fair rules to conduct criminal proceedings? Did 
the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment have the same distrust of 
state legislatures and judges in the context of the criminal process that 
the earlier Framers had of Congress and the federal judiciary? In a 
word, the historical answer is no. Nelson provides a somewhat more 
nuanced answer: Congress was willing to enforce the Bill of Rights on 
States that proved they could not be trusted. 
Though evidence shows that the South used the criminal process to 
provide unfair treatment to Union loyalists and freed slaves,245 the 
problem was not that people lacked rights against the state (to jury 
trial, to counsel, to a fair process). Rather, the problem was that the 
state authorities were not giving the former slaves and loyalists the 
rights of other defendants. In some cases, according to Representative 
Sidney Perham of Maine, the state officers were "intimidated by 
threats of violence, and brutally murdered for a faithful discharge of 
duty."246 But whether the problem was that the officers and prosecu­
tors were complicit or intimidated, a sufficient remedy was to require 
244. See MALTZ, supra note 132, at 79. 
245. CURTIS, supra note 131, at 135-36. 
246. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2082 (1866). 
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the States to provide the same fundamental rights to loyalists and 
freed slaves as to others. Again, this evidence is consistent with 
Nelson's notion that Section 1 simply sought to encourage States to 
protect the rights of blacks by threatening to impose the federal Bill of 
Rights on those that refused. 
Whatever the intent of the Framers, most scholars focus exces­
sively, sometimes exclusively, on that issue. They do not take sufficient 
account of the intent of the ratifying legislatures. If the state legisla­
tures did not understand that the Fourteenth Amendment incorpo­
rated the Bill of Rights, then it is difficult to know how they could 
have ceded that sovereignty. As I sought to demonstrate earlier,247 un­
der the basic federalist structure of the Constitution, the States only 
ceded as much sovereignty to the federal government in the Four­
teenth Amendment as they intended to cede. The incorporationists 
argue here that the States could infer limitations on their criminal pro­
cesses from the language of Section 1. The contrary argument is that 
the generality of the language of Section 1, considered in light of the 
centuries-old tradition that States design their own criminal systems, 
did not put the States on notice that the Fourteenth Amendment 
would affect their criminal processes. Lacking textual notice of a limit 
on that category of state power, the only way the States could have in­
tended to cede sovereignty in that category was by virtue of a general 
understanding that this is what Section 1 accomplished. 
Deciding what was generally understood requires deciding how 
controversial it would have been for the States to adopt the criminal 
procedure guarantees by ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Crosskey and Amar assume that the States considered the Bill of 
Rights noncontroversial. Fairman makes the opposite assumption. The 
reason this matters, of course, is that there is no contemporary evi­
dence (in the press or in the debates in the state legislatures) that any­
one even talked about specific criminal procedure guarantees in the 
Bill of Rights.248 If incorporation of the criminal procedure guarantees 
would not have been controversial, this might explain the total silence. 
But if the idea of changing all thirty-seven State criminal processes to 
conform to the federal model would have been controversial, the si­
lence is deafening. 
The silence during the ratification debates about incorporating the 
criminal procedure rights was total. Joseph James's study of the news­
papers and state legislative proceedings of the period from 1866 to 
1868 discloses not a single reference, either pro or con, to the notion 
that the Fourteenth Amendment would apply the criminal procedure 
247. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text. 
248. There is a bit of evidence relating to free speech. See, e.g., JAMES, supra note 132, 
at 162. Of course, that evidence is also consistent with Nelson's remedial incorporation the­
ory. 
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Bill of Rights guarantees to the States. In James Bond's similar study 
limited to the Southern States, the silence is equally total. Many objec­
tions were lodged against the Amendment, which initially failed to se­
cure the necessary number of States for ratification, and many impas­
sioned speeches and newspaper articles supported the idea that the 
Amendment drastically limited state power. But no one mentioned in­
corporation of the criminal procedure guarantees into the Fourteenth 
Amendment or discussed any of those guarantees as a potential limita­
tion on state criminal processes. 
After a study of all the original records in the eleven States that 
formed the confederacy, Bond concludes that "no one [in the South] 
believed that Section 1 incorporated the Bill of Rights."249 Instead, 
Bond documents that in State after State, the provisions of Section 1 
were understood as incorporating the equality-guaranteeing provi­
sions of the Civil Rights Bill. In North Carolina, the proponents of the 
Fourteenth Amendment downplayed fears that it would change the 
organic character of our federal system. They assured North Carolini­
ans that Section 1 "included only those rights enumerated in the Civil 
Rights Bill: the rights to contract, sue, and hold property. "250 Oppo­
nents in North Carolina used the same arguments against Section 1 
that they had used against the Civil Rights Bill, "implicitly con­
firm[ing] the view that Section 1 merely transformed the statutory 
provisions of the Civil Rights Bill into constitutional law."251 The New 
Orleans Tribune, "the only Radical Republican voice" in Louisiana 
during Reconstruction,252 published on June 16, 1866, a long explana­
tion of Section 1; it emphasized that the Amendment outlawed dis­
crimination on the basis of race or origin and thus gave the Civil 
Rights Bill a constitutional footing.253 A pro-suffrage paper published 
in Alabama lamented that the Fourteenth Amendment was too much 
like the Civil Rights Bill, concerned only with equality in the area of 
civil rights.254 
A Virginia newspaper opposed to ratification said that Section 1 
"is the 'Civil Rights Bill.' "255 Georgia newspapers explained that the 
Fourteenth Amendment would make "the negro" the equal of the 
white man, would guarantee the "civil rights and privileges of the per­
son in all parts of the Republic," and would reaffirm "the chief provi-
249. BOND, supra note 132, at 10. 
250. Id. at 57. 
251. Id. at 56. 
252. Id. at 75. 
253. Id. at 80-81 .  
254. Id. a t  106. 
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sions of the civil rights bill."256 In an address to voters in Mississippi on 
October 13, 1869, A.R. Johnston "denounced" the Radical Republi­
cans "and all their Reconstruction plans."257 But in a gesture to prag­
matism, Johnston told the voters he was prepared to accept Recon­
struction. "He then promised the black members of the audience 
speedy ratification of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. He 
pledged that blacks would 'be the equal before the law with the white 
race, the right to vote, serve on juries, give evidence in court, sue for 
and get all property rights. '  "258 The pro-ratification governor of 
Tennessee explained that Section 1 guaranteed "equal protection in 
the enjoyment of life, liberty, property . . .  to all citizens. Practically, 
this affects mainly the negro . . .  [making him] entitled to the civil 
rights of the citizen, and to the means of enforcing those rights."259 
Governor Thomas C. Fletcher of Missouri said of Section 1 ,  " [i]t 
prevents a State from depriving any citizen of the United States any of 
the rights conferred on him by the laws of Congress, and secures to all 
persons equality of protection in life, liberty, and property under the 
laws of the State."260 Notice that Governor Fletcher saw the Four­
teenth Amendment as protecting against state infringement rights be­
stowed by Congress but did not mention any other national rights. The 
second clause, of course, returns to the familiar theme that States had 
to provide equality of treatment under state law to all persons. We 
earlier saw Governor Cox's concern about freedom of speech,261 which 
was echoed by others - most colorfully by Representative Mann of 
Pennsylvania who noted that whoever "went down South was obliged 
to put a padlock on his mouth."262 
And what of the argument that "everyone knew" that the Four­
teenth Amendment also incorporated the Bill of Rights guarantees? 
That universal knowledge failed to make it as far as Mississippi. 
Mississippi did not ratify the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments 
until 1870. Thus, the debate over the Fourteenth Amendment that 
took place during 1869 had the advantage of the debates in the other 
States. During this period Governor James Alcorn blamed the soaring 
crime rates on the "barbarous practice" of carrying guns and knives, 
256. Id. at 234. 
257. Id. at 44. 
258. Id. 
259. Id. at 21. 
260. CURTIS, supra note 131, at 146. 
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262. CURTIS, supra note 131, at 148; see also id. at 148-49 (quoting Representative 
M'Camant, also of Pennsylvania). 
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"which was almost universal among both races in the South."263 Bond 
writes: 
[Alcorn] therefore asked the legislature to adopt laws that restricted the 
right to carry arms. It never occurred to the governor to explain why the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not prevent such laws, as it arguably might 
have, had the Second Amendment been incorporated in Section 1. After 
all, the Second Amendment guarantees the right to bear arms. Oppo­
nents of the proposed laws never relied on the Fourteenth Amendment's 
"incorporated" right to bear arms either. All seemed blissfully ignorant 
of an argument that certainly would be made by incorporationists to­
day.264 
We can learn something from the opponents of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in the South. They "repeatedly stressed the dangers of 
giving Congress" the "power to define and therefore expand the 
privileges and immunities of citizenship, which states were obliged to 
respect."265 The opponents "routinely paraded the horrid possibili­
ties": the "right of blacks to vote, followed by miscegenation, mixed 
schools, and integrated saloons and railway cars." Bond concludes: 
"Alert as the opponents were to the danger of federal power, they 
never once mentioned that it included the power to enforce the Bill of 
Rights against the states."266 Based on his study of the contemporary 
record in the Southern States, Bond concludes, "The evidence that 
Section 1 was understood to protect natural rights is overwhelm­
ing . . . .  The evidence is equally overwhelming that the privileges and 
immunities clause was also understood to include those civil rights 
which persons needed in order to protect and exercise their natural 
rights. "267 
To be sure, there was a concern about federal intrusion into state 
criminal processes, but it was not articulated in terms of incorporation. 
Consider a letter from Orville H. Browning, President Johnson's 
Secretary of the Interior, that was widely circulated during the elec­
tions of 1866. Browning said in part: 
If the proposed amendments of the Constitution be adopted, new and 
enormous power will be claimed and exercised by Congress, as war­
ranted by such amendments, and the whole structure of our Government 
will perhaps gradually but yet surely be revolutionized. And so with the 
Judiciary . . . .  The object and purpose [of the Amendment] are manifest. 
It is to subordinate the State judiciaries in all things to Federal supervi­
sion and control; to totally annihilate the independence and sovereignty 
of State judiciaries in the administration of State laws, and the authority 
263. BOND, supra note 132, at 45. 
264. Id. 
265. Id. at 255. 
266. Id. 
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and control of the States over matters of purely domestic and legal con­
cern. 268 
Browning clearly thought that subjugation of state judiciaries to 
the federal courts was an issue that would draw votes away from the 
Radical Republicans. One of Browning's examples of how the federal 
judiciary would "annihilate" the state judiciaries involves criminal law: 
[I]f a murderer be arrested, tried, convicted and sentenced to be hung, he 
may claim the protection of the new constitutional provision, allege that 
a State is about to deprive him of life without due process of law, and ar­
rest all further proceedings until the Federal Government shall have in­
quired [into the case ].269 
This concern about federal power, limited to how the courts might use 
the vague Due Process Clause to insist on the right to review state 
criminal proceedings, would likely be multiplied if anyone thought 
that the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights would be imposed for­
ever on state legislatures and courts. 
Browning's parade of horribles, including his example about the 
annihilation of state criminal processes, did not mention incorpora­
tion. The entire lengthy letter, written after Bingham and Howard en­
dorsed incorporation in Congress, contains no reference to the Bill of 
Rights as a whole or to any specific right that might be carried into the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Nor does it mention any example that might 
imply incorporation of any part of the Bill of Rights. This omission is 
even more significant when one recalls that Browning opposed the 
Fourteenth Amendment. If Browning had thought incorporation was 
a theory to be taken seriously, or perhaps had he and President 
Johnson even thought about it at all, he would surely have raised that 
as an even more draconian invasion of "the authority and control of 
the States over matters of purely domestic and legal concern." 
Moreover, as Maltz points out, the proponents of the Fourteenth 
Amendment failed to make any reference to incorporation. Calling 
this the "most puzzling anomaly for incorporationists," Maltz notes 
that "Republicans were not shy in pointing to the Civil Rights Act as a 
primary source for section one; presumably, an added appeal to the 
Bill of Rights would have had an even stronger, visceral impact."270 
The absolute silence of proponents and opponents during the ratifica­
tion process severely undermines the argument that the state legisla­
tures intended to ratify a Fourteenth Amendment that incorporated 
the Bill of Rights in any way other than as a penalty for failing to pro­
vide fundamental rights to all citizens. 
268. CINCINNATI COM., October 26, 1866, at 2. 
269. Id. 
270. MALTZ, supra note 132, at 1 17. 
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If equality was thought the principal goal of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and if Nelson is right that the federal Bill of Rights 
would be applied only to States that misbehaved, it explains how ten 
of the ratifying States could vote to impose the Fourteenth Amend­
ment on themselves even though they already had or were considering 
grand jury rules that were less comprehensive than the one in the Fifth 
Amendment.271 If the States thought that the Fourteenth Amendment 
required a fair criminal process applied equally to blacks and whites, 
then we can understand how those ten States might vote for the 
Amendment without concern. Otherwise, we have to believe that 
those States agreed to reform their criminal processes by voting to im­
pose the Fifth Amendment grand jury indictment requirement on 
themselves through the Fourteenth Amendment without any discus­
sion of whether this was a good idea.272 
Curtis argues that the ratifying state legislatures, controlled by Re­
publicans, had their eye on the bigger prize - equality to freed slaves 
and the threat of reduced representation for States that did not permit 
former slaves to vote.273 Although they did not see the inconsistency 
with their own laws and the Bill of Rights' guarantees, Curtis dismisses 
that failure as simply the product of inattention at a time when the 
stakes were high and the very Union was still unstable. Amar agrees, 
concluding that "many informed men simply were not thinking care­
fully about the words of Section One at all."274 I agree so far. But the 
next step is shaky indeed: because the legislatures were inattentive to 
the meaning of Section 1, Amar argues that their silence "is a dubious 
key to unlocking the meaning of Section One."275 This is positively 
perverse. Unless the text on its face incorporates the Bill of Rights, 
how can the inattention of the legislatures be anything other than evi­
dence against incorporation? How can a State ratify something with­
out knowing that it is doing so? As Curtis correctly notes, "The great 
controversy is how to take the absence of evidence."276 To me, inatten­
tion as to the meaning of Section 1 suggests that one should reject 
more elaborate interpretations - privileges or immunities as a silent 
mechanism to overrule Barron - in favor of the simpler interpreta­
tion that Fourteenth Amendment means what it says - that it guaran­
teed that all citizens had equal access to natural law privileges and 
271 .  AMAR, supra note 18, at 198. 
272. Maltz claims that a concern with conflicting state grand jury procedures would have 
been lost in Congress amidst the larger Reconstruction concerns. MALTZ, supra note 132, at 
1 16-17. That seems right. But it is less clear to me that the States would have found the pros­
pect of being forced into the federal model of criminal procedure a trivial prospect. 
273. CURTIS, supra note 131, at 105. 
274. Amar, supra note 133, at 1250. 
275. Id. 
276. CURTIS, supra note 131, at 217. 
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immunities and to fair court procedures, and that the laws be applied 
equally. 
The suggestion that the States intended to forfeit their right to 
conduct criminal trials the way they and their colonial antecedents had 
been doing for over 200 years ignores human nature and the still 
strong (though diminished) sense of state sovereignty that existed in 
1868. It was not that the States found the Bill of Rights guarantees ab­
horrent. The States provided most of these rights, in one form or an­
other, as a matter of state law.277 The sea change would be making the 
state criminal processes both uniform and subject to federal control. 
Criminal law, with very few exceptions in 1868, was thought to be ex­
clusively the province of the States, and the state systems differed 
from one another to some degree. The state systems and their colonial 
antecedents pre-dated the Bill of Rights by more than 150 years. The 
Bill of Rights was largely copied from pre-existing state law to control 
the feared central government. To have those limitations turned back 
against the States to create a uniform criminal process in all the States 
would have been viewed as ironic at best and perverse at worst. 
The silence on this issue continued in the aftermath of ratification. 
States continued to adopt rules that were inconsistent with the Bill of 
Rights. The California Constitution, adopted in 1879, permitted a 
prosecutor's information to be substituted for an indictment. If it had 
been generally believed that the Fourteenth Amendment made the 
Fifth Amendment grand jury rule applicable to all States, what was 
California thinking when it adopted its Constitution? Moreover, nei­
ther the Supreme Court of that era, nor the litigants who appeared be­
fore the Court, were aware that the Fourteenth Amendment had over­
ruled Barron v. Baltimore's holding that the Bill of Rights did not bind 
the States. Despite the clarity of Senator Howard's remarks, the law­
yers who represented criminal defendants before the Court did not 
make incorporation arguments, and the Court did not contemplate the 
availability of the criminal procedure guarantees in state cases. Given 
the duty of criminal defense lawyers to raise every conceivable argu­
ment on behalf of their clients, this silence speaks volumes about the 
general understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Twitchell v. Commonwealth278 was decided a year after the Four­
teenth Amendment's ratification. The Supreme Court heard an emer­
gency writ of habeas corpus from a condemned state prisoner, sched­
uled to hang six days later, who claimed that the state indictment did 
not provide sufficient notice of the charge. He claimed a violation of 
the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause and, more particularly, a 
violation of the Sixth Amendment right to be "informed of the nature 
277. NELSON, supra note 132, at 118. 
278. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 321 (1869). 
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and cause of the accusation." If the Fourteenth Amendment incorpo­
rated the Sixth Amendment, the Court should have reached the merits 
of the claim. Instead, the Court unanimously reaffirmed Barron and 
rejected the writ without reaching the merits. 
If Senator Howard's view of the Fourteenth Amendment was gen­
erally thought to express the view of Congress and of the ratifying 
state legislatures, it is puzzling that it escaped the attention of all nine 
Supreme Court justices who decided Twitchell. Amar attempts to ex­
plain Twitchell as incompetent lawyering and judging. He notes that 
Twitchell's lawyer raised the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause 
and Sixth Amendment right to notice without arguing that these rights 
were applicable against the States through the Fourteenth Amend­
ment. Without the Fourteenth Amendment before the Court, Amar 
argues, there was no ground on which to overrule Barron.279 Thus, the 
Court reaffirmed Barron, and Twitchell was off to the gallows. 
Amar's explanation suffers several problems.280 I will mention only 
one. All members of the Twitchell Court were on the Court during the 
debates, congressional passage, and state ratification of the Four­
teenth Amendment281 - events which attracted much publicity na­
tionwide and surely even more in Washington, D.C.282 Amar's view 
requires that we believe either that the Court simply did not know 
what was clear to Congress and the ratifying state legislatures, or that 
the Court knew that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Bill 
of Rights but chose not to raise this constitutional objection to 
Twitchell's execution. The first possibility requires us to accept that 
not a single Supreme Court justice of the time comprehended what is 
now patently clear. That level of incompetence is too profound to be 
accepted. 
Alternatively, if the Court was aware of the argument, it would be 
extremely casuistic to refuse to reach the merits of the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment rights contained in the Fourteenth Amendment simply 
because the lawyer asked for the rights directly rather than as incorpo­
rated in the Fourteenth Amendment. This was a case, after all, in 
which the Court had granted an emergency hearing and full oral ar­
gument to a defendant sentenced to hang a few days later. It makes no 
sense for the Court to hide the ball from the defense lawyer in that 
kind of case. One imagines the members of the Court smirking to each 
other behind a copy of the Constitution while sending a man to be 
279. Amar, supra note 133, at 1255. 
280. Dripps presents a more detailed rebuttal. Dripps, supra note 17, at 1579-82. 
281 .  Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase took the oath on December 15, 1864, and the next 
new Justice, Justice William Strong, did not take his oath until March 14, 1870. 
282. Most major newspapers carried a "Washington News" kind of summary of the con­
gressional debates on the Fourteenth Amendment as well as other subjects. See, e.g., N.Y. 
TIMES, June 30, 1866. 
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hanged. If everyone knew that the Fourteenth Amendment had incor­
porated the Bill of Rights, the Court might as well engage that under­
standing in Twitchell and be done with it. But the Court said nothing 
except that Barron was still good law in the wake of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.283 
A convenient way to assess how the Court applied the Fourteenth 
Amendment in the early years is a study done by Charles Collins, a 
1912 historian, that purports to include every Supreme Court case on 
the Fourteenth Amendment through the 1910-11 term, a total of 604 
cases.284 Collins cites a litany of natural law rights that litigants urged 
on the Supreme Court. I quote part of a list he provided (these are all 
Supreme Court cases): 
Suit to recover the value of a dog in Louisiana on which no tax had been 
paid; . . .  the sale of cigarettes in Tennessee; . . .  the question whether a 
convicted murderer in Idaho should be hanged by the sheriff or by the 
warden; . . .  the compelling of railroads in Texas to cut the Johnson grass 
off from their rights of way before it goes to seed; . . .  the segregation of 
houses of ill fame in New Orleans; the question whether running a bar­
ber shop on Sunday in Minnesota is a work of necessity or the practice of 
a handicraft for gain . . . . 285 
Of the 604 cases in the study, only fifty-five were decided against the 
state.286 In twenty-one of the fifty-five cases, the claimant also invoked 
another provision in the Constitution, often the Commerce Clause.287 
Many of the cases in which the Supreme Court found a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment involved regulation of business activities or 
taxation issues.288 
A State lost only one criminal procedure case. The Court held in 
1879 that a West Virginia statute that explicitly excluded blacks from 
serving on grand and petit juries violated the Fourteenth Amend­
ment.289 This, of course, is precisely the interpretation of Section 1 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment that I proposed earlier: leaving incorpo-
283. Three years later, the Court rejected the idea that the Fourteenth Amendment pro­
tected the right of butchers to carry on their trade free of legislative limitations on what 
slaughter-houses they could use. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). 
Though the vote was five to four, only one opinion (Justice Bradley's dissent) clearly raises 
incorporation as a theory of interpretation for the Fourteenth Amendment. Though 
Slaughter-House Cases has generated an enormous literature, it seems beside the point to me 
if limited to its narrow holding. Whatever the best approach to the right to carry on a trade, 
it tells us nothing about whether the specific Bill of Rights guarantees were incorporated. 
284. CHARLES WALLA CE COLLINS, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE STATES 
at vii, 38 (1912). 
285. Id. at 31-33 (footnotes omitted). 
286. Id. at 81. 
287. Id. at 83 (eight of the twenty-one involved the Commerce Clause). 
288. Id. at 84-108. 
289. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879). 
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ration out of the picture, Section 1 would forbid a State from adopting 
substantive laws that denied blacks equality with whites in fundamen­
tal rights. The next issue, litigated in almost twenty cases from 1879 
through 1909,290 was whether the Fourteenth Amendment also pro­
hibited the application of a facially race-neutral jury selection law to 
produce grand and petit juries that did not include blacks. This is the 
second part of my interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause - that the executive branch could not "enforce" facially neu­
tral laws in a way that violates privileges or immunities. These claims 
are, of course, more difficult to prove and the Court treaded more 
cautiously, insisting that the defendant had to show that the exclusion 
under a race-neutral law was based on race alone. As no defendant 
ever made that showing, no defendant won (though some won the 
right to a remand in cases where the state courts refused even to per­
mit evidence on the point).291 
There were, to be sure, a smattering of Bill of Rights criminal pro­
cedure claims urged on the Court during this period. The two most 
famous were Hurtado v. California292 and Twining v. New Jersey,293 in 
which defendants asserted that the Fourteenth Amendment granted 
them, respectively, a right to a grand jury indictment and the right not 
to be compelled to be a witness against oneself. The Court rejected 
both claims. Defendants made a few other claims: that execution by 
electrocution was cruel and unusual punishment, forbidden the States 
by the Fourteenth Amendment;294 that a jury of eight violated the 
Sixth Amendment right to jury trial that the Fourteenth Amendment 
imposed on the States;295 and that a coerced confession was forbidden 
by the privilege against compelled self-incrimination that was now part 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.296 The Court rejected all these claims, 
usually noting something like the following: 
The Fourteenth Amendment did not radically change the whole theory 
of the relations of the state and federal governments to each other, and 
of both governments to the people. The same person may be at the same 
time a citizen of the United States and a citizen of a State. Protection to 
life, liberty, and property rests, primarily, with the States, and the 
amendment furnishes an additional guaranty against any encroachment 
290. COLLINS, supra note 284, at 84-108. 
291 . These cases are summarized, along with a few others involving racial discrimina-
tion, in COLLINS, supra note 284, at 48-62. 
292. 110 U.S. 516 (1884). 
293. 211 U.S. 78 (1908). 
294. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890). 
295. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900). 
296. Barrington v. Missouri, 205 U.S. 483 (1907). 
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by the States upon those fundamental rights which belong to citizenship, 
and which the state governments were created to secure.297 
Consider the analytical structure of Maxwell v. Dow.298 The issue 
was whether a jury of eight, as required in the Utah Constitution, vio­
lated the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that it did not. 
It appears to us that the questions whether a trial in criminal cases not 
capital shall be by a jury composed of eight instead of twelve jurors . . .  
do[ es] not come within the clause of the [fourteenth] amendment under 
consideration, so long as all persons within the jurisdiction of the State 
are made liable to be proceeded against by the same kind of procedure 
and to have the same kind of trial, and the equal protection of the laws is 
secured to them.299 
This neatly fits the equality reading of the Fourteenth Amendment: 
the basic source of privileges and immunities under the Amendment is 
state positive law; the real force of the Amendment is to make certain 
that the state positive law is enforced in an even-handed manner. 
The number of claims in the Supreme Court during this era that 
the criminal procedure rights were part of the Fourteenth Amendment 
is insignificant compared to the number of natural law claims. Six 
hundred and four cases involved Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment, and the only criminal procedure right asserted repeatedly on 
behalf of defendants was the exclusion of blacks from grand and petit 
juries, a right that exists independently of incorporation because it is 
at the heart of an equality-based Fourteenth Amendment. If barbers 
in Minnesota were claiming a Fourteenth Amendment right to barber 
on Sunday,300 why were state defendants not claiming violations of the 
Bill of Rights criminal procedure guarantees? 
Another oddity exists in the incorporationist story. The first claim 
that one of the criminal procedure guarantees was incorporated into 
the Fourteenth Amendment was not made until 1884 (Hurtado), six­
teen years after ratification. During those sixteen years, twenty-five 
other Fourteenth Amendment cases reached the Supreme Court, 
dealing with issues from eminent domain and the fairness of state 
taxation systems to whether women had a Fourteenth Amendment 
right to vote and to practice law.301 Why so long before a lawyer raised 
297. Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 448. 
298. 176 U.S. 581 (1900). 
299. Id. at 604. 
300. COLLINS, supra note 284, at 31-33. 
301. See Fox v. Cincinnati, 104 U.S. 783 (1881) (denying that Fifth Amendment just 
compensation in eminent domain cases is a privilege or immunity); McMillen v. Anderson, 
95 U.S. 37 (1877) (denying that state tax assessment system violated due process); Minor v. 
Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874) (denying that female suffrage is a privilege or im­
munity); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872) (denying that the practice of law 
is a privilege or immunity that would entitle women to be admitted to practice). 
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an incorporation claim in the Supreme Court on behalf of a criminal 
client? 
Perhaps the States were jealously guarding the rights of criminal 
defendants. Perhaps. A more likely explanation is the lack of lawyers 
for indigent defendants. But lawyers were busily raising the claims of 
black defendants when blacks were excluded from juries. Why not 
other claims for black defendants, if not for white ones? 
It is no response to say that earlier cases had chilled the fervor. 
Criminal defense lawyers are supposed to raise plausible claims, and 
the early cases involving natural law claims did not hold that the 
criminal procedure rights were not part of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment. Notice again the perseverance of lawyers arguing for inclusive 
juries under race-neutral selection statutes. The first case was in 1880, 
four years before the first claim that criminal procedure rights were 
incorporated into the Amendment. Fifteen more claims for inclusive 
juries were spread out over the next twenty-eight years; the last one 
mentioned in the 1912 study was in 1908.302 Defendants never won yet 
the cases kept coming. Why? The answer, I believe, is because the 
country and its lawyers assumed that the Fourteenth Amendment 
guaranteed equality of treatment, and lawyers kept raising the lack of 
equality in jury selection even though the Court repeatedly rejected 
their claims. The paucity of criminal procedure claims not involving 
equality suggests that there was no similar understanding that the 
Fourteenth Amendment fastened those rights onto the States. 
So far I have argued that it is plausible to understand the Four­
teenth Amendment to require States to provide a fair process for de­
ciding criminal cases, laws that treat people equally, and the even­
handed application of the substantive privileges and immunities cre­
ated by state law. On this view, the point to the Fourteenth Amend­
ment was to ensure that former slaves were given the same jury trial 
right as other citizens, the same right to counsel, the same criminal 
process in general. Viewed that way, it was a powerful tool to ensure 
equal treatment but was never intended to be a tool to reshape the 
state criminal processes. A State could have a law, as Pennsylvania did 
in Twitchell, that the prosecutor need not specify the manner in which 
the defendant killed the victim even if that law was inconsistent with 
Sixth Amendment notice requirements, as long as the State provided 
notice consistent with due process standards. The Fourteenth 
Amendment had nothing to say about that. What no State could do is 
have a statute that required additional specificity for white defendants 
but not for black ones. 
To see how the argument works as a whole, begin again with the 
Bill of Rights. Established to restrain the central government, it had its 
302. COLLINS, supra note 284, at 65. 
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own body of constitutional doctrine for more than a century. Section 1 
of the Fourteenth Amendment can be read as a device specifically 
framed to eliminate inequality and discrimination, a reading supported 
by the history of the time and the debates in Congress and in the state 
legislatures. Most of the debate about the Fourteenth Amendment is 
about Section 2, Section 3, and the citizenship sentence in Section 1 .  
Bingham and Howard mention the Bill of Rights in connection with 
the Fourteenth Amendment, but each seems to have a somewhat dif­
ferent conception of the relationship between the Bill of Rights and 
Section 1. The rest of Congress and the ratifying state legislatures nei­
ther endorse nor oppose the perhaps inconsistent comments of 
Bingham and Howard. After the amendment is ratified, the Supreme 
Court first ignores, then rejects incorporation as an interpretation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court continues to cite Barron v. 
Baltimore when incorporation challenges are made to state power. Fi­
nally, just under one hundred years later, after a great deal of fighting 
over whether the First Amendment was incorporated, nearly every 
criminal procedure guarantee in the Bill of Rights is incorporated with 
little debate.303 The worlds have collided. 
Before we can justify collapsing federal and state criminal proce­
dure doctrine into one, however, we must conclude that the mention 
by Howard and Bingham of the Bill of Rights, without any clear indi­
cation that they had the same idea about what incorporation meant, 
plus the almost magical background consensus that Curtis and Amar 
claim to have found, is more salient, more probative on the incorpora­
tion question, than the collective weight of all the other historical facts 
noted in this Part. It is quite an interpretative feat. The remarkable 
historical fact, in my judgment, is how serenely the academy has ac­
cepted this argument. 
If I am right, the Court's most grievous error in criminal procedure 
matters in the last century was not the exclusionary rule or the expan­
sive rules set down to limit the federal government in Boyd and 
Gouled. Rather, the biggest mistake was to impose on the States the 
procedures designed to make federal convictions difficult to obtain. 
But can the Court go back? Is there an account of stare decisis that 
permits the Court to disavow the reasoning in a dozen or so cases? 
That is the subject of the next Part. 
V. THE ROLE OF STARE DECISIS 
Recovering Robust Bill of Rights Protections 
I suspect even readers sympathetic to my project will, by this stage, 
worry about the effect of my proposal on precedent. Will my n.otion of 
303. See supra note 1 5. 
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a free-standing Fourteenth Amendment not require the slaughter of 
many Warren Court precedents? If so, is that not in itself reason 
enough to stay with the Court's doctrine of selective incorporation? 
And if the reader accepts my historical critique of selective incorpora­
tion - the States could not have realistically agreed to cede as much 
sovereignty as later Courts would decide was justified - perhaps that 
argues for total incorporation. 
Oddly enough, total incorporation, but not my proposal, requires 
overruling precedents. Total incorporation would require the Court to 
overrule Hurtado, refusing to require the States to provide grand ju­
ries; Walker v. Sauvinet,304 refusing to impose the Seventh Amendment 
civil jury requirement on the States; and Presser v. Illinois,305 refusing 
to apply the Second Amendment to the States. By comparison, my 
proposal to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment separately from the 
Bill of Rights criminal procedure guarantees makes few waves. It 
would require the Court to disavow its incorporationist dicta but, on a 
standard account of stare decisis, no holdings would have to be over­
ruled. The narrow holding in every case that incorporated a Bill of 
Rights guarantee into the Fourteenth Amendment is that the Four­
teenth Amendment forbids, or requires, particular state action. The 
incorporation mantra is an analytic device, not part of the holding. 
In Gideon v. Wainwright,306 for example, the Court overruled Betts 
v. Brady3°7 and held that Gideon's constitutional rights were violated 
when his request for a court-appointed lawyer was not granted. Justice 
Black, writing for a unanimous Court, spoke expansively about what 
the Court was doing. "We think the Court in Betts was wrong . . .  in 
concluding that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel is not 
one of these fundamental rights [included in the Fourteenth Amend­
ment] ." The Court phrased the issue as whether "the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires appointment of counsel in a state court, just as 
the Sixth Amendment requires in a federal court." The Court said that 
it does, thus "incorporating" the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial 
into the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. 
But the actual holding in Gideon is more narrow - that when an 
indigent state defendant is accused of a felony in state court, and re­
quests counsel, the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause re­
quires that counsel be appointed. Stare decisis would not stop the 
Court from later deciding that Gideon is limited to felonies while the 
Sixth Amendment also applies to misdemeanors. In effect, my argu­
ment is that the Court can say it is incorporating the right to X into the 
304. 92 U.S. 90 (1875). 
305. 116 U.S. 252 (1886). 
306. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
307. 316 U.S. 455 (1942). 
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Fourteenth Amendment, but the holding in the case does not bind fu­
ture Courts who are interpreting X in federal cases. All that binds fu­
ture Courts is the holding in the case, and the holding inevitably is 
based on the Fourteenth Amendment because that is the text the 
Court is interpreting. Until the Court overrules Barron, the only text 
the Court can interpret in cases coming from state courts is the Four­
teenth Amendment. The state "incorporation" case is thus not binding 
precedent on a similar question from federal court that requires inter­
pretation of the text of the Bill of Rights provision itself. 
This traditional view of stare decisis means that the incorporation 
cases did not overrule the prior robust federal precedents. Nor did 
they necessarily overrule the narrow holdings of earlier cases refusing 
to apply Bill of Rights guarantees to the States. For example, recall 
Maxwell v. Dow,308 where the Court refused to incorporate the Sixth 
Amendment into the Fourteenth and held that a jury of eight did not 
violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Duncan v. Louisiana309 repudi­
ated the analytical structure of Maxwell and held that States had to 
provide jury trials when prosecuting serious crimes. Two years after 
Duncan, the Court held in Williams v. Florida310 that a jury of six does 
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Even though Duncan 
changed the analytical structure, nothing changed about the size of a 
jury that the Fourteenth Amendment permits. Maxwell held that ju­
ries of eight satisfy due process. Williams held that juries of six satisfy 
due process. The narrow holdings, if not the analytical structures, of 
Maxwell and Williams are consistent. In that sense, it is fair to say that 
Maxwell has not been overruled. 
Nor, for that matter, has the Court overruled Thompson v. Utah311 
and Patton v. United States,312 holding that the Sixth Amendment re­
quires a jury of twelve. To be sure, the Williams Court said it was 
holding that the Sixth Amendment permits as few as six jurors, but the 
narrow holding was that the Fourteenth Amendment permits juries of 
six. Thus, as Justice Powell remarked in a later case, it is still open to 
argue that the Sixth Amendment requires twelve jurors, and a unani­
mous verdict, even though States are permitted to use juries of six and 
to authorize verdicts on votes of 9-3.313 This is a nice, clean example of 
my two-tiered approach to the criminal procedure guarantees. Under 
Duncan and later cases, the States have imposed on them a due proc­
ess version of the Sixth Amendment jury trial right. Though the issue 
308. 176 U.S. 581 (1900). 
309. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
310. 399 U.S. 78 (1970). 
311 .  170 us 343 (1898). 
312. 281 U.S. 276 (1930). 
313. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 367-77 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring). 
October 2001] Constitutional Worlds Collide 219 
has never arisen because the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure re­
quire twelve jurors and a unanimous verdict,314 it might be that defen­
dants in federal court are still constitutionally entitled to twelve jurors. 
I do not wish to suggest that the Court could easily "overrule" the 
analytic structure of its seminal incorporation cases in the criminal 
procedure area. My two-tier approach, while faithful to history, would 
essentially require the Court to rework a dozen or more cases. While 
this would not be, in my view, a dagger to the heart of stare decisis, it 
would ruffle the feathers of important precedents from the Warren 
Court era. It would require the Court to say that it was wrong to con­
clude in Gideon that the Sixth Amendment applies to the States, that 
it was wrong in Malloy v. Hogan315 about the Self-Incrimination 
Clause applying to the States, that it was wrong in Mapp v. Ohio316 to 
say that the Fourth Amendment requires the States to apply the exclu­
sionary rule. 
Such mea culpas do not come easily to anyone, particularly courts, 
and most particularly the Supreme Court. But I seek to ease the pain 
by arguing that the holdings in these cases represent a reasonable un­
derstanding of due process of law. Thus, the Court could say in a fu­
ture Fourth Amendment case in federal court that, while it would con­
tinue to adhere to a particular doctrine from a state case as an 
interpretation of the Due Process Clause, it was going to apply a 
broader protection in cases where the Fourth Amendment is the rele­
vant text. That does not tear a hole in the fabric of American constitu­
tional law. 
To see why it might be a good idea to apply broader Fourth 
Amendment protection in federal court, recall Gouled's holding that 
police may not search for or seize lawfully possessed objects even with 
a warrant based on probable cause. As noted in Part II, Gouled's 
analytical structure was explicitly rejected in a Warren Court case 
from state court. Compare Gouled to the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment as it now applies to the States. If I set out my garbage for 
the trash collector, I have no Fourth Amendment interest in it even if 
it is still on my property.317 Unlike Gouled, whose property could not 
be seized with a warrant based on probable cause, the police can go 
through my garbage, on my property, without even the slightest suspi­
cion. Or if I make a telephone call from inside my home, the police 
can record the phone numbers called, without a warrant or any suspi-
314. FED. R. CRIM. P. 23, 31.  
315. 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
316. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
317. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988). 
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cion.318 Or if I open a skylight in my roof, police can hover overhead in 
a helicopter and observe what I am doing in my home.319 
The common law permitted constables to arrest individuals in 
public without a warrant, but only if they had specific grounds to sus­
pect that the arrestee had committed a crime.320 Today, I can be 
stopped and frisked if I am in a high-crime neighborhood and appear 
nervous and evasive.321 All of these cases came to the Court from state 
courts. Not only are Gouled and Boyd dead, but their spirit is also 
gone, sacrificed on the altar of incorporation. 
Boyd noted, "It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummag­
ing of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is 
the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal lib­
erty, and private property."322 In contrast, the Court's language today 
is more likely to note the valid societal interest in preventing crime. 
Consider, for example, language in New York v. Burger, a case up­
holding a statute that authorized warrantless and suspicion!ess 
searches of junk yards.323 
New York, like many states, faces a serious social problem in automobile 
theft and has a substantial interest in regulating the vehicle-dismantling 
industry because of this problem . . . .  In accordance with its interest in 
regulating the automobile-junkyard industry, the State also has devised a 
regulatory manner of dealing with this problem. Section 415-a, as a 
whole, serves the regulatory goals of seeking to ensure that vehicle dis­
mantlers are legitimate businesspersons and that stolen vehicles and ve­
hicle parts passing through automobile junkyards can be identified.324 
The nineteenth century Court stressed the importance of security, 
liberty, and private property; the modem Court stresses the crime 
problem. One Court assumed that security, liberty, and private prop­
erty are sometimes immune from government infringement even by 
subpoena or warrant; the other defers to statutes that advance "sub­
stantial" interests. To be sure, the rising crime rate in the twentieth 
century contributed to the shift in emphasis. But part of the change 
had to do with the crimes under investigation: in Boyd, Congress was 
seeking tools to help it uncover violations of the customs laws; in 
Gouled, the federal agents were investigating mail fraud; in Burger, 
the state legislation targeted auto theft. I suspect that Americans are 
much more concerned about auto theft than customs violations or 
318. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
319. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986). 
320. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). 
321 .  Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000). 
322. 116 U.S. at 630. 
323. 482 U.S. 691 , 713-14 (1987). 
324. Id. 
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mail fraud. Thus, extending the Fourth Amendment to the States in­
vites its reduction in scope to meet the "law and order" demands of 
citizens. 
There are only two possibilities when comparing the Gouled 
Fourth Amendment with the current version, or when comparing the 
discourse in Boyd with that in Burger: either the principles underlying 
Gouled and Boyd have, somewhere along the line, been abandoned, 
or the modern cases draw from a different constitutional source. The 
Court takes the first approach. In this Article, I argue for the second. 
Because Boyd and Gouled interpreted the Fourth Amendment and 
Burger the Fourteenth, it is possible that all three cases were correctly 
decided. My argument is that the robust protections of the Bill of 
Rights guarantees are still there, cloaked by the Court's state cases 
that say they are interpreting the Bill of Rights.325 When interpreta­
tions of due process in state cases are forced back onto the Bill of 
Rights criminal procedure guarantees, only mischief can result. The 
Framers' criminal procedure is, like Sleeping Beauty, peacefully 
awaiting the time that a Court discovers the historical error of the dis­
torting mirror that is the Fourteenth Amendment. 
VI. A NEW ROAD MAP TO INTERPRETIN G  CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE GUARANTEES 
The High Wall Between Citizens and the Federal Government 
The first five Parts suggest the following "road map" to the crimi­
nal procedure guarantees. As to the federal government, the Bill of 
Rights criminal procedure guarantees should be robustly interpreted 
as a way to maintain a high barrier against federal manipulation of 
criminal investigations and trials. This is simply true to the anti­
government attitude and intent of the Framers. But in recognition of 
the federal system that, even after the Fourteenth Amendment, still 
vests considerable sovereignty in States, I would not require States to 
meet those robust guarantees as a part of due process. Instead, I 
would use as a due process baseline the criminal procedure doctrine 
that the Court has created for state courts under its incorporation 
rhetoric. The Court has, in effect, defined due process in its current 
325. See e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (announcing that a dog sniff is 
not a Fourth Amendment search) (dicta); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (plu­
rality) (Fourth Amendment not implicated when an agent hears words of narcotics dealer 
from radio transmitter on government informant); Hoffa v. United States 385 U.S. 293 
(1966) (Fourth Amendment permits use of evidence provided by government informant who 
was posing as a colleague of Jimmy Hoffa's). The current war on drugs and the intensified 
effort to give law enforcement tools with which to attack organized crime both occurred af­
ter the Fourth Amendment had been incorporated into the Fourteenth, and the distorting 
mirror of the Fourteenth Amendment makes the Court see the criminal procedure protec­
tions in a more narrow light whether the issue arises in state or federal court. 
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criminal procedure doctrine, albeit while claiming to be interpreting 
the Bill of Rights guarantees. These cases basically ask whether the 
procedures and mechanisms are fair and likely to produce an accurate 
result. 
To specify precisely how my theory might work in the context of 
the Fourth Amendment would take an article unto itself, but I will 
sketch a few thoughts here. Much of the "mess" that is Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence results from the Court's lack of a concep­
tual model of the Amendment. We can argue about exactly what con­
stitutes a jury, or when counsel must be appointed, or when someone 
is being compelled to incriminate herself. But in each of these exam­
ples, we have a core idea of what the right protects. Other than the 
historical residue that searches of homes require a warrant, nothing 
else is paradigmatic about the Fourth Amendment. The first clause 
appears to forbid unreasonable searches and seizures, hardly a self­
defining concept. For a couple of decades, the Court sought concep­
tual clarity by reading the Warrant Clause together with the Reason­
ableness Clause to create a sort of presumption that searches be con­
ducted pursuant to a warrant. The Court referred to this presumption 
as a warrant requirement, subject to a "few well-delineated excep­
tions." 
One difficulty with the warrant requirement was the rapid growth 
of the "few" exceptions; "few" had turned into more than twenty at 
last count.326 Moreover, the probable cause requirement that accom­
panied the warrant requirement has also been seriously eroded. Police 
today can detain and frisk on reasonable suspicion, can set up drunk 
driving roadblocks and stop cars with no suspicion at all, and can ob­
tain "consent" to search even if the person giving consent does not 
know of her right to refuse. It is easy to see why the Court would not 
want to fasten a meaningful warrant or probable cause requirement on 
state and local police officers as they try to solve serious, violent 
crimes. It is less clear that a serious warrant and probable cause re­
quirement would be burdensome or out of place when federal law en­
forcement officials are investigating crime - except for the war on 
drugs, which is perhaps sui generis.327 
The Fourth Amendment, on this understanding, would require 
federal agents to obtain a search warrant whenever they have time to 
326. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582-83 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
327. Even the effort to control organized crime would not, I think, be significantly af­
fected by a meaningful warrant requirement because most of those investigations involve 
careful planning and cover long periods of time. If the war on drugs is the only federal crimi­
nal enterprise that is inconsistent with an historically indicated robust warrant requirement, 
perhaps this suggests rethinking the role of the federal government in creating and policing 
drug crimes. Only time will tell whether the war on terrorism will significantly erode Fourth 
Amendment protections and, if so, whether the erosion is justified by lives saved. 
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get one, except when searching incident to a valid arrest. This would in 
great measure simplify and clarify Fourth Amendment law and would 
distinguish the Fourth Amendment from the Due Process Clause, with 
all of its twenty-odd exceptions to the warrant requirement. The 
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement would permit searches of 
vehicles stopped on the highway when it is not feasible to seize the car 
and wait for a warrant to be issued, but not, as in the state case of 
Chambers v. Maroney,328 when the police have already towed the car 
back to the station before searching. 
A revived warrant requirement would categorically reject the "in­
ventory" vehicle search exception - a paradigmatic case in which of­
ficers have time to obtain a warrant. It might also reinstate the United 
States v. Chadwick329 doctrine requiring police to get a warrant to open 
a closed container once it has been reduced to their possession. Inter­
estingly, Chadwick is a federal case, and the decision essentially over­
ruling Chadwick is a state case.330 Under my theory, both cases can co­
exist. State officers need not obtain a warrant to search a container 
found in a car even after they have taken it into their possession, be­
cause the question is one of fairness of the investigative practice. If 
they can seize the object and hold it to get a warrant, how is it unfair 
to search it on the spot? But federal agents must get a warrant because 
they must comply with a warrant requirement rooted in the Fourth 
Amendment itself. 
Why would a warrant requirement be central to the Fourth 
Amendment but peripheral in interpreting the Due Process Clause? 
Recall that the Framers were concerned with arbitrary use of execu­
tive and legislative power. A search warrant requires the police to 
show ex ante probable cause to believe that specific evidence is in a 
particular place. If a magistrate agrees that the police have probable 
cause, he issues the warrant. The warrant, on its face, shows to the 
world that the use of power by the police is not arbitrary. And, as a 
substantive matter, the invasion of our homes and offices is less arbi­
trary if the police must show probable cause to a magistrate ex ante 
rather than to a judge in a suppression hearing after the evidence is 
found. But due process is about fairness in the investigation process, 
not arbitrary use of power. Viewed as a question of fairness, the 
twenty-odd exceptions to the warrant requirement might make good 
sense, for in every case the police either have particularized suspicion 
(probable cause or reasonable suspicion) or the suspect has done 
something to undermine his right of privacy (e.g., left the evidence in 
plain view or consented to the search). 
328. 399 U.S. 42 (1970). 
329. 433 U.S. 1 (1977). 
330. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565. 
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Fourth Amendment law could be made more protective than the 
due process version of Fourth Amendment law in other ways. If one 
takes the Fourth Amendment seriously, federal agents would not be 
able to obtain consent to search unless they warned the suspect of her 
right to refuse. They could not, as the Court permits state officers, rely 
on acquiescence as consent.331 In a federal case,332 the Court held that 
the Fourth Amendment protected a telephone caller's expectation 
that a pay phone not be bugged. But in a series of state cases, the 
Court has found few other places outside the home protected by the 
Fourth Amendment. For example, a passenger in a car has no Fourth 
Amendment interest in the car's locked glove compartment;333 one 
person has no Fourth Amendment interest in the purse of another;334 
and a person who makes telephone calls from his home has no Fourth 
Amendment interest in the numbers he dials.335 Because the Fourth 
Amendment does not protect these areas, the Court does not require 
that police act reasonably in searching or seizing. 
These holdings might make perfect sense if the issue is due process 
fairness. Is the state acting unfairly when it seizes evidence that some­
one places in an area that she neither owns nor controls? Perhaps not. 
The person has, after all, acted in a way that increases the risk of his 
activities being disclosed to others. My narcotics are without doubt 
less likely to be disclosed to others if I keep them in my pocket, where 
I have control, than if I put them in your purse or your glove com­
partment. 
But understood as a "pure" Fourth Amendment issue, why should 
the risk of disclosure be the key factor? The Fourth Amendment by its 
terms protects "effects," as well as "persons,'' "houses,'' and "papers." 
Perhaps all the Fourth Amendment should require is that I manifest 
an expectation that my effects are shielded from the eyes of everyone 
except the person to whom I entrust my effects. As long as I have re­
stricted access in a way that would prevent the general public from 
seeing my effects, why not grant Fourth Amendment protection? This 
distinction can be seen in California v. Greenwood.336 If I put my gar­
bage in an opaque plastic bag and set it on the curb on my property, 
331. Compare United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (upholding, without a 
majority opinion, a search based on consent when the federal agents told the suspect "that 
she had the right to decline the search if she desired"), with Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 
U.S. 218 (1973) (refusing in a state case to require officers to warn the suspect that he has a 
right to refuse consent). 
332. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
333. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). 
334. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980). 
335. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
336. 486 U.S. 35 (1988). 
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Greenwood said that I have forsaken Fourth Amendment protection. 
According to the Court: 
It is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of 
a public street are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, 
snoops, and other members of the public. Moreover, respondents placed 
their refuse at the curb for the express purpose of conveying it to a third 
party, the trash collector, who might himself have sorted through re­
spondents' trash or permitted others, such as the police, to do so.337 
This casuistic reasoning might be appropriate when we ask 
whether it was fair for the police to see what the trash collector, a 
snoop, or a raccoon could have seen. But it seems out of place if one 
asks the Fourth Amendment question of whether my right to be se­
cure in my effects is violated. I perhaps assume the risk that the trash 
collector will look through my garbage. But as long as my garbage, 
contained in an opaque bag, is on my property, I do not expect federal 
agents to rummage through it. Greenwood stretched pretty thin the 
assumption of the risk argument, as shown by the contrary rulings of 
some state courts when interpreting their own constitutions.338 
In sum, a "pure" Fourth Amendment doctrine might protect what 
I seek to protect. It might have a serious search warrant requirement 
that requires a warrant for all searches, other than incident to arrest, 
whenever the federal agents have time to obtain a warrant. It might 
condemn detentions and frisks based on reasonable suspicion and con­
sent obtained through implicit coercion. 
Looking at the Sixth Amendment, the defendant's right to be con­
fronted with the witnesses against him should, in a federal trial, in­
clude the right always to be in the same room when the witness testi­
fies. Due process does not include that right in a state trial, as the 
Court held in Maryland v. Craig.339 Indeed, Craig is an excellent ex­
ample of how applying the Bill of Rights differently to the state and 
federal governments would provide a more coherent interpretational 
outcome. 
The Court phrased the issue in Craig as whether the Sixth 
Amendment Confrontation Clause rendered unconstitutional the ap­
plication of a state law that permitted the victim to testify in a differ­
ent room from the defendant. The defendant's lawyer was in the room 
with the victim, and the defendant could view the proceedings and 
communicate with his lawyer via a closed-circuit television arrange­
ment. Justice O'Connor wrote a tortured opinion for the Court that 
was an easy target for Justice Scalia's sarcastic dissent. Noting that the 
337. Id. at 40. 
338. See, e.g., State v .  Morris, 680 A.2d 90 (Vt. 1996); State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d 793 
(N.J. 1990); State v. Boland, 800 P.2d 1112 (Wash. 1990). 
339. 497 U.S. 836 (1990). 
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charge was child sexual abuse, the Court found that the State had a 
valid and important interest in "avoiding, or at least minimizing, the 
emotional trauma produced by testifying" and, more broadly, in 
"safeguard[ing] the physical and psychological well-being of child vic­
tims."340 
The Court then read its prior Confrontation Clause cases to guar­
antee the right to challenge in-court testimony as a way of discourag­
ing witnesses from lying. The Court found that the Maryland system 
contained protections designed to ensure that the defendant's lawyer 
could test the witness's testimony for reliability. Balancing the interest 
of the State in the psychological well-being of child abuse victims 
against the (perhaps) slight diminution in the goal of advancing reli­
able testimony, the Court said that the Maryland procedure did not, 
on its face, violate the Confrontation Clause. It sent the case back for 
a determination of whether the balance in the particular case tipped 
for or against the defendant. 
The Court in effect read the requirement of confrontation to be 
coextensive with its rationale - to permit the defendant to challenge 
the testimony of prosecution witnesses. Since Maryland had a proce­
dure guaranteeing that defendants could challenge prosecution wit­
nesses, it was likely to produce an accurate outcome. Thus, Craig 
could have received due process even though he did not confront the 
witness against him. And of course it was a state case, so the majority 
was interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment with its requirement that 
state processes seem likely to produce an accurate outcome. 
But there was one problem. The Court based its ruling on the Sixth 
Amendment Confrontation Clause, assuming that it applies against 
the States precisely as it does against the federal government, and the 
Sixth Amendment promises the defendant the right to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him. The most natural reading of "to be 
confronted" is for the defendant to be in the same room while the wit­
ness is testifying.341 The Sixth Amendment does not talk about due 
process, or fairness, or reliable outcomes. It talks about confrontation. 
To substitute policy goals for the literal language of the Sixth 
Amendment troubled Justice Scalia, writing also for Justices Brennan, 
Marshall, and Stevens. 
The Court today has applied "interest-balancing" where the text of the 
Constitution simply does not permit it. We are not free to conduct a cost­
benefit analysis of clear and explicit constitutional guarantees, and then 
340. Id. at 854 (quoting Wildermuth v. State, 530 A.2d 275, 286 (Md. 1987)). 
341. One could argue that the passive voice of the guarantee ("to be confronted with") 
suggests only that the defendant see and hear the testimony. That was accomplished in Craig 
by means of closed-circuit television. But it strains credulity to think that the Framers meant, 
by use of a passive verb, to permit the defendant to be in a different room from the witness. 
The weakness of this argument is confirmed by the majority's failure even to mention it. 
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to adjust their meaning to comport with our findings. The Court has con­
vincingly proved that the Maryland procedure serves a valid interest and 
gives the defendant virtually everything the Confrontation Clause guar­
antees (everything, that is, except confrontation). I am persuaded, there­
fore, that the Maryland procedure is virtually constitutional. Since it is 
not, however, actually constitutional, I would affirm the judgment of the 
Maryland Court of Appeals reversing the judgment of conviction.342 
My road map recognizes both the common sense view of the ma­
jority and the power of Justice Scalia's plain meaning argument. When 
due process is the issue, why not rely on the procedural regularity of 
Maryland's system and its likelihood of producing reliable outcomes? 
But when reading the language of the Sixth Amendment, why not give 
the words their natural meaning and require the federal government 
to have all witnesses testify in the same room with the defendant? In­
deed, a Court applying the Confrontation Clause only to federal trials 
might be inclined to rethink its willingness to admit all hearsay evi­
dence that qualifies under a "firmly rooted" exception to the hearsay 
rule (an exception explained in a morass of conflicting cases and ra­
tionales beyond the scope of this Article ).343 Perhaps the federal gov­
ernment should have to produce all witnesses who are available and 
not be able to rely on the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule 
or any of the many other exceptions. This division makes sense as a 
policy matter. Federal crimes should be matters of national, not local, 
concern. The stakes should be higher. To require all available wit­
nesses to testify in court does not seem particularly outrageous as an 
interpretation of the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him." 
Another example of how the Court got the outcome right in a state 
case but failed to understand that the right should be broader against 
the federal government is the seminal speedy trial case that we saw in 
the Introduction - Barker v. Wingo.344 This habeas case arose in 
Kentucky and, under my proposed interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, should be tested by accuracy concerns rather than by the 
specific guarantees of the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right. The 
facts of Barker disclose a five and one-half year delay between arrest 
and prosecution. Most of the delay was because of the prosecution's 
strategy: the State felt it had a stronger case against the other partici­
pant in a brutal murder of an elderly couple, and it wanted to convict 
the other participant so it could force him to testify against Barker. 
Apparently recognizing the difficulty in classifying as "speedy" a trial 
that occurs five and one-half years after Barker was arrested, the 
342. 497 U.S. at 870 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
343. See, e.g., White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992). As White is a state case, the equation 
of "firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions and due process makes good sense. 
344. 407 U.S. 514 (1972). 
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unanimous Co.urt · spoke mostly in terms of whether the delay caused 
doubt about the accuracy of the outcome, about whether the defen­
dant's case was prejudiced by the delay. 
But as Justice Thomas pointed out in dissent in a later case, why 
should prejudice have anything to do with whether a trial is speedy?345 
The issue of timeliness is independent of whether the defendant was 
harmed. The likelihood of prejudice to the defendant's case, Justice 
Thomas argued, is a due process inquiry. Precisely right, on my ac­
count. When the speedy trial concept is applied to the States, it should 
not be applied as a Sixth Amendment concept, for which the length of 
the delay is the most important parameter. Instead, the speedy trial 
right in state court would be simply whether the trial, despite the de­
lay, was likely to produce an accurate outcome. For that question, of 
course, the right avenue of inquiry is whether the defendant's case was 
prejudiced by the delay. 
Congress has filled the void left by Barker v. Wingo. In the best 
tradition of American constitutionalism, where all branches of the 
federal government, and all States, have an obligation to enforce the 
federal Constitution, Congress rendered Barker largely irrelevant for 
defendants in federal court. The federal Speedy Trial Act,346 passed 
two years after Barker, is complicated and cannot be easily summa­
rized. But the essence of the Act is that defendants have a right to a 
trial within approximately six months of arrest or indictment. Thus, 
five and one-half years would not qualify as speedy. This is a good ex­
ample of a two-tier interpretation of criminal procedure rights - strict 
guidelines (speedy trial within six months or so) should apply to the 
federal government while the issue in state court is whether the defen­
dant received a trial likely to produce an accurate outcome (the an­
swer to which could be "yes" even though the delay was five and one­
half years). Barker was correctly analyzed once we adjust for the state 
court context and acknowledge its due process focus. Then we do not 
face the embarrassing linguistic challenge of having to say that five 
and one-half years is speedy. 
If Barker had arisen in federal court under the Sixth Amendment, 
the result should have been different. The Framers would not have 
thought that a five and one-half year delay was speedy, nor should we 
think so today. We have a "test" of that theory in the 1880 Montana 
case holding that even six months can violate the speedy trial right. 
Consider also the modern federal case of Doggett v. United States,347 in 
which the trial was delayed for eight years while Doggett was blissfully 
345. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992). 
346. 18 u.s.c. §§ 3161-3174 (2000). 
347. 505 U.S. 647 (1992). 
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unaware of the federal indictment.348 The Court held that the Sixth 
Amendment was violated even though there was no ascertainable 
harm to Doggett's case. To make Doggett appear consistent with 
Barker, the Court invented a presumptive prejudice arising from a 
delay of that length. I think the majority got it right in Doggett, but for 
the wrong reasons. Doggett was denied his right to a speedy trial not 
because there was a presumptive prejudice arising from the delay but 
because the federal government, the executive and judicial branches, 
have an obligation to bring an indicted defendant to trial in fewer than 
eight years. It is more satisfying to say that eight and one-half years is 
simply not speedy, rather than having to invent a new presumption to 
make Doggett fit the Barker state mold. 
One of the problems with the right to counsel is figuring out when 
the defendant has had effective counsel, an issue that has divided the 
Court between the poles of whether the result was accurate or the 
process fair. Strickland v. Washington349 tried to bridge the gap by de­
fining a "fair" trial as one that produced a "just" or "accurate" out­
come. From this premise, the Court developed a flaccid test that re­
quires reviewing courts to decide whether the lawyer provided 
assistance that was "reasonable considering all the circumstances" 
and, if not, whether the unreasonable performance prejudiced the de­
fense. To answer the latter question, the defendant must show "a rea­
sonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different."350 In effect, 
Strickland requires a case-by-case inquiry into whether the lawyer's 
failures deprived the defendant of a reasonable chance at an acquittal. 
But, as Justice Marshall's dissent in Strickland makes plain, one 
need not view "assistance of counsel" through the lens of whether the 
outcome would have been different. One could view assistance of 
counsel as a protection guaranteed in all cases, without regard to 
whether the outcome would have been different. Justice Marshall, ad­
hering to this view of the right to counsel, rejected Strickland's re­
quirement of prejudice. This seems more in line with the language of 
the Sixth Amendment, which, after all, guarantees the "Assistance of 
348. These are the facts that the Court accepts, though the failure of Doggett's mother, 
with whom he was living when indicted, to tell her son that federal marshals had come 
looking for him with a warrant has always seemed a bit suspect to me. To be sure, he had by 
that time left to go to Colombia; perhaps he and his mother had had a parting of the ways. 
That Doggett had no notice of the indictment explains why the Speedy Trial Act did not pro­
tect him. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) (2000) (computing time period from arrest or service of 
summons). 
349. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
350. Id. at 694. 
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Counsel for the defence" in all cases, not just in those cases in which a 
competent lawyer could produce an acquittal.351 
But in state cases, where the question is whether the trial produced 
an outcome likely to be accurate (and Strickland was a state case) ,  
much can be said for the Strickland majority's position. A trial can be 
both fair and accurate with a lousy lawyer if a good lawyer would have 
made no difference.352 Once again, my road map explains and justifies 
tensions long thought to be inherent in the Bill of Rights criminal pro­
cedure guarantees, but that turn out to be inherent in forcing these 
guarantees into the Fourteenth Amendment and then having to live 
with a distorted reflection of the Bill of Rights guarantees. 
Look at what I have sketched: a Bill of Rights that actually pro­
vides speedy trials, requires juries of twelve and unanimous verdicts, 
guarantees effective assistance of counsel, requires the prosecution to 
produce the witnesses against the defendant, gives the accused the un­
limited right to subpoena witnesses who might prove his innocence, 
and protects our right to be "secure in our persons, houses, papers, 
and effects." Is this a fantasy? No, it is what the Framers intended, and 
we can have it again if we separate the federal crime fighting machin­
ery from that of the States. Why should the investigation of a robbery 
or murder be burdened with the same privacy-protecting barriers as 
an investigation into tax fraud or conspiracy? Or consider that 
Congress has created about 100 statutes criminalizing false statements 
in a wide variety of contexts.353 However courts feel about the culpa­
bility of making false statements, they might be more willing to dismiss 
an indictment, for failure to prosecute in a timely manner, under one 
of those statutes354 than they would be willing to dismiss an indictment 
for the brutal murder of two helpless victims. Similarly, courts might 
want to read more expansively the right to discover the prosecution's 
case, to confront witnesses, and to present defense witness who would 
testify to the truthfulness of the statement or the defendant's lack of 
mens rea. The right to a unanimous verdict from a jury of twelve 
351 .  I assume in the text that a lawyer who performs unreasonably, and thus fails the 
first part of the Strickland test, is not providing assistance of counsel. While that is a contest­
able assumption, it is more likely as an interpretation of the Sixth Amendment than the Due 
Process Clause. 
352. One way to divide the right to counsel doctrine between state and federal systems 
is to permit federal defendants to prove a Sixth Amendment violation if either the represen­
tation was unreasonable or the outcome potentially inaccurate, while state defendants could 
show a Fourteenth Amendment violation only if they show a potentially inaccurate out­
come. 
353. See United States v. Gaudin, 28 F.3d 943, 959-61 (9th Cir. 1994) (Kozinski, J., dis­
senting). 
354. The federal Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (2000), usually provides far 
stricter time limits than the Court has discovered in the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy 
trial, but I deal in this Article with the constitutional question. Congress could, after all, 
abolish the Speedy Trial Act. 
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might be more appropriate in a false statement case. I do not claim 
here, of course, that all federal crimes are on a low order of culpabil­
ity, but with one notable and troubling exception, federal criminal law 
is largely devoted to compliance matters - including tax law, perjury, 
false claims, obstruction of justice, and bribery - as well as public 
welfare offenses, computer crime, and various types of fraud. 
The exception to this role for federal criminal law are the crimes 
against consensual behavior, largely the many criminal offenses de­
signed to deter drug use but also including gambling and prostitution. 
These crimes require aggressive investigation and put federal agents in 
a position similar to local and state law officers trying to solve murder 
or rape cases. The federal crimes punishing consensual behavior are, 
for me, a troubling exception to the more traditional federal role be­
cause they raise policy arguments against my theory that we can "af­
ford" more expansive criminal procedure protections in the federal 
criminal process. 
Perhaps in a concession to the modern role of federal criminal law, 
it is no longer possible to recover fully the robust antigovernment in­
terpretation of the Bill of Rights' criminal procedure guarantees. But 
as we saw when discussing Barker v. Wingo and Maryland v. Craig, it 
still makes sense to decouple the specific criminal procedure guaran­
tees from the fairness and accuracy concerns underlying due process 
of law in the Fourteenth Amendment. The discourse, and even the 
outcomes, should improve if we can speak more precisely about 
speedy trials and the right to confront witnesses in federal cases while 
limiting our concern in state cases to achieving a fair process likely to 
produce a reliable outcome. 
CONCLUSION 
Where We Have Been, Where We Might Be Going 
Prior to the Warren Court's incorporation of the criminal proce­
dure guarantees, the federal criminal procedure world was very differ­
ent from the world of each state's criminal procedure. When the 
worlds collided, the damage was far more severe than anyone has yet 
documented. As expected, the States lost some of their autonomy. An 
unexpected, and still poorly understood, effect is the damage done to 
the federal Bill of Rights. The barriers to federal investigation and 
prosecution, once mighty protections, are now eroded, stunted, and 
easily breached. The Court has "amended" them, one by one, through 
the process of incorporation. 
If one were designing from scratch a mechanism to oversee federal 
and state criminal proceedings, one might come up with the model I 
described in Part VI. One could plausibly expect federal authorities to 
develop their cases against suspects without resort to the short cuts 
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that the Court has approved in the state cases.355 Most federal investi­
gations involve large-scale criminal activity or complicated financial 
crimes and require sophisticated law enforcement strategies to ferret 
out the evidence. On the other hand, the state criminal law largely 
protects us from murder, rape, robbery, burglary, and larceny. Be­
cause the welfare of the citizens is more directly harmed when these 
crimes occur, and because solving these crimes is a very different en­
terprise from examining bank records or looking for evidence of a 
multistate conspiracy, one could conclude that state and local police 
and prosecutors should be permitted to engage in methods that are 
fair but not countenanced by the Bill of Rights. 
The Court can recover the Bill of Rights' criminal procedure guar­
antees that the Framers intended and that the early courts applied. 
The precedents still exist. They have not been overruled - just forgot­
ten in the rush to apply the criminal procedure guarantees to the 
States. The high wall between the federal government and its citizens 
stands today. We cannot see it because the Fourteenth Amendment 
mirror shines in our eyes, blinding us to the original purpose of the 
Bill of Rights. That document was fundamentally antigovernment. It 
was not designed to produce fair outcomes or reasonable accommoda­
tions to permit more effective crime control. It was designed to hobble 
federal prosecution of crime. Perhaps we do not wish to return to 
thoroughly hobbled federal investigators and prosecutors. But to the 
extent the critics of the last twenty years of criminal procedure doc­
trine are correct, we need to return part of the way to that castle. 
On my account of the passage and ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, no barrier exists to keep the Court from retracing its 
steps and recovering greater protections against federal investigators 
and prosecutors. One can of course reach different conclusions from 
the history I have presented in this Article. The modern consensus, 
however, does not stand on a foundation as firm as its supporters as­
sert. Indeed, in light of the scant historical support for incorporation, 
the Court's initial approach seems better than that currently in fash­
ion. When faced with the comments of Senator Howard favoring in­
corporation, the Court in 1900 remarked: "It is clear that what is said 
in Congress upon such an occasion may or may not express the views 
of the majority of those who favor the adoption of the measure which 
may be before that body . . . .  "356 The Court decided in that case not to 
incorporate a Bill of Rights provision, rejecting the theory of incorpo­
ration as an extreme interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In 
today's world, incorporation does not seem extreme. But the historical 
case for incorporation consists only of the remarks of Senator Howard 
355. At least one could so expect if drug crimes are taken out of the federal mix. 
356. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 ,  601 (1900). 
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and Representative Bingham - remarks that were met by the silence 
of the rest of Congress, the silence of the ratifying legislatures, and 
years of silence from judges and lawyers. 
The .modem understanding of incorporation, it turns out, is built 
on a consensus of silence. 
